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Like lawyer-bashing, Congress-bashing seems never to go out of
style. As every newspaper reader knows, and as public opinion surveys
confinn,1 the public's regard for the legislative branch has been discour
agingly low for years. One of the incidents that has done most to fuel
this mood is the Keating Five affair.2 The Senate Ethics Committee's

1. See, e.g., Janet Hook, Voters' Hostility Is Shaping the Business of Congress, 52
Q. WKLY. REP. 785 (1994); Richard Morin & David S. Broder, Six Out of 10
Disapprove of Way Hill Does Its Job, WASH. POST, July 3, 1994, at Al. The turnover
of party control of Congress in 1994 did not dispel the citizens' mistrust. See R.W.
CONG.

Apple Jr.,

Poll Shows Disenchontment with Politicians and Politics, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.

12, 1995, at Al.
2. See Michael Waldman, The S&L Collapse: The Cost of a Congress for Sale, 2
STAN. L. & POLY. REv. 47, 47-48 (1990) (referring to public opinion research indicat
ing a ten-point decline from 1989 to 1990 in public's assessment of congressional eth
ics, with Keating Five incident cited in focus groups as a prime factor).
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decision in the Keating case, which has been called "the ultimate meta
phor for political corruption,"3 provides a fitting prologue for this arti
cle's theme: the ethical dimensions of intervention by members of Con
gress into administrative agency proceedings.
Charles H. Keating, Jr., was the controlling figure in Lincoln Sav
ings and Loan, a California thrift institution that was under investiga
tion by officials of the Federa1 Home Loan Bank Board in the mid1980s.4 He successfully prevailed on five senators - Alan Cranston,
Dennis DeConcini, John Glenn, John McCain, and Donald Riegle - to
press Bank Board officials to take his concerns more seriously, or at
least to expedite their handling of the Lincoln case. The pressure
reached its climax at two meetings held in April 1987 between the five
senators and Bank Board officials, including the Board chainnan,
Edwin Gray. When regulators disclosed that Lincoln would be the sub
ject of a criminal investigation, most of the senators curtailed their in
volvement in the matter.
What made the case sensational was that Keating had raised
around $1.5 million for the senators' campaigns and political causes.
Senator Cranston and his affiliated groups had received most of this
money, but all of the other senators, or organizations associated with
them, had received $70,000 or more. The country's growing awareness
of the costs of bailing out failed savings and loan associations made the
events seem all the more scandalous.5

In the fall of 1989, after the press had reported many of the facts
about the five senators' interventions, the Ohio Republican Party, Com
mon Cause, and others filed complaints against the senators with the
Senate Ethics Committee. That committee launched preliminary inquir
ies against the five senators. In February 1991 the Committee an
nounced that it would take no further formal action against DeConcini,
Glenn, Riegle, and McCain, although it criticized them for poor judg
ment and, in Riegle's and DeConcini's cases, unseemly appearances.6
At the same time the Committee concluded that it had enough evidence

3. For Sale: One U.S. Capitol, ST. PE'I'ERsBURG TlMEs, Mar. 1, 1991, at A24.
4. Except as otherwise specified, all facts in the following account are taken from
the Senate Ethics Committee's report on the Keating case. See SENATE SELECT
COMM. ON ETHICS, lNvEsTIGATION OF SENATOR ALAN CRANSTON, S. REP. No.
102-223 (1991) [hereinafter KEATING REPORT]. For an engaging account of the pro
ceeding s by the Committee's vice chairman, see WARREN B. RUDMAN, COMBAT:
TwELVE YEARS IN THE U.S. SENATE 195-241 (1996).
5. See generally Symposium, Savings & Loan Crisis: Lessons and a Look Ahead,
2 STAN. L. & POLY. REv. 21 (1990) (presenting several perspectives on the crisis, in
cluding those of Gray and Keating).

6. See KEATING REPORT, supra note 4, at 17-19.
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of impropriety by Senator Cranston to warrant further proceedings.
When the Committee finally rendered its decision on Cranston in No
vember of 1991, it stopped short of recommending censure. It devised
an unprecedented intermediate sanction: a "reprimand" issued on the
Committee's authority but delivered in the presence of the full Senate.7
The Committee explained that Cranston had "engaged in an impermis
sible pattern of conduct in which fund raising and official activities
were substantially linked. "8 The Committee based its decision on no
specific acts of misconduct,

but rather on

circumstances. "9

"the totality

of the

•

Editorial reactions to the Committee's decisions in the Keating
case were caustic. The dominant view was that the Committee had been
far too lenient.1° Commentators also were troubled by the vagueness of
the Committee's explanation.11 The Committee seemed far more ready
to

acknowledge that congressional intervention in agency proceedings

has ethical limits than to specify what they are. Each of the five sena
tors had depicted his conduct as fundamentally similar to the "constitu
ent service" that all senators and representatives provide to individuals
who have disputes with federal agencies. The Committee's failure to set
forth a clear explanation for its actions suggested that it did not know
quite how to respond to that claim.
·

The Committee's decision in 1995 to recommend expulsion in the

case of Senator Robert Packwood suggests that a pattern of leniency in
congressional ethics adjudication may now be nearing an end. If so,
however, the lack of clarity as to the substance of congressional ethics
rules can only become more troublesome. Nevertheless, post-Keating
proceedings in Congress have made little further progress in defining

7. See Phil Kuntz, Cranston Case Ends on Floor with a Murky Plea Bargain, 49
CONG. Q. WKLY. REP. 3432, 3433 (1991). Senator Jesse Helms did not join in the re
port, relying instead on a public statement that he had released the previous August,
calling for Cranston's censure. See KEATING REPORT, supra note 4, at 2, 76 (separate
views of Sen. Helms). That statement was, in fact, a slightly revised version of a draft
that Robert S. Bennett, the Committee's special counsel, had prepared as a proposed
committee report. See Richard L. Berke, Cranston Censure Urged by Counsel, N.Y.
TIMEs Aug. 5, 1991, at Al.
8. KEATING REPoRT, supra note 4, at 20.
9. Id. at 35. For elaboration, see infra section IY.B.
10. See, e:.g., Kuntz, supra note 7, at 3436 (quoting the Long Beach Press
Telegram: "The wholly unsatisfying message is that in the Senate, the enforcement of
ethical standards is loose and lax and roundheeled."); Senator Riegle's Duty, N.Y.
TIMEs Nov. 26, 1991, at A20 ("The committee's spineless response
damaged its
reputation, as well as that of the Senate."); infra note 20.
11. See, e.g., The Keating Outcome, WASH. POST, Nov. 22, 1991, at A24 (con
tending that the committee left "the dividing line between right and wrong. . . . as
blurry as before").
,

,

•

.

•
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the legitimate limits of constituent service. Meanwhile, new, if less dra
matic, controversies continue to arise.12
Given the manifest lack of a consensus on the issue, now seems an
auspicious time for an inquiry into the proper limits of intervention by
members of Congress into administrative proceedings. To that end, this
article offers a survey and critique of Congress's past and possible fu

ture responses to ethics issues in constituent service.13 One of the prin
cipal conclusions of the article is that those issues are much closer and less amenable to easy answers - than most editorial writers seem
to have assumed.
Part I offers a theoretical framework, revolving around the con
flicting responsibilities inherent in the legislator's role: members of
Congress are supposed to pursue the public interest, but they also are
supposed to act as

advocates for individuals. This conflict helps to ac

count for the difficulty of the ethics issues in the constituent service
realm. Part II offers a more empirical perspective on the realities of
congressional advocacy of constituents' interests before administrative
agencies. It delves into the political science literature in order to pro
vide a factual description of the casework system. This Part also re
views the debate in the literature over the intrinsic value of that system,
noting the views of defenders as well as detractors.
With that conceptual and empirical groundwork laid, Part m ad
dresses the ethics questions that arise out of claims that an individual
legislator's advocacy of constituent interests in an administrative forum
embodies an element of "pressure" or "undue influence." The Keating
ca8e did not turn directly on this issue, but in other recent ethics cases
the theme has played a quite prominent role, most notably in the pro
ceedings brought against Speaker Jim Wright in the House of Repre
sentatives a few years earlier. A considerable body of administrative
law bears indirectly on this issue, and a major objective of this Part is
to treat judicial doctrine on undue influence as a basis for principles
that the congressional ethics committees could employ for guidance and
enforcement purposes.
Finally, Part IV turns to the narrower but more visible issue of
money influence on congressional constituent service. The discussion
analyzes the Keating case and its aftermath in Congress, as well as the
criminal law's role in reconciling the need to permit legitimate cam-

12. See, e.g., infra notes 358-61 (concerning Speaker Gingrich), 362-69 (concern
ing Sen. Lautenberg), 375 (concerning Sens. Daschle and Dole) and accompanying text.
13. This article will focus primarily on legislative ethics at the national level. For
a roundup of state ethics reform developments, see Garry Boulard, Pluperfect Purity,
STATE LEGISLATURES, Jan. 1995, at 29.
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paign finance with the need to curtail corruption of legislators. Against
that background, this Part evaluates some of the most visible proposals
for reducing the risks of congressional favoritism toward campaign con
tributors. Part N also critiques the beguiling but troublesome notion of
regulation based on an "appearance of impropriety."
This article concentrates on the

substantive rules of congressional

conduct and does not inquire into the related question of how, if at all,
the House and Senate should reform the

procedural machinery by

which they administer these rules.14 The latter theme is a highly topical
matter, having been the subject of a task force appointeil by the House
and Senate leadership during the last Congress.15 One commonly dis
cussed proposal, for example, is to entrust major portions of the en
forcement process to former members of Congress or other individuals
who are not currently serving in the legislature.16 Any procedural re
forms, however, should complement, not displace, continued attention
to fundamental substantive questions. It is too easy to argue that the
problems of the Keating scandal would take care of themselves if only
the cases were placed in the hands of adjudicators with sufficient forti
tude. Philosophical questions about the proper roles of members of
Congress as constituent advocates remain deeply controversial today,
and only if Congress and the country can reach something approaching
a consensus on those questions will the ethics committees be able to
discharge their responsibilities in this area in a coherent and credible
fashion.

I.

CONGRESSIONAL ADVOCACY AND LEGISLATIVE Ennes
THEORY

On first inspection, the vagueness, defensiveness, and caution
marking the Senate's response to the Keating problem do not seem sur
prising. One might shrug them off as just more evidence of the cor
rupting power of incumbency. After all, congressional ethics enforce
ment has historically been known for its leniency, with serious
sanctions imposed only when unavoidable.17 Any number of explana-

14. Those issues have been addressed by other scholars contributing to the project
for which this study was prepared. See Congressional Process Symposium, 48 ADMIN.
L. REv. 33 (1996).
15. See JOINT CoMM. ON THE ORO. OF CONG FINAL REPORT, S. REP. No.
103-215 & H.R REP. No. 103-413 (1993).
16. See id. pt 2, at 123-29.
17. See Richard Allan Baker, The History of Congressional Ethics, in REPRESEN·
TATION AND REsPONSmILITY: ExPLORING LEGISLATIVE ETHICS 3, 3 (Bruce
Jennings & Daniel Callahan eds., 1985). For historical surveys of congressional ethics
regulation, see generally CONG. Q CONGRESSIONAL ETHICS: HISTORY. FACTS, AND
.•

.•
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tions for this heritage have been offered, including the practical need of
members to work together over time and the human difficulties inherent
in disciplining one's peers. A perhaps more principled justification is
that Congress regards the accountability of members to the public as
something of a substitute for vigorous enforcement activities by the eth
ics committees.18
But no explanation rooted in generic characteristics of congres
sional ethics regulation can be entirely satisfactory, because from time
to time the ethics committees have overcome these obstacles and en
dorsed stiff punishments.19 Moreover, the Senate committee certainly
had no reason to be surprised by the bad press it received over the
Keating incident. Vehement denunciations of the five senators, and calls
for severe punishment, had been prominent for months.20 One might
wonder, therefore, whether any distinctive characteristics of the Keating
case help to account for the Senate committee's hesitant and equivocal
response to the issues in that case.
Part of the explanation may be that the problem in the Keating
case was itself a hard one. In certain ways, it was more analytically
challenging than most questions the ethics committees have confronted
through the years. More specifically, the case highlighted a tension be
tween

conflicting responsibilities of the senators involved. In the partic

ular context, the conflict was between their responsibility to promote ef
fective enforcement of the banking laws and their responsibility to act
on behalf of an aggrieved citizen. In retrospect, most observers have
concluded that at least some of the senators struck the balance insensi-

CONTROVERSY (1992) [hereinafter CONGRESSIONAL Ennes], and Baker, supra. The
Jennings and Callahan volume, which will be cited frequently in the next few pages, is
an invaluable symposium prepared under the auspices of the Hastings Center. See also
HAsTINGS Cm., THE Ennes OF LEGISLATIVE LIFE (1985) [hereinafter ETiilCS OF
LEGISLATIVE LIFE] (a report stemming from the same symposium).
18. Thoughtful outsiders have found substance in this argument. See SPECIAL
COMM. ON THE FED. CONFLICT OF INTEREST LAWS, AsSN. OF THE BAR OF THE
CITY OF N.Y., CONFLICT OF INTEREST AND FEDERAL SERVICE 15 (1960) [hereinaf
ter CONFLICT OF INTEREST AND FEDERAL SERVICE]; Steven G. Calabresi, Some

Structural Consequences of the Increased Use of Ethics Probes as Political Weapons,
11 JL. & POL. 521, 531 (1995); Vera Vogelsang-Coombs & Larry A. Bakken, The Con
duct of Legislators, in Ennes. GOVERNMENT, AND PuBuc POLICY: A REFERENCE
GUIDE 79, 93-94 (James S. Bowman & Frederick A. Elliston eds., 1988).
19. See CONGRESSIONAL Ennes, supra note 17, at 15-45 (summarizing pre
Packwood cases in which severe sanctions have been imposed).
20. See, e.g., Robert F. Bauer, Law and Ethics in Political Life: Considering the
Cranston Case, 9 JL. & PoL. 461, 482-83 n.52 (1993) (noting that the Committee's de
cision to drop proceedings against four of the senators elicited such editorial page epi
thets as "a farce," "a political charade from its inception," and "a craven abdication of
responsibility, a contemptible white-wash, a self-serving, tortured exoneration").
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tively, perhaps corruptly; but this consensus does not itself belie the dif
ficulty of pinning down the precise differences between the senators'
conduct and more legitimate varieties of congressional intervention in
agency proceedings. This Part explicates some of the complexities in
the very concept of representation that the case exposed: first by fram
ing the issue in theoretical terms, and then by tracing the general failure
of the literature dealing with the practical problems of legislative ethics
enforcement to come to grips with that issue.
A.

Legislators

as

Advocates

Theorists of legislative ethics widely agree on a premise that lies at
the heart of the difficulty: although members of Congress have a duty
to articulate and promote the interests of the nation as a whole, they
also have a duty to speak and act for more limited constituencies at
times.21 This role has been described as a "broker" function.22 Mem
bers of the House and Senate spend their time mediating among com
peting social interests, "representing" a bewildering variety of interests
in diverse ways. Residents of the state or district that elected a given
member may be the most common beneficiaries of this broker function,
but the function can legitimately be extended to people who are not
constituents in a literal sense.23 In a sense, this role is built into the
structure of our government, which presupposes that the clash of inter
est against interest, faction against faction, will be conducive to the
public good, or at least will minimize the risk of domination by any
particular interest24

21. See, e.g., Ennes OF LEGISLATIVE LIFE, supra note 17, at 15-16; ROBERT s.
GETZ, CONGRESSIONAL Ennes: THE CONFLICT OF INTEREST ISSUE 5, 45, 54-56
(1966); Amy Gutmann & Dennis Thompson, The Theory of Legislative Ethics, in REP
RESENTATION AND REsPONSIBILITY, supra note 17, at 167, 168, 170-71; Harry w.
Jones, Political Behavior and the Problem of Sanctions, in THE ETHIC OF POWER:
THE INTERPLAY OF RELIGION, PHILoSOPHY AND POLITICS 193, 201 -02 (Harold D.
Lasswell & Harland Cleveland eds., 1962); John D. Saxon, The Scope of Legislative
Ethics, in REPRESENTATION AND REsPONSIBILITY, supra note 17, at 197, 204. But
see EDMUND BURKE, Speech to the Electors of Bristol, in 1 BURKE'S WORKS 442,
448 (1854) ("If the local constituent should have an interest, or should form an hasty
opinion, evidently opposite to the real good of the rest of the community, the member
[of Parliament] for that place ought to be as far, as any other, from any endeavour to
give it effect.").
22. GETZ, supra note 21, at 54-56.
23. See ETHICS OF LEGISLATIVE LIFE, supra note 17, at 30-31; Gutmann &
Thompson, supra note 21, at 170.
24. See THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (Madison); Bruce Jennings, Legislative Ethics
and Moral Minimalism, in REPRESENTATION AND REsPONSmILITY, supra note 17, at
149, 158-60.
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To be sure, people who have a serious interest in public policy a description with which most readers of this article would probably as
sociate themselves - tend to mistrust this role. When members of Con
gress angle for funding of highway projects in their districts, or de
nounce proposals to close military bases there, or press for subsidies for
the locally grown crop, the normal response of the intellectual commu
nity is that these legislators really ought to try to rise above parochial
politics and put the national interest first.25 This attitude is certainly apt
in particular contexts,26 but an across-the-board dismissal of the legiti
macy of the advocacy role is simply not in keeping with the nature of
our government.

On the other hand, most readers of this article are probably also
lawyers by training, and in that regard they may be particularly able to
empathize with the legislator's advocacy role. Those schooled in the
norms of an adversarial legal system are in a good position to recognize
that a legislator who by turns articulates the sometimes conflicting per
spectives of a variety of interest groups is not necessarily a hypocrite.
To be sure, in both the legal and political arenas, some methods of ad
vocacy do lack integrity and deserve condemnation; but an effort to
make the strongest defensible case on behalf of a "represented" party
can also possess a kind of professionalism that members of the bar
should find familiar.21
The advocacy dimension of the legislator's responsibilities comes
to mind most readily in connection with lawmaking, the most familiar
and visible role a senator or representative plays. But, as the next Part
will discuss, it also finds important and appropriate expression when
members intervene before administrative agencies on behalf of individ
uals. The "broker" function takes on a different coloration in this con
text, because in lawmaking one legislator's factional advocacy is offset
by that of others, while in constituent service the legislator normaily

25. Much may depend on whose ox is gored, however. See Legislators Against the
Arts, N.Y. TIMEs, July 19, 1995, at A18 (editorial declaring it "astonishing" that House
members from the New York area, the home of many struggling artists, would vote to
terminate the National Endowment for the Arts, thus "selling their constituents down
the river"); see also infra note 125.
26. For the distinctly contrarian view that pork-barre l politics can serve the public
interest, see John W. Ellwood & Eric M. Patashnik, In Praise of Pork, PuB. lNTEREsT,
Winter 1993, at 19; Abner J. Mikva, Foreword to Symposium on the Theory of Public
Choice, 74 V A. L. REV. 167, 172 (1988).
27. This is not to overlook significant differences between the representative roles
of lawyers and legislators. For example, an attorney is generally expected to refrain
from simultaneously representing multiple clients who have directly adverse interests,
see MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.7(a) (1995), but that obliga
tion could never be imposed on members of Congress.

10
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acts alone. Thus, the checks and balances implications of congressional
intervention in agency proceedings must instead be weighed in terms of
the competitive relationship between the legislative and executive
branches. The general point, however, is that proposed ethics rules to
regulate members' contacts with agencies should be assessed from the
perspective of whether they might prevent members from acting effec
tively as constituent advocates.
That constraints on congressional intervention have a potential to
suppress legitimate advocacy is not, of course, a reason for Congress to
eschew all ethical regulation in this area. By itself, it does not even ar
gue for leniency. Subsequent sections of this article will argue that the
Keating affair, although far from commonplace in its factual details,
does highlight some dangers in the sphere of constituent service that the
ethics committees ought to police. After all, congressional constituent
advocacy can serve both public and private ends simultaneously. A leg
islator who intervenes in the affairs of an administrative agency on a
citizen's behalf may be performing a public servfoe, but he can also be
seen as cultivating the beneficiary's gratitude, which the latter can ex
press through her vote or, as in Keating's case, through campaign con
tributions. Moreover, to the extent that the member's tactics for garner
ing political support are in question, a characterization of the situation
as involving a conflict of public responsibilities looks overly argumen
tative - or at the very least debatable - because his campaign for re
election serves the public interest in one sense but in another sense
serves his own. Ethics regulation is a logical tool for counteracting the
temptations stemming from the self-interested aspects of constituent ser
vice. Nevertheless, any proposals for new proscriptions in this area
should be studied carefully to

g auge

their impact on representation.

In a thoughtful commentary on the Keating case, Professor Dennis
F. Thompson has proposed a mode of analysis that resembles the one
advanced here. Thompson offers the notion of "institutional corrup
tion," which he defines as "the improper use of public office for pri
vate purposes [in a manner that] undermines institutional purposes or
damages the democratic process. "28 He wishes to look beyond a simple
conclusion that constituent advocacy is either always corrupt or never
corrupt "The individual member's contribution to the corruption is
filtered through institutional practices that are otherwise legitimate and
may even be duties of office. "29 Thus, when a form of political behav
ior is called into question as possibly constituting "institutional corrup-

28. DENNIS F. THOMPSON, Ennes IN CONGRESS 7 (1995).
29. Id.
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tion," one must assess its impact on Congress and the democratic pro
cess in order to decide whether to condemn it.
Applying this frame of reference, Thompson finds much to criti
cize in the behavior of the Keating Five. Indeed, as we shall see, he ul
timately does not seem to believe that stricter controls on constituent
service would suppress legitimate practices, and thus he does not dis
cern a serious problem with conflicting responsibilities in this context.
Nevertheless, Thompson's conceptual framework helpfully draws atten
tion to the need for analysts in this area to engage in a wide-ranging
and discriminating inquiry that scrutinizes the specific manner in which
political activities such as constituent service are conducted and avoids
condemning legitimate political advocacy. Although institutional cor
ruption may reveal a "dark side of American politics," he says, "we
can still

try

to recognize degrees of darkness. We should aim for a kind

of moral chiaroscuro. "30
B.

The Ethics Enforcement Background

Because it implicates competing claims on legislators' allegiances,
the task of devising ethical rules to govern congressional contacts with
agencies calls for a more complex analysis than one usually encounters
in discussions about the practical issues of ethics enforcement. Most of
the House and Senate ethics rules aim to prevent members from ex
ploiting the powers of their office for their private benefit - usually fi
nancial gain.31 Familiar examples are statutes and rules regulating mem
bers' acceptance of gifts, honoraria, paid travel, outside earned income,
or employment subsequent to their service in Congress.32
30. Id. at 170; cf. Kathleen Clark, Do We Have Enough Ethics in Government
Yet?: An Answer from Fiduciary Theory, 1996 U. lLL. L. REv. 57, 78 (arguing that al
though governmental ethics regulation should in general track private-law concepts of
fiduciary responsibility, "[p]ragmatic concerns about the actual consequences of impos
ing fiduciary duties will limit their application in ways that cannot easily be explained
on a purely theoretical level"); Daniel H. Lowenstein, Political Bribery and the Inter
mediate Theory of Politics, 32 UCLA L. REv. 784, 784-85, 805-06 (1985) (arguing that
"corrupt intent," as used in the bribery laws, should be determined in light of "interme
diate political theory" evaluating the consequences of the defendant's conduct for the
political system).
31. See Jennings, supra note 24, at 151.
32. The House and Senate have recently adopted comprehensive measures banning
most gifts to their members. See H.R. Res. 250, 104th Cong., 141 CONG. REc H13,078
(daily ed. Nov. 16, 1995) (enacted) (amending H.R RULE Lll); S. Res. 158, 104th
Cong., 141 CONG. REc SI0,897 (daily ed. July 28, 1995) (enacted) (amending S.
RULE XXXV) . For an earlier survey of restrictions on financial gain, including some
rules not displaced by the 1995 measures, see A.B.A. SEC. OF ADMIN. LAw & REG.
PRACTICE, THE LoBBYING MANuAL 159-71 (Thomas M. Susman ed., 1993). For pur
poses of the present discussion, rules requiring disclosure of personal financial interests
.

.
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By their nature, such provisions will usually not give rise to con
flicts of responsibilities such as those suggested in the preceding sec
tion. No one would condemn a member for being

too scrupulous to

avoid making a personal profit from public service, nor would anyone
suggest that the member's failure to engage in the proscribed activity
would harm society in any direct fashion.33 Debates about such restric
tions as bans on gifts or honoraria typically center on questions such as
whether the rule is unnecessary, overly stringent, or clumsily drafted,
rather than on whether the rule proscribes conduct that affirmatively
serves the public interest. For this reason, the questions of representa
tion theory that scholars have broached on an academic level, and that
were highlighted in the previous section, have rarely been explored in
this context.
For essentially the same reasons, the questions of representation
theory in the Keating case are normally not presented by ethics cases
raising so-called "lifestyle" issues - sexual improprieties, drug or al
cohol abuse, and so forth.34 The most prominent current example in
volves the sensational sexual harassment allegations that led to the fall
of Senator Packwood. Such cases may involve difficult issues, but they
generally do not involve conflicting responsibilities. Perhaps the stan
dards of sobriety, sexual ethics, and so on, that a senator must observe
are higher than those applicable to other citizens, but they certainly are
not lower. No one would argue that a member of Congress is

supposed

to take sexual liberties as part of the job.
In at least one context, however, a type of ethics rule that is in
tended to prevent officials from exploiting their official positions for
private financial gain does directly implicate the process of representa
tion. That context, which obviously deserves particular attention here,
involves the House and Senate disqualification rules. Those rules, if not

can be lumped together with rules proscribing primary activity in pursuit of those
interests.
33. Arguably, stringent efforts to curb the personal benefits of public service do
cause harm to society - they can deter good people from entering government work,
drive other good people out of government, or dampen the morale of those who remain.
See A.B.A. Comm. on Govt. Standards, Keeping Faith: Government Ethics and Gov
ernment Ethics Regulation, 45 ADMIN. L. REv. 287, 294 (1993) (Cynthia Farina, Re
porter) [hereinafter Keeping Faith]; Beth Nolan, Public Interest, Private Income: Con
flicts and Control Limits on the Outside Income of Government Officials, 87 Nw. U. L.
REv. 57, 84-88 (1992). That result, however, would be only an incidental and unin
tended consequence of such rules; they should be distinguished from rules that by their
terms forbid members of Congress from engaging in advocacy activities that are
deemed unethical but arguably ought to be preserved.
34. See generally CONGRESSIONAL ETHICS, supra note 17, at 85-96 (summariz
ing past cases involving sex or alcohol abuse).
·
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completely toothless, are certainly far narrower in scope than !}le corre
sponding rules governing the executive and judicial branches. Basically,
a member

is permitted to cast a vote that will directly enhance the value

of an investment asset she owns, if she is one of a large number of in
vestors who also own that type of asset.35 Legislators, defending their
reluctance to endorse more stringent conflict of interest principles, have
argued that if every member of Congress were forbidden to vote on
bills that could affect any of his or her financial interests, it would be
impossible to muster a quorum on numerous measures on which Con
gress must act.36
The responses of students of legislative ethics to Congress's dis
qualification rules are revealing. 1\vo contrasting reactions are nicely il
lustrated by a pair of reports prepared by committees composed of emi
nent members of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York
(NYCBA). One committee, reporting over three decades ago in an in
fluential book-length study on

Conflict of Interest and Federal Service,

made numerous recommendations to clarify the rules regarding prohib
ited conflicts of interest in the executive branch. But the committee de
clined to propose anything regarding Congress, in part because it

35. Rule VIlI of the House of Representatives states that a member should not
vote on an issue if he has "a direct personal or pecuniary interest" in the matter. De
spite the facial breadth of this language, Speaker James G. Blaine ruled in 1874 that the
rule applies only to measures that would affect a representative as an individual - such
as loss of a seat. Thus, a representative may vote on matters that would affect his inter
ests as a member of a class. See GE'I'Z, supra note 21, at 57-59. This interpretation has
stood for over a century. Moreover, when the Senate codified its ethics rules in 1977, it
expressly adopted the essence of the Blaine position. See SENATE RULE XXXVI1(4)
(providing that a senator shall not introduce or promote legislation "a principal purpose
of which is to further only his pecuniary interest [or that of] a limited class of persons
[to which he belongs]"). The drafters of this rule explained that it does not, for exam
ple, prevent a senator who owns a dairy farm from promoting a bill that provides price
supports for dairy farmers generally; the "limited class" language refers only to the sort
of very small classes that might typically be the subject of a private bill. See S. REP
No. 95-49, at 42 (1977).
36. See GE'I'Z, supra note 21, at 58-59. This reasoning is similar to the "rule of
necessity" that pennits judges or administrators to decline to recuse themselves in a
case if the result would be that no one could hear the case. See United States v. Will,
449 U.S. 200 (1980) (holding that Justices could hear a challenge to validity of law that
increased all judicial salaries). An interesting but logical exception to the general pat
tern occurred in the Keating case itself: Senator Jeff Bingaman recused himself from
participating in the Ethics Committee's proceedings because his wife's law firm had
worked for associates of Cranston. See Phil Kuntz, Cranston Decision Delayed by Con
flict of Interest, 49 CONG. Q. WKLY. REP 2051 (1991). Congressional recusal is less
problematic in this situation than in most others, because members of the ethics com
mittees sit in an adjudicative capacity and do not "represent" constituencies in any sig
nificant sense.
.
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thought the notion of conflicts of interest was so different in the legisla
tive sphere:
We would think odd a fishing state congressman who was not mindful of
the interests of the fishing industry - though he may be in the fishing
business himself, and though his campaign funds come in part from this
source. 'This kind of representation is considered inevitable and, indeed,
generally applauded. Sterile application of an abstract rule against acting
in situations involving self-interest would prevent the farmer senator
from voting on farm legislation or the Negro congressman from speaking
on civil rights bills. At some point a purist attitude toward the evils of
conflicts of interest in Congress runs afoul of the basic premises of
American representative government37

A subsequent NYCBA committee, specifically established to ad
dress issues of congressional ethics, tried more assiduously to devise a
workable formula for regulation of congressional conflicts of interest,
but in the end drew back from urging Congress to extend the ideal of
conflict avoidance to the limits of its logic. The committee ultimately
endorsed a rule that would urge legislators to consider voluntary recusal
on a discretionary basis, but at the same time acknowledged that a rule
of mandatory disqualification would be unworkable.38
Similar ambivalence is evident in a very recent report by another
distinguished ad hoc panel, the Committee on Government Standards of
the American Bar Association. This committee made detailed recom
mendations for reform of the standards for financial disqualification for
officials in the executive branch. As to members of Congress and their
staffs, however, the committee limited itself to urging that these offi
cials be held to the same conflicts standards as other government em
ployees

"to the greatest extent practicable. "39 One of the reasons for

the cautious tone of this recommendation was the committee's belief
that a broad recusal requirement would cause problems of its own: "to
disable an elected official from acting on a matter is effectively to
silence

the

voice

of the

constituents

who

chose

him

as

their

representative. "40
This brief discussion is not intended to take sides on the difficult
issue of congressional disqualification because of financial interest -

37. CONFLICT OF INTEREsT AND FEDERAL SERVICE, supra note 18, at 14-15.
38. See SPECIAL COMM. ON CONG. ETHICS, AssN. OF THE BAR OF THE CITY
OF NEW YORK, CONGRESS AND THE PUBuc TRUST 71-72 (1970) [hereinafter CON

GRESS AND THE PUBuc TRUST].
39. Keeping Faith, supra note 33, at 302-03.
40. Id. at 301. The committee did, however, maintain that members of Congress
should make broad public disclosure of potentially compromising financial interests.
See id. at 302, 304.
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an issue that remains controversial in its own right.41 The point is sim
ply that, in a subject area that is not too far removed from this article's
principal concerns, the literature on legislative ethics has recognized the
tension between ethics regulation and the process of representation,42
but has seemed decidedly perplexed about how to resolve that tension.

In view of the hesitation these authorities have shown where the tension
has involved economic self-interest, one should hardly be surprised that
the Senate Ethics Committee had such trouble reaching consensus in the
far murkier area of political self-interest, in which the spheres of public
and private responsibility are even harder to separate.43 Subsequent
Parts of this article will attempt to shed at least some light on that
problem.

II.

CONSTITUENT SERVICE

Part I of this study suggested that any attempt to place ethics limits
on the conduct of legislative business must take into account the multi
ple and conflicting responsibilities that are the essence of legislative
life. If this premise is correct, one cannot expect to devise sound ethical
principles to govern the constituent service process without a reliable
understanding of the nature and significance of that process. In general,
however, the services that senators and representatives perform for indi
vidual constituents are far less visible and less familiar to the public
than, say, congressional lawmaking. It will be useful at this point, there
fore, to investigate the realities of constituent service - or casework, as
it is also known.
This Part has both a descriptive and a normative component. The
descriptive aspect will provide the factual underpinnings for all of the
analyses to follow. The normative aspect is necessary because consider
ation of potential restrictions on congressional casework inevitably pre41. See Clark, supra note 30, at 91 (arguing that current congressional rules are
"entirely inadequate"); Bernie Sanders & Maurice Hinchey, Divest Now! Members
Should Purge Stock Portfolios of Conflicts, ROLL CALL. July 13, 1995, available in
LEXIS, Legis Library, Rollcl File (discussing bill to require members to divest most as
sets or put them into blind trusts).
42. See also Nolan, supra note 33, at 62 n.8 (choosing, in article about restrictions
on government officials' outside income, to confine discussion to executive branch is
sues, in part because of complications attributable to legislators' representative
functions).
43. Indeed, the NYCBA Special Committee on Congressional Ethics avoided that
subject completely, defining conflicts of interest exclusively in terms of members' eco
nomic interests. See CONGRESS AND THE PUBLIC TRUST, supra note 38, at 38-39, 4243. Moreover, the committee specifically declined to give any attention in its 238-page
study to the questions of legislative ethics that arise out of congressional intervention in
administrative proceedings. See id. at xxii.
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supposes background assumptions about the intrinsic value of constitu
ent service. Those who approve of this function will presumably want
to ensure that ethical rules or other restrictions leave ample breathing
room for it Those who are more skeptical of the value of casework will
presumably be readier to impose restraints, notwithstanding risks that it
might be chilled. In other words, if the congressional practice of doing
favors for constituents does not serve the public interest anyway, one
would not need to worry about the possibility that the imposition of
new ethical norms could impair the performance of this practice.
The universe of scholarship available on constituent service is
fairly small. The major empirical study in the political science literature
was published by John R. Johannes in 1984.44 He presents a largely flat
tering picture. Bruce Cain, John Ferejohn, and Morris Fiorina have pro
vided a more skeptical book-length study addressing this issue,45 al
though their work focuses primarily on the electoral and policy
implications of constituent service. Both of these books draw upon
broad-based surveys of members, congressional staff, and the general
public, supplemented by extensive interviews in congressional offices.
Several works published in the 1960s and 1970s are also helpful, pro
vided one keeps in mind that the passage of time may have impaired
the validity of their findings.46 From these accounts, and from a small
number of additional articles and journalistic pieces, a realistic depic
tion of constituent service begins to emerge.
A.

Description of the Process

Congressional offices are continuously engaged in providing a va
riety of services for constituents who claim that administrative agencies
are treating them improperly or are not giving them what they deserve.
The subjects of these interventions range from individual complaints 44. JOHN R. JOHANNES, To SERVE THE PEOPLE: CONGRESS AND CONSTITU·
ENCY SERVICE (1984).
45. BRUCE CAIN ET AL., THE PERSONAL VOTE: CONSTITUENCY SERVICE AND
ELECTORAL INDEPENDENCE (1987). These authors also provide detailed analysis of
casework in Britain, but only their findings regarding the United States Congress will
be discussed here.
46. See, e.g., CHARLES L. CLAPP, THE CONGRESSMAN: His WORK AS HE SEES
IT 50-55 (1963); WALTER GELLHORN, WHEN AMERICANS COMPLAIN (1966); WAL
TER KRAVITZ, CASEWORK BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS: A SURVEY OF THE LITER·
ATURE (Lib. of Cong. Legislative Reference Serv. No. GGR-150, 1968); Robert Klo
noff, The Congressman as Mediator Between Citizens and Government Agencies:
Problems and Prospects, 16 HAR.v. J. ON LEGIS. 701, 705-08 (1979); T. Edward Wes
ten, The Constituent Needs Help: Casework in the House of Representatives, in To BB
A CONGRESSMAN: THE PROMISE AND THE POWER 53 (Sven Groennings & Jonathan
P. Hawley eds., 1973).
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regarding, for example, social security bep.efits, veterans' benefits, or
unemployment compensation - to larger-scale matters such as helping
state and local authorities with grant applications.47 Although the major
ity of requests, like the ones just mentioned, involve efforts to obtain
affirmative benefits from the federal government, congressional offices
also handle many cases in which a constituent wants help resisting ef
forts by agencies to enforce regulatory statutes. 'fypical of this category
are cases in the tax, immigration, and environmental protection areas.48
In short, the institution of congressional casework covers _much of the
same terrain as might be handled through an "ombudsman" system in
other nations.49
The magnitude of this enterprise is not easy to gauge, but Johannes
has estimated that in the Ninety-fifth Congress the workload exceeded
four million cases per year.50 All agree that casework has grown dra
matically since the 1960s and early 1970s.51 The growing size of the
federal welfare state is commonly cited as a contributing factor in this
increase; another is the growing sophistication among citizens about the
availability of programs for which they might qualify.52
47. See CAIN ET AL., supra note 45, at 58-59, 71; JOHANNES, supra note 44, at
18-24. Constituent service performed for employers, state or local governments, or other

large institutions is sometimes called "high-level casework." See Westen, supra note
46, at 68-70. Others describe such favors as "federal projects assistance," preferring to
limit the term "casework" to activities on behalf of individuals. See JOHANNES , supra
note 44, at 2. One theme of this article is that for purposes of ethics regulation the two
varieties of constituent service shade into each other, and ethics rules must recognize
this continuity. Generally, therefore, this article uses both "casework" and "constituent
service" in a broad sense, referring to any actions that congressional offices take as in
termediaries between federal agencies and constituents. This usage does not, however,
include efforts by a senator or representative to promote constituent or district interests
through legislation.
48. See JOHANNES, supra note 44, at 20-21.
49.

The ombudsman is an institution frequently used in other countries, and increas
ingly used in this country, as a means of inquiring into citizen grievances about
administrative acts or failures to act and, in suitable cases, to criticize or to make
recommendations concerning future official conduct
In cases involving the
agencies of the government, an ombudsman may deal with complaints arising
from maladministration, abusive or indifferent treatment, tardiness, unresponsive
ness, and the like.
The Ombudsman in Federal Agencies (Recommendation 90-2), 55 Fed. Reg. 34,209,
34,211 (Admin. Conf. of the U.S. 1990) (footnote omitted). For discussion of proposals
to institute an ombudsman-like entity within Congress, see infra notes 1 15-22 and ac
companying text
50. See JOHANNES, supra note 44, at 35.
51. See id. at 36; cf. GELLHORN, supra note 46, at 93 (estimating 200,000 cases
annually in 1996).
52. See CAIN ET AL., supra note 45, at 217; JOHANNES, supra note 44, at 36-39.
One measure of the expansion in constituent service is the increase in the number of
.
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Most casework is handled at the staff level.53 The caseworker typi
cally forwards a constituent's letter to the agency involved, accompa
nied by a cover letter, or perhaps only a "buck slip" - a form letter
requesting that the agency take prompt action. More significant or diffi
cult cases may dictate contacting the agency by telephone instead.54
Agencies usually respond quickly to "congressionals."55 Relations be
tween staff at the agency and the congressional offices are usually co
operative, but prolonged negotiation, cajolery, and browbeating are by
no means unheard of.56 Sometimes, especially if the agency seems to be
acting unreasonably, the casework staff will appeal to higher authorities
in the agency before giving up.s1
Senators and representatives spend relatively little time contacting
agencies themselves.58 They do, however, spend time supervising and
conferring with staff about how to handle cases, and intermittently they
will participate personally. They are especially likely to do so on major
cases - for example, a project that could benefit many residents of the
home district - or when an aide feels that the member's personal clout
will be helpful in overcoming bureaucratic resistance.59 Finally, Johan-

staff members assigned to it In 1978, according to Johannes, an average of seven staff
members were regularly involved in casework in House offices, and about ten in Senate
offices; half of each group were casework specialists. See id. at 63. By 1990, the num
ber of House staff positions in district offices, which are primarily service-oriented, had
increased to 3027 from a 1972 level of 1 189; the comparable increase for Senate staff
was 1293, compared with a 1972 level of 303. See Larry Liebert, Hill's Growth Indus
try: Constituent Service, 52 CONG. Q. WKLY. REP. 1758 (1994). The shortage of office
space in Washington is one reason for this dispersal of staff. See id.
53. For discussions of routine casework procedures, see, for example, JOHANNES ,
supra note 44, at 98-100; RICHARD H. SHAPIRO ET AL., CONG. MGMT. FOUND.,
FRONTLINE MANAGEMENT: A GUIDE FOR CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICT/STATE OF
FICES 98-131 (1989) [hereinafter FRONTLINE MANAGEMENT]; Klonoff, supra note 46,
at 704-08.
54. See JOHANNES , supra note 44, at 99-100; see also CAIN ET AL., supra note
45, at 67 (suggesting that caseworkers sometimes use an "informal signaling system"
to let agency officials know which cases the congressional office thinks deserve the
closest attention).
55. See JOHANNES , supra note 44, at 100, 1 1 4.
56. See id. at 101-05.
57. See id. at 1 10-1 1.
58. See C AIN ET AL., supra note 45, a t 62 ("When asked t o estimate the amount
of time the congressman personally spends on casework, 47% of the administrative as
sistants said that the Congressman rarely spends any time on casework, and only 9%
said that the Congressman spends more than 10% of his time on casework."). The find
ings of other researchers are similar. See JOHANNES , supra note 44, at 109, 151-53;
Klonoff, supra note 46, at 708 & n.28.
59. See JOHANNES, supra note 44, at 153; see also id. at 139 ("Usually the goal
[of personal action by the member] is to impress on an administrator that the matter is,
in fact, important").

Congressional Ethics

October 1996]

19

nes notes, "one in six respondents [in the author's Capitol Hill inter
views] indicated that congressmen handle cases personally when the
constituent is important a relative, friend, or local VIP. "60 We shall re
turn later to the equity questions implicit in this last comment The
guiding assumption, however, is that even when the member is not per
sonally involved, credit or blame for the staff 's work will reflect on the
member himself or herself.
B.

Positive Appraisals of Constituent Service

Casework is a benign and valuable institution - or at least that is
what members of Congress would have us believe. Members them
selves are among the strongest boosters of constituent service. They and
other proponents of casework maintain that the ombudsman role is ba
sic to the job . of being a member of Congress - an essential aspect of
what it means to "represent" one's constituents, and a direct outgrowth
of the constitutional right to petition Congress for redress of grievances.
The comments of former Speaker Jim Wright are typical:
We can disparage the ombudsman function [of the congressman] if we
will, but I am absolutely convinced that it is an altogether honorable
function. For many millions of private citizens, their elected representa
tive is the only person whom they remotely know in the federal govern
ment He is their only intercessor when they encounter difficulties. This
particular relationship between a congressman and the individual constit
uent, struggling for opportunity, is a very sacred one, not to be despised.
It is, in fact, essential if we are to keep government accessible and to
keep government human.6t

One might at first be inclined to discount these remarks as uniquely
self-serving, because former Speaker Wright was himself a target of
ethics committee proceedings because of his alleged abuse of the con
stituent service role.62 Other legislators, however, say much the same
thing - usually less floridly - in their own writings63 or when sur
veyed.64

A few scholars have also joined in the positive portrayal that

60.

Id. at 154.
61. Colloquy, Incumbency Advantage and Accountability: The Question of Cam
paign Finance, Congressional Perquisites, and Constituent Service, 23 CuMB. L. REv.
61, 67-69 (1993) (remarks of former Speaker of the House Jim Wright).
62. See infra Part ill.
63. See PAUL H. DOUGLAS, Ennes IN GoVERNMENT 85-88 (1952); DAVID E.
PRICE, THE CONGRESSIONAL EXPERIENCE: A Vmw FROM THE HILL 1 17-19 (1992);
Lee H. Hamilton, Constituent Service and Representation, PuB. MANAGER. Summer
1992, at 12.
64. See CAIN ET AL supra note 45, at 88; JOHANNES. supra note 44, at 16;
KRAVITZ. supra note 46, at 29-33 (quoting several members of Congress); Klonoff,
supra note 46, at 709 & nn.30-31.
••
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Wright's statement evokes.65 The idea that citizen access to a congres
sional troubleshooter "humanizes" government recurs frequently in
these accounts. They depict the congressional office as the champion of
ordinary citizens who cannot effectively protect themselves against the
occasionally arrogant bureaucracy.
Just how much benefit constituents actually derive from casework
is difficult to gauge. Caseworkers and agency staff almost uniformly
agree that a congressional inquiry will probably induce the agency to
expedite the constituent's case and to give the case a closer look, per
haps at a higher level in the bureaucracy.66 Whether constituents receive
more favorable substantive outcomes when a member of Congress in
tervenes is more controversial. Typically, members and their staffs vig
orously assert that their participation does help, but agency staff some
times assert the contrary.67 Independent analysts tend to favor the
congressional side of this argument, although estimates of the extent of
the benefit vary widely.68 Even when the legislative intervention is un
successful, casework generally serves the useful function of giving the
constituent a feeling that someone has taken action on his or her behalf.
When asked, most requesters report favorable assessments of the con
gressional office's assistance.69
Members also claim that the practice of casework keeps them in
touch with the real-world concerns of their constituents. Casework can
serve as an early warning system for problems that might not come to
their attention through the usual political channels.70 As an example,
Representative Barney Frank has noted that the human costs of the
Reagan administration's intensive review of social security disability
claims became clear to Congress because of complaints reaching mem
bers' offices.71

65. See, e.g., JOHANNES , supra note 44, at 225-27; Klonoff, supra note 46, at
718-19; AALS Section on Legis., Legislators at an Agency Door: The Ethics of Con
stituent Service (Jan. 5, 1992) (tape of panel discussion, on file with author) [hereinafter
Agency Door] (remarks of Prof. Otto Hetzel).
66. See GELLHORN, supra note 46, at 70-71; JOHANNES , supra note 44, at 132.
67. See JOHANNES , supra note 44, at 134.
68. See CAIN ET AL supra note 45, at 68 (congressional estimates range from
10% to 90%); GELLHORN, supra note 46, at 79-80 (reporting, and calling plausible, in
terviewees' consensus that 10% of cases led to better outcomes for constituents in
volved); JOHANNES, supra note 44, at 128 (stating that legislators and caseworkers
claim success rates between 28% and 40%, although "these numbers could be inflated
and self-serving").
69. See CAIN ET AL supra note 45, at 52; JOHANNES , supra note 44, at 206-07.
70. See JOHANNES, supra note 44, at 161-68; Hamilton, supra note 63, at 14.
71. See Agency Door, supra note 65 (remarks of Rep. Frank).
.,
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Finally, members say that they engage in constituent service be
cause they enjoy helping people. In contrast to the lawmaking process,
with all its frustrations, constituent service is a domain in which mem
bers can regularly get results and know that someone is better off as a
result of their efforts.72
C.

Criticisms

For the most part, the academic community has been far less gen
erous in its appraisal of constituent service than members of Congress
have been. Moreover, the Keating scandal has given rise to scathing ap
praisals of casework in the popular press.73 The three principal criti
cisms in the literature are that casework

(1) is better seen as self-serving

than as altruistic, (2) serves to entrench incumbents and thereby sub
verts the political system, and (3) is an inefficient method of improving
the administration of justice. These critiques will be examined in this
section.

A fourth criticism is that casework induces legislators to en

gage in ethically questionable behavior. Issues relating to that point will
be considered in subsequent Parts in connection with the particular ethi
cal lapses that have been alleged.74

1.

Casework as Reelection Stratagem: The Question of Motives

Although some members of Congress may suggest that they en
gage in constituent service solely beca)lse of a selfless desire to serve
the public, contemporary political scientists, influenced by the "rational
choice" school of scholarship,75 point to another incentive: legislators'
expectation that casework will enable them to reap political advantages
from appreciative constituents. Indeed, many members and staff them
selves acknowledge that they regard an efficient constituent service op-

72. See PRICE, supra note 63, at 1 19.
.
73. See, e.g., Mark B. Liedl, The Bloated Disservice of Congress's Constituent
Service, WASH. POST, Feb. 5-1 1, 1990, at 24 (natl. wkly. ed.); Robert Palmer, The Is
sues Behind the Keating Five Case, S.F. CHRoN., Jan. 24, 1991, at A21; Michael Wald
man, Quid Pro Whoa, NEW REPUBLIC, Mar. 19, 1990, at 22.
74. As later discussion will attempt to demonstrate, improper behavior by mem
bers does not appear to be nearly prevalent enough to constitute, in and of itself, a
strong argument against the institution of casework. See infra notes 244-50, 300-05 and
accompanying text
75. For overviews of the rational choice school, which also goes by names such as
"public choice" and "positive political theory," see DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P.
FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE: A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION 12-33 (1991);
Daniel B. Rodriguez, The Positive Political Dimensions of Regulatory Reform, 72
WASH. U. L.Q. l , 52-80 (1994).

22

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 95:1

eration as critical to securing their political base.76 Morris Fiorina, a po
litical scientist who is closely associated with this analysis, has noted
that part of the special appeal of casework is that it offers political re
wards without political risk. That is, taking stands on controversial is
sues can result in both political gains and losses, but constituent service
is "basically pure profit. "77 Moreover, a politician who claims credit for
helping a constituent may be more credible than one who claims to
have been instrumental in securing passage of a bill: most voters realize
that the enactment process requires the concurrence of numerous legis
lators and that no single individual is responsible for a given statute.78
This is not to say that members are solely motivated by political
self-interest when they engage in constituent service. In the words of
Fiorina and his collaborators - who have done the most to uncover ev
idence of the reelection motive behind casework - "only the most
hardened cynic" would make so broad a claim.79 The relative influence
of altruistic and selfish motives is impossible to investigate in a serious
way, or perhaps the issue is better described as meaningless.8° For pres76. See CAIN ET AL., supra note 45, at 78-80; CLAPP, supra note 46, at 52-53;
JOHANNES, supra note 44, at 1 3-14. An orientation manual for new House members
once advised: "as viewed by most Congressmen, job security and constituency service
are like love and marriage - you can't have one without the other." DONALD G.
TACHERON & MORRIS K. UDALL, THE JOB OF THE CONGRESSMAN 62 (1966). More
recently, 56% of House administrative assistants who responded to a 1989 survey iden
tified constituent services as "the most important factor in solidifying your Member's
political base," compared with only 1 1 % (!) who chose the member's legislative record.
See FRONTI.INE MANAGEMENT, supra note 53, at 94.
77. MORRIS P. FIORINA, CONGRESS: KEYSTONE OF THE WASHINGTON EsTAB
LISHMENT 35-36, 42-43 (2d ed. 1989); see also Jorm HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND
DISTRUST 1 3 1-32 (1980) (arguing that legislators delegate too many of their lawmak
ing duties to agencies, because doing errands for constituents is easier and politically
safer than resolving divisive policy issues themselves).
78. See FIORINA, supra note 77, at 43.
79. CAIN ET AL., supra note 45, at 84-85. One could, of course, beg this question
by simply positing that members of Congress are motivated solely by a desire to be re
elected. Much academic writing by the so-called public choice scholars rests on just that
premise. See, e.g., DAVID R. MAYHEW, CONGRESS: THE ELECTORAL CONNECTION
13 (1974). The premise has, in turn, been debunked as reductionist by other writers.
See, e.g., FARBER & FRICKEY, supra note 75, at 21; Mikva, supra note 26, at 1 68-70.
This article does not inquire into how much explanatory power the public choice
school's root premise may possess as a general matter, because it relies on direct evi
dence from empirical investigators who have studied constituent service in particular.
Their work confirms what common sense would suggest that the electoral motive is a
significant factor but not the whole story.
80. To make a confident statement about even one case, one would have to resort
to circumstantial evidence, or else decide how seriously to take the assurances of people
who are in the business of putting the best face on things. Even if an individual were to
be judged sincere, one would have to allow for the possibility of self-deception and ra
tionalization. Then one would have to consider the fact that individuals can have differ-
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ent purposes it is enough to posit that, in general, reelection is at least a
significant motivating factor behind members' casework activity.
The evidence for that relatively cautious proposition is quite
strong, even putting aside the admissions of members themselves. The
electoral incentive seems to be the best explanation of why some mem
bers go out of their way to

solicit cases, thus multiplying the number of

constituents whom they can serve and who will be in a position to re
member their protectors' efforts on election day.81 Moreover, several
studies have found that congressional representatives from vulnerable
districts do more constituent service than those from safe districts. The
obvious explanation is that these members feel they need more protec
tion against defeat and believe that casework will provide that
protection.82
The electoral incentive to engage in constituent service is highly
relevant to the concerns of this article, because it suggests that mem
bers' favorable evaluations of the practice may be a rationalization, or
at least colored by self-interest. Legislators who believe they profit
from casework may overlook, or be too quick to dismiss, some of the
costs that casework imposes on our political system, and - more to the
point - some of the ethical hazards it poses. In fact, the electoral in
centive increases the resemblance between the ethical pitfalls of the
casework system and the traditional subjects of legislative ethics regula
tion, which, as we have seen, generally implicate claims that a member
has elevated self-interest over the public interest.83 Thus, disinterested
observers should be prepared to look skeptically at members' own perceptions about the proper limits of casework.

·

On the other hand, political motives are not evil in themselves.
They are indispensable to democratic government, because the very no
tion of congressional accountability assumes that legislators must take
actions that they believe will engender political support.84 In the end,
therefore, the question of the extent to which ethical rules should ac
commodate an institution such as constituent service should turn prima-

ent motives at different times and that the motives of a few members may not be those
of all 535.
81. See CAIN ET AL supra note 45, at 63-64; JOHANNES, supra note 44, at 3942.
82. See CAIN ET AL supra note 45, at 95-96; FIORINA, supra note 77, at 89-90;
JOHANNES, supra note 44, at 45-47. On the other hand, the fact that all offices, includ
ing those of members with safe seats, do some casework suggests that politics is not the
only consideration.
83. See supra notes 31-34 and accompanying text
84. See ETIIlCS OF LEGISLATIVE LIFE, supra note 17, at 35; THOMPSON, supra
note 28, at 30, 66-67, 109.
.,

.,
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rily on the value of that institution to society. not on the political mo
tives that may underlie it.ss If casework is worthwhile on its own terms,
the expectation of political gain is not, by itself, a reason to condemn
the practice - any more than the existence of popular support for a bill
is a reason for criticizing a legislator who votes for the measure.s6 If a
case against constituent service is to be made, it must rest on a showing
that casework has harmful consequences for society. not on the mere
fact that a member's pursuit of political interests

could conflict with

those of the public.
2.

Casework as an Unhealthy Political Influence

The linchpin of the rational-choice scholars' argument that constit
uent service is detrimental to the body politic is that legislators not only

intend to use casework as a reelection tool, but also are successful in
using it for that purpose. In the 1989 edition of his book Congress:
Keystone of the Washington Establishment, Fiorina suggested that an in
cumbent's track record as an effective provider of constituent service
can improve the member's electoral support by five or more percentage
points.87 That much payoff would go far toward turning a marginal con
gressional district into a safe one.ss Fiorina argued that, insofar as
casework renders members less vulnerable to electoral defeat, it damp
ens the political responsiveness of Congress as a whole because na
tional trends in public opinion about policy issues are less likely to be
reflected in turnover of legislative seats. s9

85. Although the discussion at this point considers only whether casework in gen
eral should be condemned because of the motives that normally lie behind it, one
should also keep in mind the desirability of constructing rules that do not require proof
of motives in particular cases. Issues regarding an actor's state of mind, which usually
must be established through circumstantial evidence, are an uncomfortable basis for eth
ics regulation in any context, and even more so in a political arena in which the adjudi
cators have their own partisan reasons to want to exonerate or condemn the accused.
86. Conversely, of course, the fact that a member "means no harm" is not an ade
quate excuse for acts that do more to subvert than to nourish the democratic process.
See THOMPSON, supra note 28, at 23-24 (arguing that an ethical standard that identifies
corruption on the basis of objective circumstances, without undue attention to motives,
is essential to democratic accountability).
87. See FIORINA, supra note 77, at 87, 99.
88. See id. at 50-51 , 98-99.
89. See id. at 93-94. Fiorina acknowledges that members are highly attuned to cur
rents in public opinion and constantly in search of ways to adapt to it. In that sense,
they are highly responsive. See id. Nevertheless, he argues, individual members rarely
alter their political philosophies drastically over time. Thus, only turnover in seats can
effectively bring the views of the legislature into line with the views of the country. See
id. at 14, 134-35.
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Fiorina did not attempt to extrapolate this critique into a broad as
sertion that constituent service does more harm than good, and any such
use of his thesis would be open to question on several levels. First, and
most conspicuously, recent political developments make his indictment
of Congress less compelling than it once seemed. Writing in 1989, he
directed his critique most pointedly at the House of Representatives,
which at that time had remained under the control of the Democratic .
Party for almost forty years, despite many ebbs and flows in political
opinion during that interval.90 But, of course, in 1994 the Republican
Party did win control of both the House and Senate
and did so
largely by highlighting national issues, thus overcoming the erstwhile
truism that "all politics is local." Indeed, the image of the "permanent
Congress," which was so rhetorically appealing only a few years ago,
has lost much of its force now that half of all members of Congress
have won their offices within the last three election cycles. .
Even in the 1980s, when reelection rates seemed to lend so much
more support to his argument, Fiorina took pains not to exaggerate the
strength of the causal relationship he had identified. He freely acknowl
edged that he could not rigorously demonstrate that casework actually
does improve a legislator's chances of reelection.91 He also noted that
his thesis did not apply very forcefully to senators, whose campaigns
for reelection generally depend much more on incumbents' issues, ac
complishments, and personal characteristics than on their records of fa
vors for individual constituents.92 In addition, he cautioned against any
·_

90.

See id. at 134-39.
91. See id. at 94-95. Fiorina addresses this difficulty most comprehensively in his
collaboration with Cain and Ferejohn. See CAIN ET AL. , supra note '45, at 121-23. Re
luctant to dispute the politicians' broad consensus that a connection between casework
and electoral success does exist, see id. at 123, the authors point to reasons why such a
connection is inherently difficult to investigate rigorously. One problem is that all con
gressional offices engage in some casework; no one can test empirically what would
happen to a member who did none. An additional complication is that members who
feel electorally threatened tend to engage in casework more assiduously than those who
believe themselves safer. See supra note 82 and accompanying text Thus, high levels of
casework correlate poorly with electoral success because the most active offices are
those of members who were unusually vulnerable from the outset See CAIN ET AL.,
supra note 45, at 123-34; FIORINA, supra note 77, at 95-97. According to the authors,
reliable data does at least demonstrate that casework contributes to a favorable image of
the member in the public's mind. See CAIN ET AL., supra note 45, at 148-53. They ar
gue, not implausibly, that such an image is somewhat helpful on election day. But see
JOHANNES, supra note 44, at 187-21 1 (questioning the asserted connection between
casework and votes).
92. See FIORINA, supra note 77, at 1 16.
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assumption that casework is the only source of House incumbents' elec
toral advantages.93
This is not to say that the tendencies that Fiorina discerned are
nonexistent. Indeed, he could argue that the newly dominant Republi
cans are now in a position to exploit constituent service to perpetuate
their own reign.94 However, changing political circumstances have
tended to blunt the force of the normative premise underlying his cri
tique: that the incumbent-protective effects of constituent service are ex
cessive. As anyone who has paid attention to the ongoing national de
bate over term limits can attest, the argument over the clfilmed need for
increased turnover has two sides: Fiorina's side emphasizes the need for
responsiveness and fresh ideas; the other side argues that the ability of
incumbents to survive in office improves the legislature by virtue of
their experience, institutional knowledge, and ability to develop rela
tionships of mutual trust. That debate continues, but the waning for
tunes of the term limits movement95 suggest that society is unlikely to
turn its back on constituent service because of a desire to promote
greater congressional turnover.
In their book on constituent service, Cain, Ferejohn, and Fiorina
offer a more subtle, but perhaps more broadly acceptable, version of the
political entrenchment argument. They claim that, because it strengthens
a member's electoral base, casework contributes to the ability of legisla
tors to be independent entrepreneurs who have weak ties to their party
leaders and who, therefore, have little incentive to work together in the
development of coherent national policy.96 "Once members can assure
their return to office independently of the course of national events and
national performance, the parties must rely on shared views and moral
suasion - which are better than nothing, but not much to depend on
when the chips are down."97 Similarly, the electoral support that
casework generates makes members less likely to cooperate with the
President, because their own survival depends less on his.98 Decentrali93. See id. at 99-101. Other contributing factors include the ability to ascertain and
adapt to voters' issue stands and the superior access of incumbents to campaign financ
ing. These factors not only strengthen the incumbent's own campaign, but also serve to
ward off strong challengers. See id.
94. See Eric Felton, The Siren Song of Constituent Service, WASH. TIMES, Nov.
17, 1994, at A21 (warning against this possible development).
95. Both the House and Senate have rejected term limits proposals during the cur
rent Congress. See Vote Blocks Term-Limit Bill; Political Echoes May Linger, N.Y.
TlMEs, Apr. 24, 1996, at A18; see also U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 1 15 S. Ct.
1842 (1995) (holding state limits on congressional terms unconstitutional).
96. See CAIN ET AL., supra note 45, at 3, 13-14.
97. Id. at 14.
98. See id. at 16, 205-06.

Congressional Ethics

October 1996]

27

zation makes it "more difficult to formulate decisive, coherent pol
icy. "99

In short, the autonomy that legislators derive from cultivating a

personal electoral base, independent of party, contributes to parochial
ism and fragmentation in Congress.100
Much in this appraisal has the ring of truth, but the extent to which
constituent service must bear the blame for congressional fragmentation
is debatable. Certainly, as Cain, Ferejohn, and Fiorina note, other forces
contribute to the same result, including the simple fact that members
represent territorially defined districts.101

In any case, the authors do not

contend that the impact of casework on fragmentation in national poli
cymaking justifies a condemnation of the constituent service system as
a whole. They acknowledge that citizens have a legitimate need for an
advocate in Washington, and that legislators must fill that role. In short,
constituents make a variety of valid demands on the political system,
ranging from personal and locally important needs to genuinely national
ones, and "[i]n the end, some tension is inescapable."102
3.

Casework as a Flawed Grievance System

Criticisms of constituent service on public administration grounds
tend to fall into two categories. The first is that casework is a waste of
time, distracting legislators from their "primary," or at least constitu
tionally prescribed, task of lawmaking.

In the words of Walter Mondale,

who served twelve years as a senator before his term as Vice President,
"There are only

100 of you in the Senate that can deal with (national)
In con

issues. There's thousands who can deal with Social Security."103

cept, this argument opens up interesting theoretical issues about the rel
ative importance of various ways in which a legislator can serve a8 a
"representative."

In reality, however, the criticism seems ill-founded

for a simple reason: casework is primarily a staff function, and most

99. Id. at 21.
100. See id. at 197-98; ETHICS OF LEGISLATIVE LIFE, supra note 17, at 44-45
(casework and other forces have "made the legislative environment less supportive of
legislative duties of institutional responsibility").
101. See CAIN ET AL., supra note 45, at 19, 209-10.
102. Id. at 229.
103. Karen Foerstel, Reform Panel Moves to Next Stage, RoLL CALL, July 5,
1993, at 2; see, e.g., CLAPP, supra note 46, at 54-55; KRAvrrz. supra note 46, at 1315; Lied!, supra note 73, at 24; cf. Liebert, supra note 52, at 1758 (quoting Rep. Don
Edwards's comment, in mild reproof of representatives' current priorities, that "going
home [to tend the grass roots] is wonderful, but the work's here. We're getting paid to
be here.").
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members spend little time on it.104 The "waste of time" argument may
have had more validity a generation ago than it has now. The amount of
time that members spend on constituent service seems to have de
creased in the past few decades, 105 even though caseloads themselves
have increased sharply during the same time period. The expansion of
staff resources devoted to casework has apparently allowed members to

use their time more efficiently.106

The second, more substantial criticism is that casework is a clumsy
and haphazard approach to improving the administration of federal pro
grams. One of the nation's foremost administrative law scholars, the
late Walter Gellhorn, made a strong case for this position in his
book

1966
When Americans Complain.101 When a member of Congress ob

tains a result that is satisfying from a particular constituent's perspec
tive, Gellhorn argued, the member has not necessarily promoted the na
tional interest. The legislator's intervention does not improve the overall
delivery of services to the public and may well cause a delay in the
processing of other, equally deserving citizens' cases.108 Moreover, to
the extent that a congressional inquiry causes the agency to use its dis
cretion to favor the citizen about whom the request was made, it under
mines the evenhandedness of the particular agency's system.109 Instead
of focusing on individual cases, Gellhorn maintained, legislators should

104. See FIORINA, supra note 77, at 91 (conceding that he had previously erred in
arguing that congressional offices' increased emphasis on casework is at the expense of
legislative work); JOHANNES , supra note 44, at 156-59; supra note 58. But see Fred
Barnes, The Unbearable Lightness of Being a Congressman, NEW REPUBLIC, Feb. 15,
1988, at 18, 18 (describing how one idealistic "Reagan revolutionary" was trans
formed, after his election to the House, into "a workaholic with little time for what he
calls 'macro issues' and an obsession with the parochial interests of his district
like
nearly everyone else in the House").
105. See JOHANNES, supra note 44, at 149-50.
106. To be sure, casework does take at least some of members' time - including
the time they spend supervising their staff - and a minority of representatives do
choose to spend significant amounts of time on constituent service. See supra note 58.
Still, no one really kllows how much of the time currently spent on casework would
otherwise be devoted to studying and resolving great questions of national policy, as
opposed to being spent on other forms of advocacy of local district interests, see
Barnes, supra note 104, or on self-promotional activities such as campaigning, fundrais
ing, or "show-horse" position-taking.
107. See GELi.HORN, supra note 46.
108. See id. at 77-78; JERRY L. MASHAW, BUREAUCRATIC JUSTICE 71, 135-36
(1983) (Social Security Administration); Abraham D. Sofaer, The Change-of-Status Ad
judication: A Case Study of the Informal Adjudication Process, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 349,
383-84 (1972) (Immigration and Naturalization Service).
109. See MASHAW, supra note 108, at 135-36; Sofaer, supra note 108, at 383-84.
•

•

.
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concentrate on getting agencies to do their work right the firs� time, or
to fix problems themselves when the need arises.U0
Not surprisingly, the idea that casework is actually an impediment
to effective administration finds favor with more than a few agency of
ficials.1 1 1 What looks like "overcoming bureaucratic arrogance" from
the standpoint of congressional caseworkers will, of course, often look
like "legislative interference" from the agency's standpoint.
Nonetheless, these are relatively isolated voices. Casework has in
general been a popular and effective practice that serves with some fre
quency to rectify genuine problems in administration. One can readily
appreciate the logic of Gellhom's central insighLthat the casework sys
tem is founded on

advocacy; the objective of improving the overall sys

tem is at best incidental to the more central objective of securing relief
for the requester.112 In this sense, there might very well be more effi
cient ways to upgrade deficient administrative operations. Congres
sional constituent service is, however, surely better than nothing. Agen
cies do make mistakes, after all, and the dilemma of the citizen who
does not know where to tum for relief is .not a fictitious one. Indeed,
Johannes reports that a majority of the agency officials he interviewed
had a favorable view of the present system.113 It is unlikely that either
Congress or the public would accept the abandonment of the extant
casework system unless some other form of external grievance machin
ery were made available to citizens.114
To be sure, Gellhorn did not favor such an abandonment. On the
contrary, he, like others who have argued in a similar vein, paired his
critique with a suggestion that Congress should explore the possibility
of instituting an ombudsman program that would substitute, at least in
part, for the congressional role.115 Indeed, over the past thirty years a
1 10. See GELLHORN. supra note 46, at 80-81, 124-25, 128.
1 1 1. See also JOHANNES , supra note 44, at 94 (indicating that program adminis
trators sometimes look upon casework inquiries as a headache). A more benign view,
however, prevails in congressional relations offices in the larger agencies. See id. at 8789.
1 12. See GELLHORN, supra note 46, at 216-17.
1 13. See JOHANNES , supra note 44, at 89-92.
1 14. This assumes that judicial review, standing alone, is not a sufficient check on
administrative agencies. Congressional casework serves many citizens who do not have
the nerve or the money to resort to the courts, or who have grievances that the judici
ary, with its limited scope of review, will not rectify. See Klonoff, supra note 46, at
718-19. In any event, even if one accepts the criticism that congressional intervention
helps the fortunate few without improving administration for the many, one should also
recall that judicial review has been criticized for doing exactly the same thing. See
MAsHAW, supra note 108, at 138-39, 185-86.
1 15. See, e.g., GELLHORN, supra note 46, at 128-30, 218-32; Wtlliam B. Gwyn,
Transferring the Ombudsman, in OMBUDSMEN FOR AMERICAN GOVERNMENT? 37

'
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few members of Congress themselves have offered a variety of propos
als for an "office of constituent assistance" or another ombudsman-like
entity that would be located in the legislative branch but detached from
individual member offices.116 These proposals, however, have been al
most entirely ignored. As already explained, members believe that the
current system serves their political interests, a perception that may help
to account for Congress's hesitation to try something new. Regardless of
the reasons, however, no movement toward adoption of such a proposal
can be discerned.
The general lack of interest in ombudsman plans as an alternative
to constituent service does not, of course, prove that the idea is not
worth pursuing. Nevertheless, if the purpose of seeking reform is to
minimize the possibility of incidents like the Keating episode, this is al
most certainly not the right solution. All of the most visible proposals
for a congressional assistance office have
ombudsman would receive cases only

contemplated

that the

by voluntary referral from a

member's office.117 Members would remain entirely free to handle cases
in the traditional way if they chose. Presumably, ethical lapses such as
favoritism or the exercise of undue influence are most likely to occur in
cases in which a member has decided, for whatever reason, to make an
unusual display of clout. Almost by hypothesis, members would be un
likely to view such cases as good candidates for referral to an
ombudsman.118 Accordingly, although an ombudsman arrangement may

58-59 (Stanley V. Anderson ed., 1966). For a defmition of the ombudsman concept, see
supra note 49.
1 16. See FREDERICK M. KAISER, A CONGRESSIONAL OFFICE OF CONSTITU

AsSISTANCE: PROPOSALS, RATIONALES, AND POSSIBLE OBJECTIONS (Cong.
Res. Serv. No. 91-893 GOV, 1991); Klonoff, supra note 46, at 724-33.
1 17. See GELLHORN, supra note 46, at 87 (describing proposal by Rep. Henry
Reuss); KAISER, supra note 1 16, at 4-5 (describing plans proposed by Rep. Wayne
Owens and Sens. Vance Hartke and Dennis DeConcini); Klonoff, supra note 46, at 723
(Reuss plan), 725 (author's plan). The political logic behind this aspect of the plans is
that members value their ability to claim credit for casework activities. See supra notes
76-82 and accompanying text. Such credit-claiming contributes to their image as help
ful, effective representatives, but could not occur if constituents were free to bring cases
directly to the ombudsman. For this and other reasons, observers have agreed that an
ombudsman system that would totally displace congressional offices' constituent service
could never be enacted. See GELLHORN, supra note 46, at 93-94 (arguing that both po
litical realities and caseload volume preclude transfer of all casework business to
ombudsman); JOHANNES , supra note 44, at 214, 216); Klonoff, supra note 46, at 723ENT

24.
1 18. The only visible congressional proponent of an ombudsman plan in recent
years has been Senator DeConcini, one of the Keating Five respondents. He argued that
the creation of a constituent assistance office would enable benignly motivated legisla·
tors to refer politically sensitive inquiries to the ombudsman office and thereby avoid
being accused of excessive partisanship or favoritism. See 137 CONG. REc. Sl2,205
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for the sake of such public administration values as

efficiency, coordination, and breadth of vision in routine cases, its util
ity as a tool of ethics reform is much more questionable.119
Proposals to replace congressional constituent service with a more
neutral ombudsman would also face bona fide objections on the merits.
Johannes reports that both congressional caseworkers and agency offi
cials are deeply skeptical about the idea.120 Possible managerial
problems aside, they doubt it would be very effective without the "per
sonal touch," the sense of commitment to the constituent's cause that
congressional offices bring to their work.121 Indeed, one suspects that
the American temperament finds something distinctly more attractive
about placing one's trust in an adversarial system than in what would
inevitably be perceived as "another bureaucracy."122 Members of the
public recognize the same political realities as Congress does - that
legislators

are

more

immediately

responsible

to

them than an

ombudsman could ever be. While the overall desirability of an
ombudsman scheme cannot be analyzed in any depth here, the widely
held perception that an ombudsman office would not succeed because it
would lack the elected official's sense of advocacy deserves emphasis,
because it highlights the close connection between casework and our
culture's conceptions of a member's role as advocate.

D.

Interim Conclusions

The discussion in this Part suggests why rules of ethics that would
circumscribe the constituent service function have the potential to create
a dilemma for the conscientious member of Congress. Casework is now
a deeply entrenched element of congressional life. It responds to legiti
mate interests of citizens who have grievances against an administrative
agency and in many cases have no other readily available advocate to
champion their interests. It functions fairly smoothly most of the time
and improves agency accountability in many cases.
Critics make valid points when they· call attention to the resource
costs that casework imposes on both agencies and congressional offices,
(daily ed. Aug. 2, 1991) (remarks of Sen. DeConcini). The premise of this argument 
that members would pass along requests from people like Keating to an ombudsman seems questionable. At least the senator did not suggest that he himself would have
availed himself of that option during the famous events of 1987, had it been available.
1 19. See Glenn R. Simpson, Post-Keating-5 Report on Constituent Service Awaits
Mitchell Action, ROLL CALL, Feb. 24, 1992, at 10 (" [f]he ethical benefits to Congress
of an Office of Constituent Service might be minimal.").
120. See JOHANNES, supra note 44, at 214.
121. See id. at 214-15, 218.
122. See DOUGLAS, supra note 63, at 87-88.
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or when they note the ways in which casework can aggravate tenden
cies toward opportunism, parochialism, and fragmentation. Yet none of
these critiques appears to rise to the level of showing that casework is
on balance detrimental to society's interests. Furthermore, the option of
establishing

an

institutional

alternative to casework,

such

as

an

ombudsman office, seems remote and perhaps not even a good idea.
This appraisal of the constituent service system provides a back
ground perspective with which we can evaluate contemporary pressures
on Congress to reform itself in the wake of the Keating scandal. As a
practical matter, external pressure to clean house is surely the main fac
tor spurring current interest in ethics reform. Ethics reform is touted as
a means by which Congress can combat cynicism and restore public
confidence in the legislative branch.
Public opinion,. however, is a two-edged sword. Studies have con
sistently shown broad public support for congressional casework.

In a
1978 survey, an overwhelming majority of citizens considered casework

important, and about eleven percent considered it a representative's

most important function - a figure in the same ballpark as the nineteen
percent who said the representative's lawmaking function was most im
portant 123 To be sure, these fmdings predated the Keating scandal, but
there is little evidence that the current high levels of disillusionment
with Congress have significantly eroded this ·support for casework.124
Talk show hosts continually deride Congress, but rarely if ever do they
condemn its constituent service function. One hears various politicians
pledge to oppose salary increases, decline PAC money, or serve no
more than a few terms, but seldom does one hear a candidate for Con
gress pledge not to go to bat against recalcitrant agencies in behalf of
his constituents. 125
123. See CAIN ET AL., supra note 45, at 38.
124. Fulfilling a pledge in the "Contract with America," the House of Representa
tives in the 104th Congress reduced the size of its committee staffs by a third; but re
ductions in representatives' personal staffs, which handle most casework, were neither
promised nor adopted. See Gabriel Kahn, House Votes Overwhelmingly to Slash Com
mittee Budgets, Staff by One-Third, Rou. CALL, Mar. 16. 1995, available in LEXIS,
Legis Library, Rollcl File.
125. One who did was ex-Representative Michael Hufftngton, in his unsuccessful
1994 race to unseat Senator Dianne Feinstein of California. A defense contractor, in ap
plying for a waiver from the State Department that would allow it to sell equipment to
Taiwan, had sought Huffington's assistance; when he refused to help, the contractor en
listed Feinstein's aid and ultimately received the waiver. Hufftngton's campaign boasted
of his principled stand against special interest government, pointing out that Feinstein
had accepted a political contribution from the contractor at about the time of her inter
vention. Press comment, however, praised Feinstein's efforts (which had preserved Cali
fornia jobs), dismissing Huffington's stance as peculiar and contrary to the state's best
interests. Editorialists remembered, but chose not to be swayed by, the experiences of
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At most, one might describe the public as ambivalent about con
stituent service in the wake of. the Keating scandal. Citizens may want
"Congress" to be more restrained in pressuring administrative agencies,
but at the same time they presumably want their own senators and rep
resentatives to continue to be vigorous advocates for local interests.126 It
is not clear whether a significant curtailment of the role of members as
advocates would cause greater satisfaction or dissatisfaction among the
electorate. Indeed, to articulate the dilemma in its starkest terms, the
public has come to

expect its representatives to provide generous

casework services. Members believe, with good reason, that voters will
retaliate if they do not run an effective constituent service operation.127
Ethics reformers would likely argue that this discussion is beside
the point, because their goal is not to revamp routine casework func
tions but to curb the actions of legislators who display undue influence
or favoritism on behalf of wealthy special interests.128 Even to define
those evils, however, one needs to take account of the role that congres
sional constituent advocacy plays in our system of goveriunent. This
Part's analysis of the casework system as a whole has been designed to
illuminate the nature of that role. Furthermore, any new restrictions that
may be proposed should be evaluated not only in terms of the corrup
tion they would suppress, but also- in terms of the legitimate activity
that they would incidentally prevent. To the extent the reader accepts
the proposition that the social benefits of constituent service outweigh
its costs, the grounds for concern about possible overbreadth in any
suggested reform measure will be augmented.
This Part's elaboration of some of the potential complications at
tending this branch of congressional ethics reforms is not intended to
make the case for doing nothing. Indeed, even if the Keating scandal
and the public clamor resulting from it had never occurred, there would
have been good reasons for Congress to reappraise the ethics of constit
uent service. Casework has burgeoned in recent years, and with ex
panded activity comes a greater risk of misconduct. Moreover, in view
of the political payoffs that members · expect to reap from aggressive

California's recently retired senator, Alan Cranston. See, e.g., Gerry Braun, Huffingion's
Hands-Off Stance Baffles Analysts, SAN DIEGO UNION-Tum., Aug. 1 1 , 1994, at 8;
John Jacobs, Huffington's Political "Purity," SACRAMENTO BEE, Sept. 22, 1994, at
B6; Debra J. Saunders, The Clueless Philosopher-Candidate, S.F. CHRON., Sept. 21,
1994, at A23.
126. Political scientists have frequently pointed out that voters tend to have a far
higher opinion of their own representative than of Congress as a whole. See, e.g., CAIN
ET AL., supra note 45, at 198-203.
127. See id. at 85-86, 21 1 .
128. See, e.g., Waldman, supra note 73, a t 23.
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and vigorous pursuit of casework activities, one has to wonder whether
legislators are likely to give the ethical pitfalls in the process the atten
tion they deserve.
The real task is to identify principles that will address the tempta
tions that create ethics problems in constituent service without any real
impairment of members' legitimate functions as advocates. To that task
we now tum.

ill.

IMPROPER CONTACTS AND UNDUE INFLUENCE

Narrowly viewed, the Keating case dealt with the ethical problems
that arise when a member of Congress intervenes in an administrative
proceeding on behalf of a campaign contributor. Those problems will be
considered in Part rv. This Part, however, will address an antecedent
question: whether, and under what circumstances, congressional constit
uent service can be improper because it acts as an "undue influence"
on an agency, even in the absence of money as a complicating factor.
This question was not a contentious issue during the Keating proceed
ings, apparently because no one on the Senate Committee was prepared
to argue that the five senators' behavior would have been improper if
campaign contributions had not been involved.129 Nevertheless, undue
influence problems - which have been controversial in other cases will be examined here in order to clarify the boundaries of accepted
practice and set the stage for consideration of the issues of money influ
ence that were central to the Keating scandal.
The discussion looks initially to authorities that have directly ad
dressed the undue influence issue in the context of legislative ethics.
However, because ethics committees have rarely addressed this topic,
the discussion will tum to judicial doctrine. Indeed, the subject of un
due influence has generated an extensive case law, much of which is fa-

129. See KEATING REPORT, supra note 4, at 8-9, 15, 16. At the outset of the
Committee's hearings, the Committee's special counsel, Robert Bennett, intimated that
he might make an issue of overly aggressive conduct by the five senators in the case.
See 1 Preliminary Inquiry into Allegations Regarding Senators Cranston, DeConcini,
Glenn, McCain & Riegle, and Lincoln Savings & Loan: Hearings Before the Senate Se
lect Comm. on Ethics, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 74-75 (Nov. 15, 1990) [hereinafter Keating
Hearings; references herein to these hearings include specific dates, because each day's
transcript is separately paginated]. Ultimately, however, he apparently abandoned this
stance and concentrated his attack on the links between the senators' conduct and their
receipt of campaign assistance from Keating. See, e.g., 6 id. at 192 (Jan. 15, 1991) (con
ceding during closing argument that Senator Riegle's actions in setting up the April 2,
1987, meeting were proper if not influenced by money).
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miliar to administrative lawyers.130 These surveys of past cases will then
provide a basis for analysis of possible new ethics rules.
A.

Ethics Enforcement Cases

Undue influence is a relatively new subject on the agendas of the
congressional ethics committees. As recently as a decade ago, there had
never been a disciplinary case raising the issue, and even advisory gui
dance was quite limited.
For many years, the most authoritative pronouncement on point
was Advisory Opinion No.
in

1 of the House Ethics Committee.131 Issued

1970, the advisory opinion seemed largely devoted to setting forth a

strong defense of congressional casework. The Committee added only a
few qualifying admonitions; for present purposes, the most relevant of
these was that "[d]irect or implied suggestion of either favoritism or re
prisal in advance of, or subsequent to, action taken by the agency con
tacted is unwarranted abuse of the representative role." 132 The House
has subsequently published and periodically updated an ethics manual,
which primarily summarizes existing legal limitations on casework, but
also contains brief advice as to its proper exercise.133

In addition, Congress has long had available the highly regarded
and thoughtful writings of the late Senator Paul H. Douglas. The sena
tor initially published his ideas in a report that he wrote in 1951 on be
half of a special subcommittee looking into ethical problems of govern
ment at large.134 He elaborated on the subject in lectures published

130. The literature contains several helpful surveys of the case law, including

MORTON ROSENBERG & JACK H. MAsKELL, CONGRESSIONAL INTERVENTION IN
THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS: LEGAL AND ETIIlCAL CONSIDERATIONS (Cong.
Res. Serv. No. 90-440A, 1990); Mark E. Solomons et al., Agency Diplomacy: Relations

with Congress and the White House, and Ethics in the Administrative Process, 4 An
MIN. LJ. AM.. U. 3, 27-38 (1990) (comments of David M. Klaus) [hereinafter Klaus];
Brett G. Kappel, Comment, Judicial Restrictions on Improper Congressional Influence
in Administrative Decision-making: A Defense of the Pillsbury Doctrine, 6 JL. & POL.
135 (1989).
131. Advisory Opinion No. 1, House Comm. on Standards of Official Conduct,
1 16 CONG. REc. 1077 (1970) [hereinafter Advisory Opinion No. 1].
132. The opinion also cautioned that " [t]he overall public interest
is primary
to any individual matter," and that " [a] Member's responsibility in this area is to all his
constituents equally
irrespective of political or other considerations." Id. at 1078.
The former admonition is discussed briefly infra at notes 197, 208 and accompanying
text; the latter is discussed in Part IV.
133. HOUSE COMM. ON STANDARDS OF OFFICIAL CONDUCT, 1020 CONG., 2o
SESS., ETIIlCS MANuAL FOR MEMBERS, OFFICERS, AND EMPLOYEES OF THE U.S.
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 241-62 (1992) [hereinafter HOUSE ETIIlCS MANuAL].
134. SUB COMMITfEE OF THE SENATE COMM. ON LABOR & PUB. WELFARE,
820 CONG., l ST SESS., PROPOSALS FOR IMPROVEMENT OF ETIIlCAL STANDARDS
.
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in Government the following year.135 Jn these writ

ings he vigorously defended the practice of constituent service, but also
commented on the ethical obligations that he thought should accompany
the. practice, including trying to find out the merits of the case, avoiding
financial conflicts of interest, and showing respect for agency officials.
A numbei: of the senator's suggestions will be noted in the discussion
that follows. For now it may simply be observed that these unofficial
and highly personal reflections were, until the 1990s, the closest thing
the Senate had to a code of ethics for constituent service.
'
The undue influence issue came into much sharper focus in 1989,
in conjunction with a complaint filed with the House Ethics Committee
against then-Speaker Jim Wright. The special outside counsel appointed
to investigate the case identified several assertions of "undue influ
ence" as probable violations of House rules.136 He accused Wright of
having gone beyond pennissible bounds in pressing officials of the Fed
eral Home Loan Bank Board to be less aggressive in proceeding against
Texans who were suspected of unsound practices in the management of
savings and loan institutions. According to the special counsel, Wright
had pestered bank regulators with numerous telephone calls and meet
ings, demanded the ouster· of hard-line regulators, and induced the
chairman of the Bank Board to appoint independent counsel to investi
gate whether a particular respondent - a prominent fundraiser for the
Democratic Party of Texas - had been mistreated. Most strikingly, per
haps, Wright was accused of having placed a "hold" on a savings and
loan bailout bill in order to pressure the Bank Board chairman to re
place an official whom Wright considered "inflexible" in dealings with
one of Wright's constituents.
The Ethics Committee refused to proceed with the undue influence
charges (although it did fmd reason to believe that Wright had violated
several financial conflict of interest rules, and these fmdings led directly
to Wright's resignation from the House). It gave the following brief
explanation:
. It is clear that under our constitutional form of government there is
a constant tension between the legislative and executive branches regard
ing the desires of legislators on the one hand and the actions of agencies

IN' THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 28-30 (Comm. Print 1951) [hereinafter DOUGLAS
REPoRT]. Although published for a subcommittee of five, the report is commonly asso
ciated with Douglas, the subcommittee chair.
135. See DOUGLAS, supra note 63, at 85-92.
136. HOUSE COMM. ON STANDARDS OF OFFICIAL CONDUCT, 101ST CONG.,
lST SESS., REPORT OF THE SPECIAL OUTSIDE COUNSEL IN THB MATTER OF
SPEAKER JAMES C. WRIGHT, JR. 18-24 (1989).
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on the other in carrying out their respective responsibilities. The assertion
that the exercise· of undue influence can arise based upon a legislator's
expressions of interest jeopardizes the ability of Members effectively to
represent persons and organizations having concern with the activities of
executive agencies.
Accordingly, while it may well be that Representative Wright was
intemperate in his dealings with representatives of the Federal Home·
Loan Banlc Board, the Committee is not persuaded that there is reason to
believe that he exercised undue influence in dealing with that agency. In
sum, such a finding cannot rest on pure inference or circumstance or, for
that matter, on the technique and personality of the legislator, but, in
stead, must be based on probative evidence that a' reprisal or threat to
agency officials was made.137

The states have made very few formal efforts to deal with the ethi
cal dimension of legislators' "undue influence" on administration,138
but one exception is

In re Tuttle, an advisory opinion by the Maine Eth

ics Commission.139 There, three state legislators had written to the
Maine real estate commission, urging it to dismiss a pending license
suspension proceeding against an individual. The Ethics Commission
concluded that the letter had constituted an exercise of undue influence,
particularly because the legislators, in seeking dismissal, had also com
mitted themselves to seeking an expansion of the real estate. commis
sion's statutory authority.140 The opinion found that the senator who had
drafted the letter had been motivated "purely to assist a friend by hav
ing a case against the friend dismissed," a motive tha� the Commission

137. HOUSE COMM. ON STANDARDS OF OFFICIAL CONDUCT, 101ST CONG
l ST. SESS., STATEMENT IN THE MATTER OF REPRESENTATIVE JAMES C. WRIGHT,
'
JR. 84 (1989).
138. See Mark W. Lawrence, Comment, Legislative Ethics: Improper Influence by
a Lawmaker on an Administrative Agency, 42 ME. L. REv. 423 (1990). The author of
this exceptionally thorough and thoughtful Comment reports that he sent inquiries to
legislative ethics authorities in all fifty states, the District of Columbia, and several ter
ritories, municipalities, and Canadian provinces. Out of forty-five responses, the Maine
Legislature and the U.S. House were the only entities that reported having dealt with
the undue influence issue in any formal manner. See id. at 432 n.65. In 1993, however,
the Kentucky legislature amended its ethical misconduct statute by adopting the second
sentence of the following provision: "A legislator, by himself or through others, shall
not use or attempt to use any means to influence a state agency in direct contravention
of the public interest at large. Absent an express or implied threat of legislative reprisal,
nothing in this subsection shall prevent a legislator from contacting a state agency on
behalf of a person" KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 6.744(1) (Michie Supp. 1994) (emphasis
added).
139. In re Tuttle (Maine_ Commn. on Governmental Ethics & Election Practices,
Oct. 14, 1988) (on file with author), summarized in Lawrence, supra note 138, at 44348.
140. See In re Tuttle at 4.
.•
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considered inappropriate.141 The other two legislators were deemed to
have exercised poor judgment by signing the letter without knowing the
specifics of the case. 142
The Ethics Commission referred the matter to the legislature for
possible disciplinary action; however, neither the House nor the Senate
took any further action.143 It is worth noting here that the commission
members were apparently not legislators themselves.144 Just as in the
Wright matter, one observes in

Tuttle a revealing disparity in perception

between those who serve in the legislature and those who do not: "out
siders" see an abuse where "insiders" see none. That saine pattern rep
licated itself in the Keating case: although outsiders have viewed the
case as an example of improper pressure tactics even apart from the
senators' financial ties to Keating, 145 the Senate Ethics Committee, as
noted above, 146 firmly rejected that view.

In fact, to this day neither the
Committee nor the full Senate has adopted any limits on the manner in

which senators may intervene in administrative proceedings, 147 although
the Committee has "encouraged" senators to "use House Advisory
Opinion No.

1 as a source of guidance.''148
B.

Judicial Case Law

One line of analysis that could help to bridge the gap between
"outsider" and "insider" perceptions is to examine how the legal sys
tem has responded to allegations of undue influence in legislative inter
vention in agency proceedings. The courts have never had occasion to
weigh the merits of the casework system as a whole, as might be neces
sary if a serious separation of powers challenge to the system were
mounted.149 They have, however, dealt tangentially with aspects of con-

141. In re Tuttle at 6.
142. See In re Tuttle at 5.
143. See Lawrence, supra note 138, at 445-46. One reason may have been that the
senator who wrote the letter was defeated for reelection soon after the commission deci
sion. Id.
144. See ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit l , § 1002(2) (West 1989).
145. See, e.g., Palmer, supra note 73, at A21; Waldman, supra note 73, at 22.
146. See supra note 129 and accompanying text
147. See infra section IY.C. (discussing the Senate's new Rule XLilI).
148. See KEATING REPORT, supra note 4, at 1 1 .
149. A full-scale attack o n congressional constituent service o n separation o f pow
ers grounds would probably not succeed. The most likely basis for a challenge would be
the premise that, under our constitutional system, the executive branch alone should im
plement the laws and the legislative branch should do nothing but write them. This
highly formal model of the constitutional allocation of powers would find a degree of
support in modem cases in which the Court has struck down what it regarded as con
gressional efforts to exceed a lawmaking role. See Metropolitan Wash. Airports Auth. v.

October

1996]

Congressional Ethics

39

stituent service in the course of reviewing agency actions that stem
from the proceedings in which the interventions occurred. Much of this
case law deals with congressional contacts that might more naturally be
described as "legislative oversight" than as "constituent service." As
the following analysis will show, however, those two components of
legislative life are closely intertwined and can be considered together
for purposes of discussion.
1. Formal Proceedings

The state of the law is most easily described in the context of so
called "formal" administrative proceedings - those decided on the ba
sis of trial-type, "on-the-record" hearings. In this setting, discussion of
congressional intervention has long been dominated by Pillsbury Co. v.
FTC,150 decided by the Fifth Circuit in 1966. The case is so well known
that the entire case law on undue influence is often known as the Pills
bury doctrine.

Citizens for the Abatement of Aircraft Noise, Inc., 501 U.S. 252 (1991); Bowsher v.
Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986); INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983); see also Kappel,
supra note 130, at 147 (asserting that Congress may not use informal oversight mecha
nisms to circumvent Chadha).
On closer inspection, however, all of these cases dealt with actual or threatened
congressional attempts to override executive actions through nonstatutocy controls that
purported to have the force of law, or at least were deemed equivalent to de facto con
trol. Thoughtful analysts have recognized that the formalist model of separation of pow
ers cannot plausibly be extended to condemn all informal congressional "influences"
on the execution of the laws. See Susan Low Bloch, Orphaned Rules in the Administra

tive State: The Fairness Doctrine and Other Orphaned Progeny of Interactive Deregu
lation, 16 GEO. LJ. 59, 1 18-22 (1987); H. Lee Watson, Congress Steps Out: A Look at
Congressional Control of the Executive, 63 CAL L. REv. 983, 1061-63 (1975). Their

work need not be duplicated here, but one could add that the Justices have taken note of
casework on several occasions without intimating that these activities are all unconstitu
tional. See, e.g., United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501, 512 (1972); Brewster, 408

U.S. at 557 (White, J., dissenting); Johnson v. Avecy, 393 U.S. 483, 491 (1969)
(Douglas, J., concurring).
Alternatively, one could imagine a more subtle challenge to constituent service,
predicated on the so-called "functional" approach to separation of powers analysis,
which requires a highly contextual judgment about whether a given practice unduly
strengthens or weakens one of the branches of government. See Nixon v. Administrator
of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 443 (1977) (using functional analysis). In this vein one
could argue that casework - at least in some manifestations - upsets the checks and
balances system by intruding too far on the executive branch's ability to execute the
law. Defenders of constituent service, however, would likely reply that such interven
tion promotes checks and balances by curbing overreaching by the executive branch.
The clash between these two views replicates the policy debate over the merits of
casework; just what insight would be gained by conducting that debate in constitutional
terms is not apparent.
150. 354 F.2d 952 (5th Cir. 1966).
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The case began in 1953, when the FI'C rendered an interlocutory
decision in a merger case brought against the Pillsbury Company, en
dorsing a "rule of reason" approach to mergers under the Clayton Act.
Soon afterwards, the chairman of the FI'C attended an oversight hearing
at which senators took him to task for the FI'C's failure to adopt a rule
of "per se" illegality instead. The senators repeatedly criticized the

Pillsbury ruling by name during the hearing. Five years later, after trial
on the merits, the Pillsbury case again reached the Commission, which
ordered divestiture. The chairman who had been questioned during the
oversight hearing had long since left the Commission, but other com
missioners who had attended the hearing joined in the order.
The court set the order aside, asserting that the oversight hearing
had tainted the agency as a whole. The panel acknowledged that Con
gress may properly use oversight hearings to examine agency members
on the positions they adopt pursuant to their "quasi-legislative" func

tion, such as in policy statements or interpretative rules. ISi However, the
court continued:
when such an investigation focuses directly and substantially upon the
mental decisional processes of a Commission in a case which is pending
before it, Congress is no longer intervening in the agency's legislative
function, but rather, in its judicial function. At this latter point, we be
come concerned with the right of private litigants to a fair trial and,
equally important, with their right to the appearance of impartiality,
which cannot be maintained unless those who exercise the judicial func
tion are free from powerful external influences.152

Strikingly, the court seemed little interested in whether the interro
gation had actually caused the Commission to reach a conclusion it
would not otherwise have reached; indeed, the circumstances strongly
suggested that there had been no such influence.153 As far as the court
was concerned, such an inquiry was apparently irrelevant; the main
concern was to preserve the integrity of the Commission's processes
when it acted in a "judicial" capacity.

151. See 354 F.2d at 963-64.
152. 354 F.2d at 964.
153. In particular, (1) five years elapsed between the oversight hearing and the
challenged decision; (2) the chainnan had already disqualified himself, and the commis
sioners who joined in the final agency order (and whose "appearance of impartiality"
was in question) had not spoken or been questioned at the oversight hearing; (3) the
FI'C had already spoken on the antitrust issue that the senators raised, and this issue
was not even in controversy in the FI'C decision after remand; and, most important, (4)
the FI'C did not adopt the senators' view at all, but instead adhered to the same position
on the "per se" issue as it had taken originally. See 354 F.2d at 955-56; Pillsbury Mills,
Inc., 57 F.T.C. 1274, 1390 n. 70, 1399 n. 71 (1960) (decision below).
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In a sense, the Pillsbury holding has been subsumed within a
broader statutory prohibition of ex parte contacts in formal agency pro
ceedings.

In 1976, as part of the Government in the Sunshine Act, Con

gress added a new section 557(d) to the Administrative Procedure Act.
According to this provision, "interested persons" outside an agency
may not make any ex parte communication "relevant to the merits" of
a formally adjudicated case to any agency official who will be involved
in deciding the case.154 The term "interested person" was specifically
intended to include members of Congress, according to the legislative
history.155 Whether the Sunshine Act would apply directly to the facts of
Pillsbury is debatable, because the Act defines "ex parte communica
tions" to mean contacts that are "not on the public record" - a phrase
that might not apply to an oversight hearing, which would not routinely

of the agency proceeding, but which cer
in public. At a minimum, however, section 557(d) reaf

be memorialized in the record
tainly occurs

firms Pillsbury's fundamental premise that formal proceedings deserve
a high degree of procedural regularity. Since the formal adjudicative
process is often used to resolve accusations of wrongdoing and other
highly particularized allegations about individuals, much can be said for
congressional caution in this area.
Yet, even in the realm of formal adjudication, the legal system has
shown more flexibility than one might have expected from the Pillsbury
opinion. Under section 557(d), prohibited ex parte contacts do not lead
automatically to invalidation of an agency order; the court is expected
to decide the scope of relief "to the extent consistent with the interests
of justice and the policy of the underlying statutes." 156 Pursuant to this
directive, courts have sometimes found congressional intervention in
formal adjudication to be too marginal or inconsequential to justify set-

154. 5 u.s.c. § 557(d) (1994).
155. "While the prohibitions on ex parte communications relative to the merits ap
ply to communications from Members of Congress, they are not intended to prohibit
routine inquiries or referrals of constituent correspondence." HR REP. No. 880, 94th
Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1 , at 21-22 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2183, 2203; see
also Portland Audubon Socy. v. Endangered Species Comm., 984 F.2d 1534, 1544-46
(9th Cir. 1993) (holding that the President was an interested person). The latter half of
the quoted statement reflects the fact that § 557(d) applies only to communications "rel
ative to the merits," and perhaps also the fact that the Act defines "ex parte communi
cations" to exclude "requests for status reports." 5 U.S.C. § 551(14) (1994).
156. 5 U.S.C. § 557(d)(l)(D) (1994); see Professional Air Traffic Controllers Org.
v. FLRA, 672 F.2d 109, 1 12-13 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (per curiam) (holding that ex parte
contact by private citizen violated § 557(d), but did not warrant immediate reversal be
cause it did not prejudice the petitioner and had no apparent effect).
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ting the agency action aside.157 Some such cases can be seen as adopt
ing a sort of harmless error analysis: the congressional contact was im
proper, although it did not warrant judicial intervention.158 Even that
posture is a considerable departure from

Pillsbury.159 Other cases, how

ever, go further: they stress the importance of congressional oversight
and treat it as another factor that justifies judicial flexibility.1 60
More particularly, it has come to be understood that many agencies
do some of their most important policymaking through the adjudicative
process, and Congress needs some latitude to carry on oversight of this
policymaking. A pragmatic principle of etiquette has emerged in the
context of oversight hearings: Members who wish to question the legal
positions that agency officials take during adjudication should if possi
ble avoid referring to the individual cases by name; and in any event
they should not discuss the facts of the cases, but only the legal princi
ples announced there.161 A recent case illustrates the practice. In
Monieson v. CFTC, 162 the Commodities Futures Trading Commission
(CFTC) revoked a commodities broker's registration and ordered him to
pay a $500,000 fine; thus, the proceedings had an accusatory flavor that
157. See ATX, Inc. v. United States Dept. of Transp., 41 F.3d 1522, 1528-30 (D.C.
Cir. 1994) (upholding DOT's denial of certification to airline despite heavy congres
sional pressure, including letters from 125 senators and representatives; the court noted
that agency decisionmakers had distanced themselves from the congressional contacts
and had written a decision that the record strongly supported); Power Auth. v. FERC,
743 F.2d 93, 109-10 (2d Cir. 1984) (ruling that ex parte contact did not pose "a serious
likelihood of affecting the agency's ability to act fairly and impartially," because it con
tained no new facts and opposing parties were able to rebut it); Gulf Oil Corp. v. FPC,
563 F.2d 588, 61 1-12 (3d Cir. 1977) (relying on, inter alia, the facts that only a few rep
resentatives commented, that the FPC did not alter its views as the representatives had
urged, and that the issue was purely legal and thus subject to plenary judicial review},
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1062, and cert. dismissed, 435 U.S. 91 1 (1978); cf. Paragon
Cable Television Inc. v. FCC, 822 F.2d 152, 156 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (per curiam) (finding
that ex parte letters from senators and others, submitted before adjudication began, were
harmless because they were promptly disclosed to petitioners).
158. See Power Auth., 743 F.2d at 1 10 (criticizing letter and public statements in
which four House members urged FERC to consider deleterious economic conse
quences of reallocation of electric power). But see Municipal Blee. Utils. Assn. v.
Conable, 577 F. Supp. 158, 164 (D.D.C. 1983) (opining that the same letter was
"within permissible bounds of legislators who validly sought to represent the views of
their constituents").
159. See supra note 153 and accompanying text.
160. See Gulf Oil, 563 F.2d at 610, 612 (giving weight to "the importance and
need for Congressional oversight").
161. See Peter L. Strauss, Disqualification ofDecisional Officials in Rulemaking,
80 COLUM. L. REv. 990, 1026-27 (1980). As a practical matter, staff members for the
executive and congressional participants in the hearing can usually reach agreement in
advance on the bounds of legitimate inquiry, because the two sides share a common in
terest in avoiding sabotage of the underlying legal proceedings.
162. 996 F.2d 852 (7th Cir. 1993).
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warranted the utmost in procedural regularity. Nevertheless, the court
brushed aside the petitioner's complaint that the senator who chaired
the committee overseeing the CFfC had written to the agency expres
sing concern about its enforcement policy. The court noted that the sen
ator did not "take an interest in this case above all others," nor did he
"lean on the CFfC to decide this case in a particular way." He only
asked the chair "to respond to some general questions." Thus, his letter
was "legitimate oversight, not overreaching. " 1 63
For members of Congress to proceed by indirection in this fashion
may seem a superficial solution to the due process problems presented
by legislative oversight; but if one accepts the legitimacy of oversight
itself, etiquette may well be considered the right level on which to
"solve" this problem. Moreover, the principle is not entirely artificial:
members who avoid direct references to pending cases are likely to
avoid addressing themselves to disputes of adjudicative fact, as to
which their prerogative to offer political guidanc� is much more
questionable.

In sum, neither the fame of Pillsbury nor the adoption of section
557(d) has prevented the courts from seeking pragmatic ways to recon
cile the principle of due process with Congress's interest in supervising
administrative decisionmaking, even in the fairly strict domain of for
mal adjudication. This accommodation, however, is overshadowed by
the much greater degree of flexibility usually found in "informal" administrative proceedings, to which this analysis now turns.
2.

·

Informal Proceedings

As has been mentioned,

Pillsbury arose in the context of the Ad

ministrative Procedure Act's framework for formal adjudication. For the
most part, courts have confined its holding to that context. The key de
cision explaining the basis for this limitation is

D.C. Federation of

Civic Assns. v. Volpe.164
D.C. Federation involved a House subcommittee chairman who
threatened to withhold funding for construction of the Washington,
D.C., subway system until the Secretary of Transportation approved a
bridge connecting Virginia with the District of Columbia. After the Sec
retary granted the requested approval, citizens' groups petitioned for re
view in the District of Columbia Circuit. The court remanded for rea
sons unrelated to the present discussion, but it also addressed the issue
of the congressman's threat. Judge Bazelon, writing for the court, rec163. 996 F.2d at 865.
164. 459 F.2d 1231 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
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ognized that according to Pillsbury the mere appearance of bias or pres
sure could be fatal to certain administrative decisions. The

Pillsbury

reasoning did not come into play in this case, however, because the
Secretary's

approval of the bridge

"was

not judicial or quasi

judicial. " 165 By this the court meant that the Secretary "was not re
quired to base it solely on a formal record established at a public hear
ing." 166 The APA uses virtually the same criterion in delimiting the
realm of formal adjudication.167
Nevertheless, the court continued, the inapplicability of
did not detract from the elementary proposition that

an

Pillsbury

agency must

not, in acceding to congressional pressure, decide a case on the basis of
" 'considerations that Congress could not have intended to make rele
vant.' " 168 In the court's view, the chairman's stance was not a factor
that the agency could permissibly consider under the legislation in
volved there; thus, the court admonished the Secretary that on remand
he must reevaluate the bridge proposal without reference to congres
sional pressure.169

D.C. Federation has become the dominant judicial authority on
congressional intervention into informal agency proceedings. Subse
quent cases have adhered almost uniformly to Judge Bazelon's refusal
to give an expansive scope to the

Pillsbury position that congressional

pressure in agency adjudication violates due process in and of itself.
While the contours of the Due Process Clause may not depend directly
on the APNs definition of formal proceedings, adjudications have not
been considered "judicial" within the meaning of Pillsbury unless they
involve highly structured, adversary litigation. 170 Only a small fraction
of administrative actions can be deemed "judicial" under this approach.
165. 459 F.2d at 1246.
166. 459 F.2d at 1247.
167. See 5 U.S.C. § 554(a) (1994). Some have read the court's language as mean
ing that the Pillsbury rule does apply to all proceedings that are "judicial or quasi
judicial" in the sense of being adjudication as opposed to rulemaking. See, e.g., KEAT
ING REPORT, supra note 4, at 9; THOMPSON, supra note 28, at 89. This is an untenable
reading of the D.C. Circuit's opinion, because the agency action reviewed in D.C. Fed
eration itself was adjudication, not rulemaking.
168. 459 F.2d at 1247 (quoting United States ex rel. Kaloudis v. Shaughnessy, 108
F.2d 489, 491 (2d Cir. 1950)).
169. Judge Bazelon was the only member of the panel who concluded that the

Secretary had in fact been influenced by congressional pressure during the prior pro
ceedings. The swing voter on the panel, Judge Fahy, expressed no opinion on that point,
although he joined in the court's opinion insofar as it held that the Secretary would be
required to eschew any such reliance during the remand proceedings to come. See 459
F.2d at 1246.
170. See DCP Fanns v. Yeutter, 957 F.2d 1 183, 1 1 87 (5th Cir. 1992); cf. Koniag,
Inc., v. Andrus, 580 F.2d 601, 609, 611 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (applying Pillsbury to adjudi-
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For all other agency proceedings, the critical questions have become, as
in

D.C. Federation, whether the legislative contact actually -influenced

the decision, and, if so, whether the administrator's reliance on that
contact was incompatible with the decisional criteria specified in the
underlying statute.m
The evidentiary burden of showing that congressional intervention
had an actual impact on the agency decision has proved formidable.
Usually courts are disinclined to find that a congressional contact has
had such influence.172 In fact, with one arguable exception, 173 no appel
late decision has sustained such a contention in the twenty years since

D.C. Federation was decided. This evidentiary hurdle has been criti
cized as having made it too difficult for litigants to challenge agency
decisions by alleging congressional interference.174 To be sure, part of
.
the basis for this burden of proof is the courts' tradition of presuming
the regularity of administrative action.175 More fundamentally, however,
the criticism reflects a misunderstanding of the underlying legal stan
dard.

D.C. Federation's actual impact test reflects a view that, except in
Pillsbury, the evil to be
addressed is not congressional intervention as such, but rather a break

cases that are "judicial" within the meaning of

down of the rule of law if the agency relies on it to reach an unautho
rized result.176
cation that was technically not covered by APA but did involve adversary litigation
before an administrative law judge).
171. See, e.g., Chemung County v. Dole, 804 F.2d 216, 222 (2d Cir. 1986) (hold
ing that the test is whether political pressure was intended to and did influence agency
to act for irrelevant reasons).
172. See Peter Kiewit Sons' Co. v. U.S. Army Corps of Engrs., 714 F.2d 163, 170
(D.C. Cir. 1983) (finding no proof that ex parte contacts by senator caine to the atten
tion of the actual administrative decisionmaker); Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298,
409 n.539 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (concluding that single newspaper report of senator's hint
that concessions in EPA rulemaking could bolster his support for administration's other
policies was not substantial evidence of impropriety); American Pub. Gas Assn. v. FPC,
567 F.2d 1016, 1068-70 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (finding no d4'ect evidence that hostile interro
gation of agency chairman affected agency's decision, particularly since the Commis
sion adhered to the specific proposition that the representatives had challenged).
173. See Koniag, 580 F.2d at 610-1 1 (stating, in the context of rejecting plaintiff's
request to disqualify Secretary of Interior from rendering a decision on remand, that a
congressman's letter to the Secretary had compromised the appearance of impartiality);
see also SEC v. Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corp., 648 F.2d 1 18, 130 (3d Cir. 1981) (en
bane) (remanding on the question of whether an SEC investigation had been prompted
by legitimate concerns and not merely by a senator's pressure).
174. See Kappel, supra note 130, at 154.
175. See Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 420-21
(1971).
176. See Peter Kiewit Sons' Co., 714 F.2d at 169-70 (Bazelon, J.). But cf. Tex.as
Medical Assn. v. Mathews, 408 F. Supp. 303 (W.D. Tex. 1976). Mathews contains many
broad statements indicating that agency reliance on congressional pressure is improper
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Federation has been followed

so consistently is that some courts appear to entertain a distinctly sym
pathetic attitude toward congressional participation in the administrative
process. This support has been particularly evident in the context of
agency rulemaking.

In Sierra Club v. Costle, 177 environmental groups

complained that Senator Robert Byrd had "strongly" expressed certain
concerns to the Environmental Protection Agency during its develop
ment of regulations that would profoundly affect the coal mining indus
try. The court responded with a ringing endorsement of congressional
participation in the rulemaking process:

·

Americans rightly expect their elected representatives to voice their
grievances and preferences concerning the administration of our laws.
We believe it entirely proper for Congressional representatives vigorously
to represent the interests of their constituents before administrative agen
cies engaged in informal, general policy rulemaking, so long as individ
ual Congressmen do not frustrate the intent of Congress as a whole as
expressed in statute, nor undermine applicable rules of procedure. Where
Congressmen keep their comments focused on the substance of the pro
posed rule - and we have no substantial evidence to cause us to believe
Senator Byrd did not do so here - administrative agencies are expected
to balance Congressional pressure with the pressures emanating from all
other sources. To hold otherwise would deprive the agencies of legiti
mate sources of information and call into question the validity of nearly
every controversial rulemaking.11s

To be sure, intervention by members of Congress in rulemaking
does not fall within the narrowest definition of "casework." Neverthe
less, such intervention can certainly have constituent service implica
tions. The rulemaking proceeding in

Sierra Club itself is illustrative.

Although it was concerned with a general policy issue, not an individ
ual constituent's situation, the D.C. Circuit did recognize in the above
quoted language that the senator was promoting his home state's inter
ests.

In any event, judicial expressions of support for legislators' roles

as representatives of district interests may be found in both rulemaking

regardless of whether the legislator's view of the statute is sustainable. See 408 F. Supp.
at 306-07, 310, 313. Those statements rest on a misreading of D.C. Federation. The
holding of the case, however, was completely consistent with D.C. Federation: the
court vacated professional standards review regulations because it found that a senator's
pressure on HEW officials to alter the regulations had a major impact on their ultimate
contents and was predicated on an erroneous interpretation of legislative intent. See 408
F. Supp. at 313-14.
177. 657 F.2d 298 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
178. 657 F.2d at 409-10 (footnote omitted). See also Environmental Defense Fund
v. Blum, 458 F. Supp. 650, 653 (D.D.C. 1 978); United States ex rel. Parco v. Morris,
426 F. Supp. 976 (E.D. Pa. 1977).
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and adjudication contexts.179 For example, a senator's effort to induce
the Commerce Department to approve a commercial development grant
for his home state would by no means implicate rulemaking, but this
situation led one court to remark: "There is . . . nothing improper in an
elected federal official attempting to secure for his constituents a feder
ally funded project for the area that he represents. Indeed, this is one
reason why we send Representatives and Senators to the United States

Congress." 1 80

It would be an exaggeration to say that these sentiments are uni
versally shared within the judiciary. One can find an occasional decision
in which, although a plaintiff 's challenge may be rejected for failure to
meet the

D.C. Federation standard, the court opines that congressional

intervention was unseemly if not inappropriate.18 1 Nevertheless, it seems

fairly well settled that, in informal proceedings, courts will tolerate or
even endorse congressional contacts, so long as these contacts do not
undermine the agency's adherence to the substantive law.

179. See Blum, 458 F. Supp. at 662-63 (noting that representatives who "vigor
ously" supported their state's request for regulation allowing use of pesticide "largely
came from areas where the . . . problem is severe and properly brought to the agency's
attention the concerns of their respective constituencies"); accord Municipal Blee. Utils.
Assn. v. Conable, 577 F. Supp. 158, 164 (D.D.C. 1983), quoted at supra note 158.
Some of the literature takes a much more tolerant view toward congressional interven
tion in rulemaking, in which an agency acts in its "legislative" capacity, than toward
intervention in adjudication, in which the agency's role is said to be "judicial." See,
e.g., THOMPSON, supra note 28, at 98-99. Pillsbury itself rested heavily on this distinc
tion. See supra notes 151-52 and accompanying text The distinction has some force, in
asmuch as a member of Congress can claim to speak with greater authority on issues of
law and policy, the typical subjects of rulemaking, than on the facts of individual cases.
Yet the importance of the distinction should not be exaggerated. See ROSENBERG &
MASKELL. supra note 130, at 35-36. Administrative adjudications frequently implicate
unsettled legal and policy issues that are seriously disputed and may even be the domi
nant controversy in the case. Moreover, many of those issues are unlikely ever to be
come the subjects of rulemaking proceedings. These realities help to account for the
courts' unwillingness to bar members of Congress from intervention in all adjudicative
cases. See supra notes 164-71 and accompanying text
180. National Ctr. for Preservation Law v. Landrieu, 496 F. Supp. 716, 745
(D.S.C.), affd. per curiam, 635 F.2d 324 (4th Cir. 1980).
181. See American Pub. Gas Assn. v. FPC, 567 F.2d 1016, 1068 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
This 1977 case was decided during the heyday of judicial efforts to bring rulemaking
proceedings into greater conformity with the procedural expectations traditionally asso
ciated with formal adjudication. Since Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. National
Resource Defense Council, 435 U.S. 519 (1978), the trend has run strongly in the oppo
site direction.
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Reform Proposals and New Approaches

The public scrutiny being directed at constituent service in the
wake of the Keating scandal gives impetus to the question of whether
the Houses of Congress should take new steps to discourage their mem
bers' "undue influence" on administrative proceedings. The subject
does not, however, lend itself to many easy answers. One must take se
riously the House Ethics Committee's suggestion in the Wright case that
the very concept of undue influence is in constant tension with the af
firmative duty of a member to vigorously represent his or her constitu
ents' interests. It would be incongruous to acknowledge that duty and
then complain merely because a legislator fulfilled it effectively. The
consequence of imposing an overly strict standard could be to deter
members from effective performance of their representative roles.

It does not follow, however, that legislators' advocacy must go
completely unregulated. The legal profession exhorts attorneys to advo
cate their clients' interests zealously within the limits of the law, yet
also manages to circumscribe that duty with various ethical obligations.
So, too, there may well be ways to identify excesses in congressional
constituent service without impairing the core of the activity. At least,
the idea that further reforms in this area might be helpful should not be
dismissed without scrutiny of some of the specific proposals that have
been offered in recent years.

1.

Formal Agency Proceedings and Other Sensitive Cases

A logical place to begin the inquiry is with limitations pertaining
to "formal" administrative proceedings, because the legal restrictions
on congressional intervention are most clearly defined in that context.
As previously explained, the ex parte contact provisions of the Sunshine
Act, as well as the

Pillsbury doctrine, make strong statements against

legislative interference with formal agency proceedings. Those pro
nouncements, however, will be effective only to the extent that mem
bers are informed about them. Research indicates that, in general, legis
lators and their staffs are aware of the governing principles.182 In view
182. A survey of House members in the Ninetieth Congress (just after Pillsbury
and well before the Sunshine Act) found broad awareness of the basic ground rules. See
EDMUND BEARD & STEPHEN HORN, CONGRESSIONAL ETillcs: THE Vmw FROM
THE HousE 76 (1975) ("Congressmen appear to appreciate the judicial nature of the
work of the commissions; consequently, they hesitate to interfere. The impropriety of ex
parte communications in these cases was mentioned often" in the authors' survey). Sig·
nificantly, the same respondents claimed to be much more aggressive in nonjudicial
cases. See id. at 74-76. For more recent evidence, see JOHANNES , supra note 44, at
109, 126; Charles R. Babcock, Ex-Regulators: Few Improper Contacts, WASH. POST,
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of the considerable growth in size of the legislative establishment in re
cent decades, however, it is important for Congress to ensure that ex

isting limitations on ex parte communications are clearly communicated
to all. The House Ethics Manual contains fairly clear warnings on this
score.183 The Senate, however, has no equivalent document compiling
and synthesizing recognized ethical principles for the guidance of its

members and their staffs. It ought to have one.184

The logical next question is whether any other types of agency

proceedings should normally be exempt from the intrusions of congres
sional constituent advocacy. Proceedings that involve a criminal prose

cution might be one such category. In the Keating Five case, the Senate

Ethics Committee found that it was not improper, in and of itself, for
three of the senators to have continued to intervene on Keating's behalf
even after learning of the criminal referral in his case. At worst, said the
Committee, this persistence reflected poor judgment.185 Others have

taken a less generous view of such contacts. In fact, the Keating scandal
has given rise to the suggestion that members of Congress should sim

ply avoid "interfer[ing] with ongoing individual crlniinal investigations
or prosecutions. " 186 Moreover, Senator Douglas strongly recommended

against congressional involvement in individual criminal matters.187

Several strong arguments militate in favor of an ethics rule that

would forbid legislators from intervening in ongoing criminal proceed
ings. In important respects, criminal proceedings resemble the formal,

on-the-record administrative proceedings covered by section 557(d) of

Nov. 29, 1990, at A25 (quoting former agency heads who recalled receiving improper
communications from members of Congress occasionally but not frequently).
183. See HousE Ennes MANuAL, supra note 133, at 242-47.
184. The Senate Ethics Committee has provided this sort of guidance in response
to individual requests. See, e.g., SENATE SELECT COMM. ON Enn es, 1030 CONG.,
lST SESS., INTERPRETATIVE RULINGS OF THE SELECT CoMM. ON Ennes No. 237
(Comm. Print 1993) [hereinafter INTERPRETATIVE RULINGS] (advice to senator not to
communicate with bankruptcy judge on constituents' behalf, other than through fonnal
procedures). But a collection of individualized rulings is unlikely to be as effective an
orientation tool as a clearly written synthesis of the controlling principles would be.
185. KEATING REPORT, supra note 4, at 17, 56 (concerning Sen. DeConcini); id.
at 18, 54-55 (concerning Sen. Glenn); id. at 16, 56 (concerning the same two plus
Cranston).
186. Waldman, supra note 73, at 22.
187.
There are some fields of administrative action which legislators would, on
the whole, do well to avoid. The first is the field of criminal action. Unless legis
lators are deeply convinced of the justice of their position, they certainly should
not make any inquiries or recommendations about possible indictments or crimi
nal prosecutions.
DOUGLAS, supra note 63, at 91-92.
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the APA - both are cases in which society's concern for procedural
regularity is high. Since Congress has already accepted! a diminution in
the scope of permissible constituent service with respect to formal adju
dications, it should likewise be amenable to such a curtailment with re
spect to criminal matters. A prohibition of this kind would also seem to
be reasonably workable, because it would be triggered by relatively
clear-cut, objectively determinable events.188 The prohibition might be
framed in terms of directing members to refrain from pressing a constit
uent's cause with prosecutors189 (which apparently was Douglas's spe
cific point), as well as with administrators who are handling an enforce
ment matter that will also be the subject of a criminal investigation, as
the facts of the Keating case might suggest.
Yet, just as practical approaches have evolved to reconcile the

Pillsbury doctrine with the congressional interest in oversight, so too
might the suggested ethical rule be framed or applied in a manner that
leaves some scope for congressional constituent advocacy on behalf of
what a member believes may be unjustified prosecution. General over
sight activities that make no reference to the facts of particular cases,
and preferably do not refer to specific cases at all, are presumably
valid.190 Additionally, perhaps ethics rules should address only those sit
uations in which members or their staffs contact agencies directly. Some
leeway for political dialogue in the public arena must be allowed. After
all, senators and representatives commonly use floor speeches and com
mittee hearings to demand criminal investigations of suspected viola
tors. Speeches urging an opposite outcome would seem to be equally le
gitimate. If one legislator can legitimately accuse the executive branch
of being too soft on flag burners or abortion protesters, should not other
legislators, with different ideological commitments, be permitted to ac
cuse the executive of being too harsh? Public pronouncements of this
kind, which would not ordinarily be considered "ex parte contacts" and

188. In marginal cases, however, ethics authorities might face difficulty determin
ing just when a member actually learned that an alleged regulatory violation had been
referred for criminal investigation.
189. One of the most contentious of recent confrontations between Congress and
Justice Department prosecutors involved efforts by Representative John D. Dingell, for
mer Chairman of the House Energy and Commerce Committee, to expose what he con
sidered the Department's mishandling of environmental criminal cases. Representative
Dingell's office insisted, however, that the investigating subcommittee was interested
only in cfosed cases, not open ones. See Jerry Seper, 'Partisan' Grab Seen in Environ
ment Cases, WASH. TIMEs, June 6, 1994, at Al . This claim appears to reflect an ac
knowledgment that pressure regarding a pending case would be improper.
190. See supra notes 161-63 and accompanying texf.
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deprive no one of an opportunity to respond with a n opposing point of

view, presumably do not contravene principles of legislative ethics.

Perhaps the trickiest problem in this area is to determine the cir
cumstances in which a legislator may intervene in an administrative
proceeding that might ripen into either a criminal investigation or a for
mally adjudicated enforcement proceeding, but has not yet done so.
When the possibility of enforcement action is on the horizon but not
imminent, legislators have a relatively strong claim that their "represen
tative" duties compel them to intercede on their constituents' behalf; as
the likelihood of formal action looms larger, rule-of-law values press
with increasing force toward restraint on the legislator's part. Where are
the lines to be drawn?
Section 557(d) of the APA suggests one guideline: the ex parte
contact rule in formal adjudication generally comes into play at "the
time at which a proceeding is noticed for hearing unless the person re
sponsible for the [ex parte] communication has knowledge that it will
be noticed."191 Reasonable minds might conclude,. however, that a
broader prohibition should apply to members of Congress and their
staffs - commencing, for example, when the congressional office be
comes aware that formal proceedings are under active consideration.192
Whatever standard may be chosen, the sensitivity of enforcement pro
ceedings, both civil and criminal, justifies special caution from mem
bers and their staffs who propose to intervene in them. Even where in
tervention as such is not deemed improper, legislators should be
particularly careful in these cases to make sure that they have checked
out the facts and are not making untoward threats. Those are .sound
guidelines under all circumstances, as will be discussed shortly, but
they are especially good advice in the enforcement context, because of
the public's special concern that these matters should be resolved ac
cording to law.193

191. 5 u.s.c. § 557(d)(l)(E) (1994).
192. In DCP Farms v. Yeutter, 951 F.2d 1 183, 1 187 (5th Cir. 1992), the Agricul
ture Department made an initial determination of abuse in the farm subsidy program,
and the respondent appealed and requested a hearing. The court stated that Pillsbury re
strictions would not come into play until the time of that hearing. That dictum seems in
compatible with § 557(d)(l)(E), but the court was justified in refusing to apply Pills
bury to a legislator's intervention that had occurred during the early stages of the
department's investigation, even though an inspector general's report had left little
doubt that the respondent might ultimately face formal proceedings.
193. In the period prior to a criminal referral or notice of the commencement of
formal proceedings, legislators should have relatively broad freedom to make contacts
that take no position on the merits but merely prod the agency to reach a speedy con
clusion in the constituent's case. Although, strictly speaking, such statements can be le
gitimate even after enforcement activities have reached a more formal stage, see supra
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Indiscriminate Advocacy

We turn now to consider what substantive prohibitions should ap

ply to legislative intervention

outside the realm of formal adjudication.

One simple guideline that bears exploration would be that a member
should not intervene on behalf of a constituent unless the constituent's
claim has some merit.194 Much of the literature suggests that members
are not always so restrained - that many feel that their job is to advo

cate the constituent's cause, right or wrong.195 Senator Douglas argued
against this attitude: "A legislator should not immediately conclude that

the constituent is always right and the administrator is always wrong,

try to find out the merits of each case and
only make such representations as the situation permits. " 196

but as far as possible should

To the extent it exists, the attitude that every constituent's case de
serves to be pursued, regardless of its merits, seems at odds with the

House Advisory Opinion's teaching that "the overall public interest . . .
is primary to any individual matter. " 197 The ethics committees should

consider elaborating on that precept by endorsing the proposition that
every member should give

some consideration to the merits before hon

oring a request for intervention, instead of always taking the constitu

ent's side against the bureaucracy.198 This article argued above that the

advocacy dimension of the legislator's role is normal and inescapable.199

Legislators are not

solely advocates, however. They are also responsibie

for promoting the public interest - which encompasses the interests of

groups and individuals who lack the resources to press their case on
Capitol Hill as effectively as highly organized groups can.200 That the

obligation to consider an issue from multiple vantage points probably

note 155, they run the risk of being construed as obstruction of a criminal inquiry or as
covert pressure to decide the case in the constituent's favor. See S. REP. No. 354, 94th
Cong., 1st Sess. 37 (1975) (suggesting that requests for status reports should in "doubt
ful cases" be regarded as falling within the scope of § 557(d)).
194. See Waldman, supra note 73, at 23.
195. Jn the Keating case, Senator DeConcini took this view: even constituents
with a "lousy" case have "a right to have somebody stand up for them." 5 Keating
Hearings, supra note 129, at 108 (Jan. 9, 1991). For evidence that this view is widely
held, see BEARD & HORN supra note 182, at 74-75 (quoting from survey responses by
House members themselves); GELLHORN, supra note 46, at 71-72; JOHANNES, supra
note 44, at 122. As one might expect, many agency officials agree that congressional
offices often forward cases uncritically. See id. at 105.
196. DOUGLAS, supra note 63, at 88.
197. See Advisory Opinion No. 1, supra note 131.
198. See THOMPSON, supra note 28, at 94-97.
199. See supra section I.A.
200. See Ennes OF LEGISLATIVE LIFE, supra note 17, at 47-48; David E. Price,
Legislative Ethics in the New Congress, in REPRESENTATION AND REsPONSIBILITY,
supra note 17, at 129, 136-38.
,

October 1996]

Congressional Ethics

53

cannot be enforced does not mean that it should be ignored as an ethical
iqeal.
A rule or aspirational principle to the effect that members should
pursue only cases with serious merit would have particular force if it
entailed a duty to investigate the facts before intervening, so that the
member would have some minimum level of confidence in the claim
before pursuing it. However, any provision intended to codify a require
ment of this sort would have to be carefully drafted so as to recognize
that casework takes many fonns. Frequently a congressional office sim
ply restates facts presented by the constituent, or forwaros the citizen's
letter with a perfunctory cover letter attached.201 In these situations, the
office is in little position to appraise the strength of the claim - nor is
the agency really likely to believe otherwise. On this point the Senate
Ethics Committee was persuasive:
The Committee believes the duty of a Member to determine the merits of
a case is related to the level of action he or she is going to take. For ex
ample, a routine status inquiry would not require the same level of famil
iarity with the merits of a case as would proposing a possible solution.
The Committee also appreciates the fact that in the normal course of
daily events a Senator's staff, without the Senator's knowledge or in
volvement, provides many routine constituent services which by their na
ture require little or no inquiry into the merits.202

Moreover, casework is often an informal, interactive process:

a

caseworker may inquire whether there is anything to a constituent's
grievance, an agency spokesperson explains why there is not, and the
matter ends there.203 Such interchanges occur on too casual a level to
warrant the kind of "Rule

1 1 " obligations that accompany the filing of

a civil lawsuit.204
Yet, short of placing a burden of inquiry on members to determine
the merits of every claim to which they lend assistance, one can suggest
more modest guidelines: that members should avoid making affirmative
representations without a reasonable basis,205 should refrain from press201. See, e.g., Klonoff, supra note 46, at 705-06.
202. KEATING REPORT, supra note 4, at 10.
203. See JOHANNES, supra note 44, at 100-01.
204. See FED. R. CIV. P. l l (b) (requiring litigants filing court papers to certify, af
ter reasonable inquiry, that their legal contentions are tenable and their factual conten
tions have or are likely to have evidentiary support).
205. See Houss Ennes MANuAL, supra note 133, at 249 ("As a matter of com
mon sense, when communicating with an agency, Members and staff should only assert
as fact that which they know to be true
A prudent approach in any communication
would be to attribute factual assertions to the constituent"). A related technique that
congressional offices sometimes use is to write a letter to the agency stating what the
member expects it to do if the facts tum out to be as the constituent claims.
.

.

•

.
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ing a cause that they know is invalid under controlling law, and should

intervene only after making whatever inquiry is reasonable under the
circumstances.206

3.

Threats of Reprisal on Unrelated Matters

Another question is whether certain types of arguments should be
off-limits - or at least strongly disfavored - when members of Con
gress do casework for constituents. House Advisory Opinion No.
bids suggestions of "favoritism or reprisal"

1 for

directed toward the

agency.207 The meaning of this prohibition is not entirely clear, how
ever. Moreover, neither the Senate nor its ethics committee has ex

pressly adopted any restriction in this area, although the committee has
"encouraged" senators to look to the advisory opinion for "guidance. "
The subject of reprisal thus deserves close attention here.

Of course, the House advisory opinion's admonition that the "pub

lic interest" is paramount in constituent service activities208 would mili

tate against the use of threats for some purposes - for example, pursuit
of a personal feud - but certainly not for all of them. Sometimes a

member might threaten a "reprisal" precisely in order to promote the

public interest as he or she defines it.

D.C. Federation,209 offers a useful

illustration. Everyone in that case seemed to assume that the chairman

sincerely believed that the bridge should be built; nothing suggested

that he was threatening to hold up subway funding for any other reason
than to advance that goal. Notably, the court pointedly refused to criti
cize him for his conduct210 - perhaps because it felt that such a judg

ment was beyond judicial competence, but possibly also because the in
trinsic legitimacy of this behavior was unclear.

A logical extrapolation of the court's decision would point toward

congressional ethics rules expressly providing that members should re-

206. See FRONTLINE MANAGEMENT, supra note 53, at 212-13. For an example
of the embarrassment and unfavorable publicity that can result from a failure to check
one's facts, see Benjamin Sheffner, A Tale of Constituent Service Gone Awry, ROLL
CALL, Jan. 23, 1995, available in LEXIS, Legis Library, Rollcl File (describing how
then-Representative Jon Kyl, at the request of a constituent, wrote a letter urging the
Latvian parliament to cease denying a seat to a local politician; Kyl was chagrined
when he later learned of the Latvian's criminal record as a racial extremist).
207. See supra note 132 and accompanying text. Kentucky's ethical misconduct
statute, although confusing, appears to endorse essentially the same principle. See supra
note 138.
208. See supra note 132.
209. D.C. Fedn. of Civic Assns. v. Volpe, 459 F.2d 1231 (D.C. Cir. 1971); see
supra notes 164-69 and accompanying text.
210. See 459 F.2d at 1249.
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frain from attempting to influence administrative decisions by making
threats or promises to talce action on an unrelated matter.211 Such a rule
seems supportable even though vote-trading, exchanges of favors, and
other sorts of "logrolling" are an integral part of congressional cul
ture.212 The constituent service area differs from the typical struggle that
talces place exclusively within the legislature, because an agency acts
under a statutory mandate. For an administrator to rely on a factor ex
trinsic to its mandate, such as the possibility of a legislator's retaliation,
would normally render the agency's decision ultra vires. Thus, the rule
would reflect the central concern of

D.C. Federation: preventing

agency actions that violate the rule of law. Theoretically it would oper
ate

before the fact to intercept approximately the same sort of com

ments that, if the agency were shown to have acted on them, would
support judicial reversal of the agency action after the fact. Moreover, it
would serve as a remedy for some congressional pressures that the
courts cannot effectively police because of justiciability limits.
Such a rule also would fit well with existing ethics authorities,
even if one regards the "favoritism or reprisal" language in Advisory
Opinion No. 1 as inconclusive. Senator Douglas cautioned legislators
that they should not

"try

to punish administrators for adverse rulings by

withholding appropriations or by other punitive actions," nor should
they threaten to do so.213 The

Tuttle decision from Maine is easily justi

fied on the basis of the suggested rule, although it involved a promised
inducement rather than a threat. The holding of the

Wright case appears

at first glance incompatible with the rule, because one allegation there
was that Wright had placed a "hold" on a savings and loan bailout bill
in order to obtain more favorable treatment for Texans facing enforce
ment actions.214 The House Ethics Committee's dismissal of this allega-

211. Such a rule might well apply to a recent incident in which a dozen members
of Congress wrote to the National Labor Relations Board, urging it to settle charges
pending against an employer, Overnite Transportation Company. Their letter warned:
"All parts of the federal government are being reviewed for ways to cut spending."
Describing the letter as a ploy, one representative explained: "I was trying to do
whatever I could to offend them into some type of cooperation." Pro-Business Republi
cans Cutting Agency Regulations (NPR radio broadcast, Sept. 4, 1995), available in
LEXIS, News Library, NPR File.
212. See generally Daniel Hays Lowenstein, For God. for Country, or for Me?, 74
CAL. L. REv. 1479, 1497-1500 (1986) (book review) (questioning notion that political
logrolling is necessarily wrong).
213. DOUGLAS, supra note 63, at 90.
214. See supra note 136 and accompanying text.
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tion, however, appears to have rested on a lack of probative evidence
rather than a belief that such conduct is permissible.21s
One commentator, however, has criticized

D.C. Federation on the

ground that statutes should generally be interpreted to permit agencies
to consider congressional policy views as such, because this interpreta
tion will promote the essential process of compromise between the two
politically accountable branches.216 He suggests that in

D.C. Federation

the court should have read the statute as authorizing consideration of
the chairman's views, because it did not explicitly foreclose reference to
that consideration.217

The answer is that an individual member is not the Congress and
does not speak for the entire body. Indeed, it is doubtful that Congress
could pass a law expressly ascribing relevance to the wishes of influen

tial members as such.218 Thus, an ambiguous statute should not be inter

preted as doing so by implication. Of course, a sound argument does

not become impermissible "political influence" merely because a mem

ber of Congress makes it.219 Moreover, prudent administrators strive for
a good relationship with their congressional overseers, and may often
be well advised to accept their interpretation of ambiguities in the stat

ute. Both sides, however, should be encouraged to remember that their

preferences must operate within whatever framework the statute pro
vides as a test for the agency's use of discretion.

The precise legal framework applicable to a given case may be

subject to intense debate. For this reason ethics rules in this area should
apply only to manifestly irrelevant arguments.220 In the end, however,

one should recognize that even broadly worded administrative statutes

typically have some boundaries written into them. Pure logrolling is un215. See Agency Door, supra note 65 (remarks of Rep. Frank); Klaus, supra note
130, at 36-37.
216. See Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Political Control Versus Impermissible Bias in
Agency Decisionmaldng: Lessons from Chevron and Mistretta, 57 U. Cm. L. RBv. 481,
496-98 (1990).
217. See id.
218. A law providing, for example, that "any decision under this section must be
acceptable to the chair of the relevant appropriations subcommittee" would be in dan
ger of being held to confer "executive" functions on legislative actors, a practice that
the Supreme Court regards with considerable disfavor under separation of powers prin
ciples. See supra note 149 (discussing modem cases on separation of powers).
219. See DCP Farms v. Yeutter, 957 F.2d 1 183, 1 188 (5th Cir. 1992) ("[T]he force
of logic and ideas is not our concern [in defining congressional 'interference' and 'po
litical pressure']. They carry their own force and exert their own pressure.").
220. When legislators influence an administrative decision by advancing a legal
interpretation that is erroneous but defensible, the proper remedy is not an ethics sanc
tion, but judicial reversal of the agency's action. See, e.g., Hazardous Waste Treatment
Council v. EPA, 886 F.2d 355, 364-66 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (per curiam).
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likely to qualify as the kind of "reasoned decisionmaking" that agen
cies are expected to display in their exercises of discretion. To return to
the

D.C. Federation example, scholars have made powerful arguments

that the judiciary has given a narrower construction to the highway stat
ute involved in that case than Congress ever intended;221 nevertheless, it
would be a stretch to interpret the law as saying, "Authorize a bridge if
it will get you a subway." An · even more extreme example would be the
allegation made, but not proven, against Senator Byrd in

Sierra Club:

that he offered to trade support for the SALT treaty for· concessions in
an EPA rulemaking.222
4.

Threats in General

The House Ethics Committee suggested a broader formulation in
the

Wright case, which said that an allegation of undue influence should

not be considered in the absence of evidence of a "reprisal or threat."
Should there be a general proscription of "threats"? That was the pro
posal of a study commission that was convened in Maine following the

Tuttle

case,223

although

the

legislature

did

not

act

on

this

recommendation.
A condemnation of all threats seems overbroad, however. Taken
literally, it could suppress legitimate oversight.224 A good example is
suggested by

Yeutter,225 a case decided in 1992 by the
Fifth Circuit - the same court that had decided Pillsbury a quarter cen
DCP Farms

v.

tury earlier. The court summarized the background facts:
This case arises from attempts by the Department of Agriculture to en
force the statutory limit of $50,000 per "person" in federal crop subsi
dies against DCP Farms. The three farms, controlled by two families, had
created 51 irrevocable trusts to maximize the number of "persons" eligi
ble to receive farm subsidy payments. DCP Farms were slated to receive
$1.4 million in subsidies for the 1989 crop year.226

221. See, e.g., Peter L. Strauss, Revisiting Overton Park: Political and Judicial
Controls over Administrative Actions Affecting the Community, 39 UCLA L. REv. 1251
(1993).
222. See Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298, 409 n.539 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
223. "All legislators, without exception, shall refrain from any threat, or statement
that could be reasonably construed as a threat, orally or in writing, relating to legislative
action in communication with a state agency or authority." COMMISSION TO EXAMINE
ETHICS IN STATE GOVERNMENT, REPORT OF 3 (1988); see Lawrence, supra note
138, at 448-49.
224. See Lawrence, supra note 138, at 450 (criticizing the Maine study commis
sion's proposal on this groilnd).
225. 957 F.2d 1 183 (5th Cir. 1992).
226. 957 F.2d at 1 185.
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Congressman Jerry Huckaby, chairman of the House subcommittee that
had sponsored the subsidy limits, wrote to the Department about DCP's

situation, which had been described in press reports. He declared that

payment of the full amount would violate the letter and spirit of the
law. Moreover, "Congressman Huckaby indicated that if the USDA al
lowed DCP Farms to treat all 5 1 irrevocable trusts as 'persons,'

he
would introduce legislation to revise the definition of 'persons' to ex
clude trusts entirely. "227 The Department responded that it would take a
very aggressive enforcement position toward the farms. When it did so,
DCP Farms sought interlocutory judicial review. A district court en

joined the proceedings, but the court of appeals reversed. The appellate
court rejected the notion that a congressman's expression of views
about how a law should be interpreted injects an extraneous factor
within the meaning of

D.C. Federation, remarking that it "would be

unrealistic to require that agencies turn a deaf ear to comments from
members of Congress. "228

The principals' exchange about the meaning of the statute was

clearly permissible oversight. More to the point, the congressman's

statement that he might introduce legislation if the Department did not

accede to his position, while it could be called a "threat," seems en
tirely legitimate. It would be excessive hair-splitting to distinguish be

tween the congressman's expression of opinion as to the meaning of the
law as it then stood and the congressman's determination to seek

changes in it if necessary to "clarify" the legislature's intention. The

latter flows naturally out of the former. It is doubtful that one would

want to criticize - let alone punish - Huckaby for "threatening" to
play the very role that the Constitution assigns to lawmakers.

This issue illustrates with unusual clarity the analytical value of

Professor Thompson's claim that constituent service activities should be
evaluated from the standpoint of whether they enhance or impede dem

ocratic processes.229 Certainly one would not have wanted an influential
member of Congress to commence efforts to change the statute

without

informing the agency and giving it an opportunity to consider whether
it wanted to head off possibly unpredictable legislative action by acqui

escing in the member's interpretation. The participants' interchange
provided an opportunity for the kind of dialogue over legal and policy

227. 957 F.2d at 1 186 (emphasis added).
228. 957 F.2d at 1188.
229. See supra notes 28-30 and accompanying text
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issues that ought to take place between the lawmaking and law
enforcing branches.230
To generalize, political power touches the relationship between the
legislative and executive branches on too many levels for one to be able
to say that congressional "threats" are always out of place. Such a pro
hibition seems distinctly less attractive than the guideline discussed ear
lier, which in effect would reach only those threats that would induce
the agency to act for plainly irrelevant reasons if it acceded to the legis
lator's demand.231
5.

The Outer Limits of "Undue Influence" Regulation

The ultimate question about ethics regulation of "undue influence"
in constituent service is whether a member who does

not resort to

threats should nevertheless be subject to sanctions for exerting inordi
nate pressure on an agency. During the Keating proceedings, Senator
Helms - in a statement that borrowed heavily from the recommenda
tions of the Committee's special counsel232 - tried to articulate such a
standard: "Even absent . . . threats, a legislator's pressure on behalf of a
constituent may lead the administrator reasonably to believe that he or
she should decide a case not on the merits, but should accede to the leg
islator's request because of a concern about the ability to deal with the
legislator on future agency matters. " 233 Thus, "Senators must avoid in
terventions that appear to be improper either because they are not merit
based or because they are of such a kind or degree that administrators
reasonably believe that their decisions cannot be merit-based. "234
Although the Senate Ethics Committee as a whole did not endorse
that or any other standard to define the limits of permissible pressure in
senators' interventions with administrators, it was very critical of Sena
tor DeConcini's aggressiveness toward the bank regulators.235 Neverthe
less, the Committee, including Senator Helms, drew back from finding

230. For another recent example, see Jane Fritsch, Senate Aide Uses Budget
Threat To Intervene in a Pollution Case, N.Y. 'fIMEs, Aug. 24, 1995, at Al (describing
aide's threat to use appropriations rider to challenge designation of Superfund cleanup
site if EPA did not reconsider its plan to adopt that designation).
231. Just as some "threats" should be tolerated, so too should some affirmative
inducements that are intended to influence administrative action. An example would be
a member who, in urging the USDA to keep its generous definition of "person,"
promises to oppose any effort by Huckaby to get the statute changed.
232. See supra note 7.
233. See KEATING REPORT, supra note 4, at 97 (separate views of Sen. Helms).
234. Id. at 98.
235. See id. at 17 (report of the Committee).
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an impropriety in his conduct.236 A less forgiving observer might argue
that the Committee not only should have reached the opposite conclu

sion on that point, but should have found all five senators guilty of im

proper pressure tactics in the Keating case. Such a claim might rest in
large part on the singular fact that the five senators arranged to meet

as

a group with bank regulators on Keating's behalf.237 One could easily
interpret this coordinated effort as an attempt to make a show of force

that one or two senators could not have displayed by themselves. An

application of the Helms standard might also lead to the conclusion that
the House Ethics Committee should have reprimanded Speaker Jim
Wright for what it regarded as his "intemperate" advocacy, even
though it found insufficient evidence of an overt threat or reprisal.238

Given the unequal power relationship between members of Con

gress - or at least some well-positioned members - and many agency
officials, it would be difficult to deny that risks of implicit coercion

often inhere in the casework situation.239 Agencies understand that they
incur at least some risk of adverse consequences if they appear too un

cooperative in their response to a legislator's contact.240 Senator

Douglas addressed the ethics implications of this dynamic by advising

legislators that they should not bully or intimidate agency officials and
should clearly acknowledge that the ultimate decision rests in adminis

trative hands.241

In a disciplinary context, however, one may doubt that the ethics

committees could fairly administer a ban on overly aggressive advo

cacy.242 Unlike a prohibition on threats of reprisal, which can be framed

as a more or less bright-line principle, the Helms standard seems ex

tremely vague. It would provide a member with virtually no guidance
236. See id. (DeConcini's conduct was "inappropriate" but gave only the "appear
ance of being improper").
237. See Babcock, supra note 182, at A25 (quoting a fonner SEC chairman: "I re
garded it as highly unusual to have even a single senator come to me. To have five
come would have seemed extraordinary."). But see 6 Keating Hearings, supra note 129,
at 193-94 (Jan. 16, 1991) (remarks of Sen. Rudman) (dismissing as "absurd" Common
Cause's position "that there is improper conduct if a group of Senators intervene with
an agency on behalf of a citizen even in the absence of political contributions").
238. See supra note 137 and accompanying text.
239. See, e.g., DOUGLAS REPORT, supra note 134, at 29-30.
240. See JOHANNES, supra note 44, at 102-04.
241. See DOUGLAS, supra note 63, at 90.
242. Cf. Bloch, supra note 149, at 1 1 9 n.255 ("An attempt to draw a judicially en
forceable line between 'strong feelings on the merits' and 'threats' would be arbitrary,
highly manipulable, and too restrictive."). Professor Bloch maintains that the limits of
legislative advocacy are best left to be defined by the consciences of individual legisla
tors, not the courts - although she does not directly address the possibility of regula
tion by the ethics committees. See id. at 122.
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as to what kinds of advocacy might be held in a disciplinary proceeding
to be too aggressive. The problem is not simply with Senator Helms's
particular formula; indeterminacy seems unavoidable in this area.243 A
member naturally strives to be
ence become

influential; at what point does this influ

undue? Nebulous standards are particularly worrisome

when they are to be enforced in a political arena, in which damaging
charges are easy to lodge and in which the adjudicators are elected offi
cials who themselves are subject to strong political pressures.
Against the risks of arbitrary and unforeseeable application of an
"excessive advocacy" standard must be weighed the potential benefits
of a rule that might constrain overly aggressive behavior by legislators.
As an empirical matter, however, the magnitude of the undue influence
problem should not be exaggerated. In his study of constituent service,
Johannes reported that members and caseworkers almost always hesitate
to pressure an agency; they , consider the technique ineffective or
counterproductive in most instances.244 Although he acknowledged in
stances in which congressional offices have pursued cases with a re
markable degree of aggressiveness,245 even agencies seemed to agree
that extravagant pressure is rare.246 Fear of adverse publicity was an
other constraining factor for members and their staffs247 - and that was
before the Keating affair, which undoubtedly has led to even more cau
tion.248 Agencies are in the best position to blow the whistle on heavy-

243. An alternative formula was offered by an ethics consultant, Michael Joseph
son, when the Senate was considering its new Rule XLill (which will be discussed in
Part IV, infra). He urged that the rule be amended to provide that congressional inter
vention must be "neither calculated to, nor reasonably .
likely to, cause another
government official to make a decision on any basis other than the appropriate criteria."
Glenn R. Simpson, Post-Keating-Five Rules Change for Constituent Service Urged by
Leaders, ROLL CALL. Mar. 23, 1992, available in LEXIS, Legis Library, Rollcl File.
This formulation seems even less clear than the Helms version. Legislators or staffers
who wished to conform to it would apparently have to predict not only how their words
would be understood, but also the administrator's likely response to those words - a
judgment that might require speculation on such matters as the tractability of the partic
ular agency official contacted.
244. See JOHANNES, supra note 44, at 102, 106-07.
245. See id. at 108 (citing Mary Thornton, Rep. Lott Forcefully Presents His Views
to the Justice Department, WASH. POST, Feb. 19, 1982, at A2 (reporting that then
Representative Trent Lott "hounded" the Justice Department, senqing it a letter every
other day)). Lott is now Senate Majority Leader and, in fact, sat on the Senate Ethics
Committee during the Keating case.
246. See id. at 102-03; see also Babcock, supra note 182, at A25.
247. See JOHANNES, supra note 44, at 107, 126.
248. See Sara Fritz & Paul Houston, Amid Scandal and the New Accent on Ethics,
Senators Tread Carefully, L.A. TIMEs, Feb. 1 1 , 1990, at A26.
•

.
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handed casework tactics.249 They also can strike back in more mundane
ways, such as by failing to act promptly on other cases or to pass along
tips about impending federal grants in the district.250
In short, legislators wield significant power in their contacts with
agencies, and they have a responsibility to exercise it in an ethical fash
ion. The ethics committees would do well to follow Senator Douglas's
lead by admonishing members against heavy-handedness and intimida
tion in the constituent service realm. Moreover, because the House's ex
isting guidelines forbid "direct

or implied" suggestions of reprisal,251

they would seem to leave some room for sanctions in a case in which a
legislator makes perfectly clear, without putting into words, his inten
tion to retaliate against an agency that does not submit to his demands.
The Senate should adopt a similar rule. When faced with the possibility
of attempting to enforce open-ended prohibitions on aggressive advo
cacy, however, the committees have probably been correct in choosing
to err (if at all) on the side of underinclusiveness.

6.

Public Disclosure Options

An alternative, or perhaps additional, means by which Congress
could take steps to prevent or discourage improper legislative influences
upon administrative proceedings would be through a disclosure mecha
nism. Commentators have maintained that problems attributable to con
stituent service would be reduced if congressional contacts with agen
cies were logged and regularly disclosed to the public.252 Although this
is a somewhat indirect method of promoting legislative ethics, the argu
ments for and against the idea have a considerable overlap with issues
regarding the substantive content of the legislative ethics rules. The fol
lowing discussion summarizes the arguments for and against such a

249. Much of the early reporting on the Keating Five affair itself was based on in
formation obtained from sources within the FHLBB. See, e.g., Michael Binstein, A
Study in Power: How S&L 'War' Led Senators To Pressure Regulators, WASH. PosT,
May 15, 1988, at Hl (relying on internal agency documents).
250. See JOHANNES , supra note 44, at 102, 144.
251. See Advisory Opinion No. l , supra note 131 (emphasis added).
252. See, e.g., THOMPSON, supra note 28, at 101; Waldman, supra note 73, at 23.
Professor Schotland has proposed a docketing requirement limited to requesters who
have given the legislator campaign contributions above a specified amount. See Roy A.
Schotland, Proposals for Campaign Finance Reform: An Article Devoted to Being Less
Dull Than Its Title, 21 CAP. U. L. REv. 429, 460 (1992). A difficulty with that plan is
that caseworkers do not necessarily know which requesters are contributors, see
JOHANNES, supra note 44, at 125, and the Keating decision in effect cautions against
the ethical appearances of their making efforts to find out. See infra section IY.E.3.
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plan, focuses on an intermediate position as a basis for analysis, and ex
plores some implementation issues.
Arguments for a logging procedure run something like this: Regu
lar disclosure of constituent service contacts would permit the normal
mechanisms of political accountability to supplement, or partially sub
stitute for, enforcement proceedings by the ethics committees. Armed
with the facts, the public could make its own assessment of the propri
ety of individual contacts. The logging procedure would also serve as a
deterrent to constituent service activities that a member would be em
barrassed to have on the public record. One would expeet that members
of Congress would normally

welcome public knowledge about the ser

vices they perform for constituents; if there are situations that the mem
ber wishes to keep away from the sunshine, perhaps these are contacts
that deserve to be deterred. For example, if the logs were to disclose
that a series of interventions by one member was entirely out of keep
ing with normal patterns, the member could at least be called on to ex
plain his unusual activity. Finally, a logging requirement would promote
public confidence in government, because it would provide - even if
only imperfectly - assurance that members could not intercede for in
fluential constituents without leaving any fingerprints. At the same time
it would give legislators of good will a way of saying that they have
nothing to hide.

An across-the-board logging requirement would be a costly en
deavor, however. According to the leading political science study of
constituent service, the average House office handles

about

100

casework requests per week, and the average Senate office handles
about 300. This adds up to an annual workload of about four million
cases.253 The amount of time and energy that would be consumed each
year in the creation of four million docket entries could be substantial.
At a time of growing emphasis on the streamlining of government, one
could wonder whether a new layer of red tape should be imposed with
out a clear public need in this area.
The existence of such a need is certainly open to doubt. Political
science studies do not lend much support to the popular belief, which
the Keating scandal has no doubt fostered, that attempts to exert undue
influence in constituent service are commonplace.254 Indeed, if congres
sional constituent service is a routine and generally appropriate activity,
as this article has maintained, one can question whether it should be
monitored as if it were inherently suspicious. Finally, if records of leg-

253. See JOHANNES. supra note 44, at 35.
254. See supra notes 182, 244-50 and accompanying text.
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islative interventions were made readily accessible, the impact on public
debate would undoubtedly prove somewhat mixed. Public logs would
presumably reveal significant facts in some instances, but they would
also lend themselves to exploitation and distortions by a member's po
litical enemies, who could hint at sinister dealings in a manner that the
member would have trouble rebutting.
The issue is debatable, but let us suppose, for the sake of analysis,
that Congress does decide to institute a logging requirement. A plausi
ble point of departure would be a proposal that Senator Robert Dole
made while the Keating case was pending in Congress. His plan would
have required executive-branch agencies to maintain records of their
contacts with legislators or legislative aides on pending or potential en
forcement matters or awards of contracts. Written communications
would have been placed in a public file; oral communications would
have been logged for publication in the

Congressional Record.255 He ex

.plained this proposal by invoking what he called the "front-page test":

"if we are not willing to read about an intervention on the front page of
the newspapers, then we ought to think twice about making that phone
call or writing that letter. "256
The theory behind the Dole plan seems to be that disclosure obli
gations should be limited to particularly sensitive types of cases. Con
sistently with that theory, Congress might wish, if it decides to create a
logging regime, to experiment with a system that would follow the gen
eral outlines of the Dole plan to the extent it would apply to pending or
potential agency enforcement proceedings.257 In enforcement cases,
even if the probability of abuse is low, arguably the need for public
confidence that the rule of law will be maintained is at its zenith. This
may be one reason why the Keating case, which of course arose in an
enforcement context, struck a raw nerve. At the same time, a require
ment limited to enforcement cases would be less unwieldy than an
across-the-board logging requirement, because members of Congress in
tervene less often in enforcement proceedings than in situations in
which a constituent seeks affirmative benefits from government.258

255. See 137 CONG. REC. S6492 (daily ed. May 23, 1991).
256. Id.
257. Senator Dole's proposal for docketing also extended to any agency proceed
ings "relating to the award of contracts." Id. There is, however, no conspicuous record
of scandals or undue congressional influence in that context Nor is it intuitively obvi
ous why contract awards should be deemed more sensitive than, say, awards of licenses
or of local development grants. Senator Dole himself did not explain why he singled out
contract awards for special attention.
258. See JOHANNES, supra note 44, at 21. As one author put it (somewhat tauto
logically): "[T]he goal [of the Keating Five] was to get an independent agency to back
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Who, if anyone, should do the logging - the agency or Congress?
Senator Dole's selection of the agency as a more logical candidate
seems correct, for several reasons. First, if the justification for logging
is to minimize the risks of congressional overreaching, placing the re
sponsibility for recording these interactions in hands other than those of
Congress itself seems appropriate. Second, a researcher could more
conveniently retrieve all records pertaining to a single transaction if
they were compiled by a single source rather than by multiple congres
sional offices. Third, agencies have substantial experience maintaining
similar logs in other contexts: many already possess formal procedures
for recording or summarizing ex parte contacts that they receive in for
mal adjudications259 and in rulemaking proceedings.260 Fourth, agencies
also have broader experience than congressional offices in handling the
privacy issues (discussed immediately below) that could arise in this
connection.
Any proposal for logging of congressional contacts regarding en
forcement matters must confront some significant privacy issues. Sup
pose that a legislator visits an agency and argues $at a constituent
whom the agency is investigating is blameless. Spurred by this visit, the
agency takes a closer look, concludes that the legislator . was right, and
drops the investigation. One certainly C!lll doubt the fairness of placing
on the public record the name of the individual who was investigated.
The "front-page test" may make sense for members of Congress them
selves, because they must be accountable for exercises of official
power; but the now-vindicated citizen is in a different position. Simi
larly, one could imagine other circumstances in which records of a con
stituent service contact might contain private information that should
not be stored in an easily accessible government record.261
off from an ongoing enforcement proceeding. That's .not only wrong; more unusual for
Washington, it's rare." Waldman, supra note 73, at 22-23.
259. Under the APA, ex parte contacts are prohibited in formal adjudication, but if
they do occur, the official who receives them is expected to place written communica
tions, and memoranda summarizing oral communications, on the public record. See 5
U.S.C. § 557(d)(l)(C) (1994). For examples of regulations that individual agencies have
issued to implement this mandate, see 1 8 C.F.R. § 385.2201 (1995) (FERC); 47 C.F.R.
§§ 1.1208, 1.1212 (1995) (FCC). Rules of the Food and Drug Administration refer spe
cifically to legislative contacts. See 21 C.F.R. § 10.65(c), (i) (1995).
260. See BENJAMIN W. MlNTz & NANCY G. Mil.LER, ADMIN. CONFERENCE OF
nm U.S., A GUIDE TO FEDERAL AGENCY RULEMAKING 230-32 (2d ed. 1991)
(describing six agencies' formal procedures for recording or summarizing ex parte con
tacts in rulemaking).
261. For example, an agency might be studying the antitrust or tax implications of
a planned corporate transaction; public disclosure of the existence of those plans might
thwart their effectiveness. Or an agency's investigation of alleged fraud in _disability
benefits might implicate highly personal medical information.
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Although Congress might wish to design a special set of proce
dures to deal with this tension, probably the simplest solution would be
to make use of existing laws. Thus, the Freedom of Information Act
(FOIA)262 contains a list of types of information that are exempted from
public disclosure,263 and an extensive case law fleshes out these exemp
tions so as to reconcile competing impulses toward disclosure and se
crecy. Every agency has acquired experience applying the exemptions
that relate most closely to its work. Other provisions protecting individ
uals from unjustified disclosures of information in government hands
are found in the Federal Privacy Act.264 Agencies are accustomed to
working with this Act as well. On the other hand, the FOIA and the Pri
vacy Act do not apply to Congress. Although proposals to extend those
laws to Congress are now under consideration, the difficulties of such
an extension should not be underestimated.265
The FOIA also contains a well-defined set of procedures for effect
ing disclosure. Under the FOIA framework, the basic question to re
solve would be whether agencies should place the logs routinely into a
publicly accessible database,266 or should instead release information
from their logs only in response to an aff"mnative request.267 Although
the former choice would make disclosure easier and quicker for the
public, it could also force agencies to devote an inordinate amount of
time to the redaction of entries that no one intends to peruse. Accord
ingly, the latter approach seems to be the preferable default rule. An in
dividual agency might well decide, however, in the context of its partic
ular case load, that the risks of intrusion on legitimate privacy interests
are so low that routine publication of the logs it maintains would be
warranted.
To be sure, the sort of privacy-protection precautions suggested
here may prove to be unnecessary - or, on the contrary, may mean
that there would be, in practice, so little disclosure of congressional
contacts as to cast doubt on the value of the entire logging procedure.
Congress or the agencies themselves should give due consideration to
these empirical questions before disclosure measures are implemented
on any ambitious scale.

262. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1994) (as amended).
263. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (1994).
264. 5 u.s.c. § 552a (1994).
265. See James T. O'Reilly, Applying Federal Open Government Laws to Con
gress: An Explorative Analysis and Proposal, 3 1 HAR.v. J. ON LEGIS. 415 (1994).
266. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(2) (1994).
267. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3) (1994).
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A final implementation issue is suggested by an unusual episode in

1989, when the Interior Department began to maintain a log of contacts
between its employees and congressional offices. Congress responded
with a brief, though ineffective, effort to prohibit the department from
requiring the logging.268 House members explained that the Depart
ment's procedure could deter agency whistleblowers from bringing
questionable administrative behavior to the attention of the legislative
branch. Although the validity of these fears is unclear, any new propo
sal to mandate logging of congressional contacts with agencies should
at least take into consideration, and seek to ameliorate, the potential for
an adverse impact on valuable communications originating

from the

agencies.

IV.

FAVORITISM AND MONEY INFLUENCE IN CONSTITUENT
SERVICE

The Keating Five affair has given rise to an enormous amount of
discussion about the relationship between constituent service and cam
paign fundraising. To date, however, the Senate's response to pressures
for new rules that might allay public fears about money influence has
been exceedingly cautious, and the House has not responded in any for
mal fashion at all. This Part begins by describing the limited regulation
and case law that now exists, including the Keating case and its after
math. Next the discussion attempts to identify some of the premises that
should guide the design of further ethical standards in this area. Finally,
this Part examines several options for new written guidelines, using as a
vehicle for analysis a set of standards that were proposed during the
Keating case by the special counsel to the Senate Ethics Committee.
A.

Background

Financial relationships between members of Congress and their
supporters and associates are regulated in a variety of ways. For exam
ple, the Federal Election Campaign Act269 limits the amounts that sena
tors and representatives may receive for their election campaigns.270
Moreover, statutes and internal rules in each chamber circumscribe the
outside income, gifts, travel, and other financial benefits that members

268. See Susan M. Davies, Comment, Congressional Encroachment on Executive
Branch Communications, 57 U. Cm. L. REv. 1297, 1297-98 (1990) (describing how
Congress adopted the prohibition but then retreated due to White House pressure).
269. 2 u.s.c. §§ 431-455 (1994).
270. See 2 U.S.C. §§ 441a-441h (1994).
-
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may accept from private parties for personal use.271 The criminal law
places other constraints on receipt by government officials of illicit fi
nancial benefits from outsiders, such as bribes and illegal gratuities.272
Until recently, however, authorities on legislative ethics had rarely
addressed the problems generated by links between constituent service
and financial benefits to members. Senator Paul Douglas, whose writ
ings on legislative ethics were described earlier, stressed the importance
of separating fundraising from casework, such as by allowing a "decent
interval" to elapse between the favor and the request.273 Later, in 1 970,

House Advisory Opinion No. 1 declared that one "self-evident" princi
ple to be observed was that " [a] Member's responsibility in this area is
to all his constituents equally . . . irrespective of political or other con
siderations. "274 For the most part, however, the Senate Ethics Commit
tee

had scant official guidance available to it when public pressure

forced it to confront the Keating Five scandal. In fact, it became fairly
clear from the early stages of that proceeding that the case implicated
no violations of specific laws or Senate rules. Consequently, the case
turned primarily on an application of Senate Resolution

338, a catchall

provision empowering the Committee to redress "improper conduct
which may reflect upon the Senate. "275
B.

The

Keating Case

As the reader will recall from our earlier perusal of the proceed
ings in the Keating case,276 the Committee decided to take no formal ac
tion against four of the senators. It issued a "reprimand" to Senator
Alan Cranston, explaining that he had "engaged in an impermissible
pattern of conduct in which fund raising and official activities were sub-

271. See supra note 32.
272. The principal criminal provisions are discussed infra text and accompanying
notes 308-27.
273. Senator Douglas noted:
It is probably not wrong for the campaign managers of a legislator before an
election to request contributions from those for whom the legislator has done ap
preciable favors, but this should never be presented as a payment for the services
rendered. Moreover, the possibility of such a contribution should never be sug
gested by the legislator or his staff at the time the favor is done. Furthermore, a
decent interval of time should be allowed to lapse so that neither party will feel
that there is a close connection between the two acts. Finally, not the slightest
pressure should be put upon the recipients of the favors in regard to the
campaign.
DOUGLAS, supra note 63, at 89.
274. Advisory Opinion No. l , supra note 131, at 1078.
275. S. Res. 338, 88th Cong. § 2(a) ( l), 1 10 CONG. REC. 16,939 (1964).
276. See supra notes 4-9 and accompanying text
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stantially linked. "2n In its final decision on Cranston, as well as in its

earlier report on the other four senators, the Committee was clearly sen
sitive to the central dilemma of the Keating Five case: articulating a ba
sis on which to distinguish the five senators' conduct from that of other

senators who are constantly engaged in both campaign fundraising and
constituent service, sometimes with the same people. In fact, the com

mittee labored to write a narrow decision that could justify the repri
mand of Cranston while reaffirming conventional norms of the Senate.

Specifically, the Committee defended constituent service as an es

sential aspect of a senator's job,278 and indeed declared that a senator
has an

obligation to help a campaign contributor with a legitimate

grievance, although, in such a case, the senator -should "talce special

care" to avoid harm to the public trust.279 The Committee found that
none of the senators had lacked a reasonable basis for raising questions

about the fairness of the Bank Board's treatment of Lincoln;280 when

considered apart from Keating's contributions to their campaigns, none
of their interventions with regulators had been improper.281 Conversely,

none of the contributions they received had been improper when con
sidered apart from their acts of intervention.282 Thus, in Cranston's case,

the sole basis for disciplinary action was that his fundraising and offi

cial actions had been "substantially linked." At the same time, the
Committee did not say that this "linkage" had been causal; it expressly

declined to find that there had been _a corrupt bargain, which would

have constituted bribery.283 The issue, instead, was basically one of un
seemly appearances.

What_ was the substance of the "substantial linkage" between

Cranston's fundraising and official actions? The Committee was delib

erately indefinite, stressing that its decision was based on ••the totality
of the circumstances. "284 Nevertheless, two broad areas of improper
conduct emerge from the Committee's explanation. First, the Committee

found several instances in which discussions about Lincoln's regulatory
problems between Cranston and Keating, or their respective staffs, oc

curred in close contiguity with fundraising activities, sometimes at the
same meetings or only days apart.285 The magnitude of Keating's contri277.
278.
279.
280.
281.
282.
283.
284.
285.

KEATING REPORT. supra note 4, at 20.
See id. at 6-7, 12.
See id. at 12.
See id. at 14.
See id. at 14-16.
See id. at 16.
See id. at 29, 36.
Id. at 35.
See id.
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butions to organizations affiliated with Cranston - nearly one million
dollars - may also have contributed to the Committee's feeling that the
financial relationship between the two of them called for an extra mea
sure of discretion that Cranston did not display.
The second basis for the Committee's decision was that Cranston's
office practices resulted in an exceptional blurring of the line between
fundraising activities and official business. The Committee relied spe
cifically on the activities of Joy Jacobson, Cranston's chief fundraiser.
Although she was not a Senate employee and had no substantive re
sponsibilities, she sat in on meetings on the Lincoln problem, arranged
some substantive meetings, and so forth. She also sent Cranston memo
randa indicating a belief that his major financial backers, including
Keating, were entitled to expect favored treatment, a belief that Cran
ston apparently never sought to dispel.286
A critical appraisal of the Committee's rationale leaves one with
the uneasy feeling that Cranston's misconduct regarding Keating was, at
most, different only in degree from what other members of Congress
do. Cranston's bitter "everyone does it" defense287 may not have been
literally correct, because differences of degree can matter; but the Com
mittee's reasoning, with its vague central concept of "substantially
linked" activities and its reliance on the "totality of circumstances,"
had little capacity to provide guidance to other legislators. The finding
that Cranston's office practices differed from those of other senators
seems to have rested on a firmer factual foundation;288 yet one can
scarcely believe that this finding would have led to disciplinary action
in the absence of the charges relating to Keating.
C.

Rule XLIII

Whatever the limitations of its ruling as a source of instruction for
other senators, the Ethics Committee managed to save some face by
pointing out that guidance might soon be forthcoming from another
quarter.289 At the Committee's request, the Senate party leaders had ap
pointed a bipartisan task force the previous April to draft prospective
rules governing senators' constituent service activities. That task force,
chaired by Senator Wendell Ford, presented its report the following
spring in the form of a resolution. In July 1992 the Senate adopted the

286.
287.
288.
289.

See id. at 27-29.
See Kuntz, supra note 7, at 3438.
See KEATING REPORT, supra note 4, at 31.
See id. at 16, 50.
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resolution - with an absolute minimum of fanfare290 - as Rule XLill
of the Senate Code of Official Conduct.291
Like Advisory Opinion No. 1, which the House Ethics Committee
adopted in 1970, Rule XLill begins by affirming the right of a legisla
tor to assist constituents or other petitioners by communicating with ad
ministrative officials. The rule lists several types of services that sena
tors may render, such as "express[ing] judgments" and "call[ing] for
reconsideration of an administrative response. "292 Then comes the only
substantive limitation in the rule: "The decision to provide assistance to
petitioners may not be made on the basis of contributions or services, or
promises of contributions or services, to the Member's political cam
paigns or to other organizations in which the Member has a political,
personal, or financial interest. "293 The rule also declares that senators
are responsible for the conduct of their staff.
The rule and the accompanying section-by-section analysis by its
sponsors are carefully drafted, but the substance of the rule is extraordi
narily cautious. In fact, the rule really does nothing to upgrade the ethi
cal standards governing senators' constituent service practices. The
rule's admonition that decisions about whether to provide service to
constituents and other petitioners "may not be made on the basis of"
financial contributions merely restates a proposition that had previously
been expressed in the House's Advisory Opinion No. l294 and in the
Keating report.295 At most, therefore, the new rule elevates what had

290. Senator Ford brought the resolution to the Senate floor "[i]n the dead of
night"; two senators made brief supporting remarks; the Senate passed the resolution by
voice vote; and minutes later Congress left for a two-week recess. Glenn R. Simpson,
Senate Quietly OKs Constituent Service Rule; Votes Just Moments Before Recess on
Post-Keating Provisions for Handling Requests, ROLL CALL, July 13, 1992, available
in LEXIS, Legis Library, Rolle! File. Obviously the Senate was not inclined to advertise
its new rule as a triumph for reformism.
291. See S. Res. 273, 102d Cong. 138 CONG REc. S9764 (daily ed. July 2, 1992).
292. The task force borrowed this list almost verbatim from the House advisory
opinion. See Advisory Opinion No. 1, supra note 131, at 1078.
293. SENATE RULE XLll(3), 138 CONG REc. S9764 (daily ed. July 2, 1992).
294. "A Member's responsibility in this area is to all his constituents equally
irrespective of political or other considerations." Advisory Opinion No. 1, supra note
131, at 1078.
.

.

•

295.

The cardinal principle governing Senators' conduct in this area is that a Senator
and a Senator's office should make decisions about whether to intervene with the
executive branch or independent agencies on behalf of an individual without re
gard to whether the individual has contributed, or promised to contribute, to the
Senator's campaigns or other causes in which he or she has a financial, political
or personal interest
KEATING REPORT. supra note 4, at 1 1-12; see also id. at 30.

•

.
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been a supporting rationale in the Keating case to the status of a
positive-law requirement.
Moreover, the rule is actually less stringent than Advisory Opinion
No. l , because it does not endorse the House committee's renunciation
of suggestions of "favoritism or reprisal." That principle - as well as
Senator Douglas's advice - presumably would carry some moral au
thority in any future ethics enforcement proceeding, but, as the Ethics
Committee itself pointed out in the Keating case, they do not have the
force of Senate precedents.296
Finally, although the new rule states a desirable precept as far as it
goes, its utility as an enforcement mechanism seems quite limited.
When the Ethics Committee is asked to enforce the rule, it will have to
make an inquiry into motive, which may be fruitless in the absence of
"
unusual "smoking gun evidence. It is already hard for the Committee
to reach a consensus on matters that are deeply personal and have such
obvious partisan implications in the background. Making the operative
standard inherently conjectural can only aggravate this difficulty. To be
sure, one could have criticized the parallel language of Advisory Opin
ion No. 1 and the Keating report on the same ground. The point re
mains, however, that Rule XLill is unlikely to make any significant dif
ference in Senate nonns or practice. Presumably the rule would prevent
an office from overtly establishing a double standard between the ser
vices it renders to contributors and noncontributors; but it is hard to be
lieve that any senatorial office has such a policy, at least after the Keat
ing affair.297
Ultimately, each House must strike a balance between a legisla
tor's freedom to serve constituents and her responsibility to uphold the
public trust. Given the vagueness of the Keating case's teachings combined with the remarkable restraint manifested in Rule XLill one can be confident that the Senate's efforts to reconcile these compet
ing objectives will not be the last word. Accordingly, the following sec
tions attempt to carry forward the debate where the prevailing ethics au
thorities have left off.

296. "[S]ources . . . such as the writings of Senator Paul Douglas and Advisory
Opinion No. 1 of the House . . . have value as helpful guidance
However, these
sources, in and of themselves, are not precedential and should not be considered as es
tablished Senate norms for purposes of discipline." Id. at 14.
297. Had it been in force at the time of the Keating decision, however, Rule XLID
would have furnished a straightforward basis for disciplinary action in Cranston's case:
the Committee found that Joy Jacobson made clear her belief that contributors deserved
special favors and that Cranston never tried to disabuse her of this understanding. See
id. at 20.
•

•

•

.
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Tightening the Rules: Some Normative Premises

Before turning to specific proposals that are intended to curb fa
voritism and money influence in constituent service, this section exam
ines some of the underlying policy considerations that any such reforms
must take into account. Once again, the subject can be analyzed as in
volving conflicting responsibilities. Some of those responsibilities lend
impetus to the argument for stricter regulation; others suggest the need
for a degree of caution.

1.

The Impulse Toward Stricter Regulation

In a sense, the case for new ethics rules in this area seems obvious.

All would agree298 that members of Congress should not intervene in
administrative proceedings because their services have been purchased
for money. As noted earlier, most legislative ethics regulation is ad
dressed to conflicts of interest between a member's self-interest and her
legislative duties, and the manner in which constituent service can be
used to promote one's reelection prospects would certainly fit that
description.299 The weakness of Rule XLill' s response to this sort of
abuse naturally stimulates interest in finding stronger remedies.
One difficulty in appraising the strength of this rationale, however,
is that it does not, and apparently cannot, rest on tangible evidence of
pervasive favoritism in constituent service. Disturbing as the Keating
episode was, no one has substantiated the frequently encountered accu
sation300 that it was typical of a large class of cases. Indeed, political
science accounts of constituent service tend to indicate the contrary.
John Johannes, in his book on casework (published before the Keating
scandal), reported that although interventions by congressional offices
in administrative agency matters were not always free of favoritism,
most were.301 Nor have other empirical studies of constituent service
identified favoritism as a significant problem.302

298. Except, perhaps, Charles Keating. When asked whether he thought his contri
butions had brought him influence, he responded, "I certainly hope so.'' Terry Atlas,
Scandal Builds Around Lincoln S&L, Cm. Tum., Nov. 19, 1989, at C7.
299. See supra notes 31-34, 83 and accompanying text.
300. See, e.g., Lied!, supra note 73.
301. See JOHANNES, supra note 44, at 124-25. Interestingly, Johannes seemed to
assume that to the extent the offices gave special treatment to anyone, they generally
did so for a member's personal friends or political allies, or for VIPs from the home
district; he barely mentioned contributors as potential beneficiaries of such treatment.
See id. at 123-27. But see id. at 124, 154 (quoting two caseworkers who alluded to fa
voritism for "big contributors").
302. Cain, Ferejohn, and Fiorina, although generally skeptical about the value of
constituent service to the body politic, do not mention the issue of favoritism at all. See
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Members and staff point to several factors303 as militating against
special treatment for particular requesters, including a sense of profes
sionalism among caseworkers, their awareness of existing ethics rules,
and apprehensions about adverse publicity (which may be the greatest
deterrent factor of all, particularly since the Keating affair304). Political
logic also lends plausibility to congressional offices' claims that they do
not confme constituent service to friends and supporters: part of the
motivation for casework is that the member can use it to reap political
support from citizens who might not agree with her stands on policy
issues.305

•

Of course, the ethical hazards of special treatment for campaign
contributors in the constituent service process deserve the ethics com
mittees' attention even if overt favoritism in that process is not particu
larly common. Moreover, Congress has at least one other obvious rea
son to consider tightening existing safeguards against favoritism in
constituent service: the prevalent public belief that Congress as an insti
tution has fallen captive to wealthy "special interests." The Keating
case has become a focal point for public disgust about lobbyists, PACs,
and other symbols of the dominance of money in the legislature. The
scramble for campaign donations has become so visible, and the
amounts involved so large, that corruption seems to many citizens an
ever-present danger on the legislative scene. Thus, even if stories about
special favors in the specific context of constituent service are excep
tional, they loom large when seen through the lens of the widely held
conviction that people like Charles Keating already enjoy more than
their share of political influence.
The House and Senate have recently made efforts to counteract
these perceptions by voting to overhaul their rules on acceptance of
gifts and on lobbyist registration.306 Similarly, the shaky state of Con
gress's reputation for integrity should give impetus to any proposal that
promises to reassure the public that the legislative branch is striving to
free itself from the risks of dependency and of "legalized bribery." The
establishment of visible and relatively objective rules may minimize the

CAIN ET AL.. supra note 45. Klonoff asserts that constituent service is equally available
to all citizens. See Klonoff, supra note 46, at 708 n.26.
303. See JOHANNES, supra note 44, at 125-27.
304. See supra notes 247-48 and accompanying text
305. See PRICE, supra note 63, at 1 19; supra notes 75-82 and accompanying text;
cf. Lowenstein, supra note 30, at 849-50 (arguing that exchanges of favors between leg
islators and administrators - so-called "state-bribery" - should not be considered
criminal bribery, in part because they benefit the affluent and nonaffluent alike).
306. See Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-65, 109 Stat. 691
(codified at 2 U.S.C.A. §§ 1601-1612 (West Supp. 1996)); supra note 32.
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chances of incidents that would embarrass their institution in the future.
Perhaps such rules could also provide something of a safe harbor for
members whose constituent service or fundraising practices might sub
sequently be questioned.
2.

Cautionary Factors: Lessons from the Corruption Case Law

Nevertheless, there are valid reasons to approach proposals for re
form with circumspection. First, Congress should leave sufficient lati
tude for members to perform constituent service, which .in and of itself
constitutes a legitimate feature of the informal checks-and-balances sys
tem of the government. The executive branch does make mistakes, and
congressional intervention is often a useful corrective to bureaucratic
error. This theme has been developed at length in Part II and need not
be recapitulated here.
Second, the Senate Ethics Committee was correct when it re
marked in the Keating case that fundraising for congressional cam
paigns is " a fact of life."307 Ethics rules designed to prevent special
treatment for contributors must come to terms with that reality.
Obviously members of Congress

desire latitude for campaign fun

draising - but should the ethics rules accommodate that desire? One
way to explore that question would be to examine the attitudes of a rel
atively disinterested branch of government - the judiciary - in an
analogous context. Just as the field of administrative law sheds light on
the proper contours of "undue influence" in legislative ethics, the crim
inal law offers suggestive lessons about the needs of legislators as can
didates. The most relevant case law arises under the corruption statutes,
including those punishing bribery, extortion, and illegal gratuities.
These provisions raise numerous issues of interpretation that other
scholarly works have dissected in detail;308 for present purposes only a
few points from the case law need be mentioned.

307. KEATING REPORT, supra note 4, at 16.
308. See 2 KATHLEEN F. BRICKEY, CORPORATE CRIMINAL LIABILITY §§ 9:28:41 (2d ed. 1993). Regarding the specific problem of applying the corruption laws to
campaign contributions, see Jmrn T. NOONAN, JR., BRIBES 621-51 (1984); Lowen
stein, supra note 30; ROSENBERG & MASKELL, supra note 130, at 41-62. The last
cited study includes a discussion of the criminal "conflict of interest" statute, 18 U.S.C.
§ 203 (1994), which prohibits members from accepting "compensation" for "represen
tational services" before federal agencies. See id. at 48-52. Neither that statute nor sev
eral other obscure criminal provisions analyzed by Rosenberg and Maskell will be dis
cussed here, because of the absence of case law directly addressing the issue with which
this section is concerned. Cf. James M. Falvey, Note, The Congressional Ethics Di
lemma: Constituent Service or Conflict of Interest?, 28 AM.. CRIM. L. REV. 323, 348,
358-59 (1991) (acknowledging, despite the allure of applying § 203 to facts like those
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some outer limits on a legisla

tor's ability to use constituent service as a fundraising device. Undoubt
edly, campaign contributions are sometimes bribes,309 and a legislator's
intervention with an administrative agency is sometimes the considera
tion for which the forbidden payment is made.31° Furthermore, the
Speech or Debate Clause of the Constitution,31 1 which prevents courts
from examining the "legislative acts" of members of Congress, would
probably not impede a prosecution of a legislator for taldng a bribe in
exchange for constituent service, because casework is not the kind of
"legislative act" that the clause shields from judicial scrutiny.312
Nevertheless, the courts have sometimes taken great pains to avoid
a reading of the corruption laws that would interfere with the legitimate
needs of the campaign fmance system. The Supreme Court made its

McCormick

clearest statement along these lines in

v.

United States.313

The defendant was a West Vrrginia state legislator who solicited money
from an organization of foreign-born doctors on whose behalf he was
sponsoring legislation to liberalize medical licensing requirements for
organization members. The Department of Justice prosecuted him under
the Hobbs Act, an extortion statute that applies to "the obtaining of
property from another, with his consent, induced by wrongful use of ac
tual or threatened force, violence, or fear, or under color of official
right. "314 McCormick defended his actions on the ground that the pay
ments

he

had received

from

the

doctors

had

been

campaign

contributions.
The Court found compelling policy reasons to read the statute to
permit normal solicitation of political contributions:
Serving constituents and supporting legislation that will benefit the
district and individuals and groups therein is the everyday business of a
legislator. It is also true that campaigns must be run and financed. Money
is constantly being solicited on behalf of candidates, who run on plat
forms and who claim support on the basis of their views and what they
intend to do or have done. Whatever ethical considerations and appear
ances may indicate, to hold that legislators commit the federal crime of

of the Keating case, the lack of case law defining when, if at all, campaign contribu
tions can be "compensation").
309. See United States v. Anderson, 509 F.2d 312, 330-31 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Low
enstein, supra note 30, at 808-09.
310. See, e.g., United States v. Biaggi, 909 F.2d 662 (2d Cir. 1990); United States
v. Podell, 519 F.2d 144 (2d Cir. 1975).
311. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 1 ("[F]or any Speech or Debate in either House,
they shall not be questioned in any other Place
")
312. See United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501, 512 (1972).
313. 500 U.S. 257 (1991).
314. 18 u.s.c. § 195l(b)(2) (1994).
.

•

.

.
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extortion when they act for the benefit of constituents or support legisla
tion furthering the interests of some of their constituents, sl\ortly before
or after campaign contributions are solicited and received from those

beneficiaries
. would open to prosecution
conduct that in a very
real sense is unavoidable so long as election campaigns are financed by
•

•

.

.

•

private contributions or expenditures, as they have been from the begin.:.
ning of the Nation.31s

Therefore, political contributions would be subject to prosecution as
having been obtained "under color of official right," within the mean
ing of the Hobbs Act, "only if the payments are made in return for an
explicit promise or undertaltjng by the official to perform or not to per
form an official act. In such situations the official asserts that his offi
cial conduct will be controlled by the terms of the promise or undertak
ing."316

The

Court's

requirement

of

an

"explicit

promise

or

undertaking" - one form of a "quid pro quo" - was striking because
of the absence of statutory language on ·which to predicate it.317 Equally
striking, perhaps, is that even the government essentially agreed with
this requirement, at least in the abstract; its defense of the verdict in

McCormick rested on the assumption that the jury had properly found
that the payments to McCormick were not campaign contributions at
all.318
The strained statutory construction to which the Court resorted in

McCormick319 would not have been necessary if the case had involved a
315. McCormick, 500 U.S. at 272. Note the Court's suggestion that "ethical con
siderations" may diverge from the dictates of the criminal law. Still, if the Court is cor
rect in its belief that the described conduct is "unavoidable," ethics rules must take that
fact into account, just as the criminal justice system does.
316. 500 U.S. at 273.
317. See 500 U.S. at 277 (Scalia, J., concurring).
318. See Brief for the United States at 29, McCormick (1991) (No. 89-1918) ("If
this case had involved a campaign contribution rather than a personal payoff, it would
have been necessary for the government to prove that the contribution was obtained by
a threat to take unfavorable action or a specific promise to take favorable action, i.e., a
quid pro quo."). See also Evans v. United States, 504 U.S. 255, 286. (1992) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting) (reasoning that the quid pro quo requirement in McCormick was necessary
"to prevent the Hobbs Act from effecting a radical (and absurd) change in American
political life").
319. The policy analysis in McCormick may have lost some of its practical impor
tance in light of a later case, Evans v. United States, 504 U.S. 255 (1992), in which the
Court apparently adopted a restrictive mental state requirement for all extortion prose
cutions arising out of the "under color of official right" language of the Hobbs Act regardless of whether campaign contributions are involved. See 504 U.S. at 268 n.20.
The Court defined the requisite state of mind for such prosecutions somewhat more
broadly than McCormick had: an agreement would not have to be explicit, but could be
inferred from the official's having "obtained a payment to which he was not entitled,
knowing that the payment was made in return for official acts." 504 U.S. at 268; see
also 504 U.S. at 257 (finding that the defendant's acceptance of bribe, with knowledge
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member of Congress prosecuted under the federal bribery statute, 18
U.S.C. § 201(b)(2). That statute contains explicit language suggesting a
quid pro quo requirement: the bribed official must have solicited, ac
cepted, or agreed to accept something of value "in return for . . being
influenced" in the performance of an official act.320 Moreover, the brib
ery statute also requires a showing that the official acted "corruptly," a
criterion that would surely leave room for judicial flexibility if some fu
ture case were to present a possibility that a member of Congress had
been convicted of bribery because of normal fundraising actions.321
Thus, although one reasonably could assume that, on facts like those of
McCormick, the Court would require at least as strong a showing of a
guilty mental state under the bribery statute as it has required under the
Hobbs Act,322 the case law acknowledging a quid pro quo requirement
under § 201(b)(2)323 is not a particularly illuminating test of the judici
ary's solicitude for the campaign fundraising process.
The statute imposing liability for the offense of accepting an illegal
gratuity, 18 U.S.C. § 201 (c)(2), is a different story. It applies to any of
ficial who, "otherwise than as provided by law for the proper discharge
of official duty . . . seeks [or] receives . . . anything of value personally
for or because of any official act performed or to be performed by such
official. "324 On its face this statute seems to pose a considerable threat
to routine solicitation or acceptance of campaign contributions, because
its words do not even hint at a requirement of an illicit bargain or cor
rupt motive.
.

of payor's intent to ensure favorable action, "constituted an implicit promise to use his
official position to serve the interests of the bribegiver"). Lower courts remain uncer
tain whether the Court has modified McCormick itself, that is to say, whether a jury
should be instructed to apply the relaxed Evans state of mind rules even if it finds that a
payment was a bona fide campaign contribution. See United States v. Blandford, 33
F.3d 685, 695-98 (6th Cir. 1994) (summarizing competing views}, cert. denied, 1 15 S.
Ct 1821 (1995).
320. 18 U.S.C. § 201(b)(2) (1994) (emphasis added).
321. Lowenstein's solution to the problem of potential overbreadth in the bribery
laws is to define the scope of "corruptness" by reference to "intermediate political the
ory" - theoretical assumptions about what rules are most conducive to the health of
the political system. See Lowenstein, supra note 30, at 805-06. That method is roughly
comparable to the approach used by the McCormick and Brewster decisions discussed
in this section, although these courts may have reached substantive conclusions that dif
fer from Lowenstein's.
322. Cf. United States v. Allen, 10 F.3d 405, 41 1 (7th Cir. 1993) (dictum) (sug
gesting that bribery statutes should be read consistently with McCormick unless they
contain language plainly suggesting otherwise).
323. See, e.g., United States v. Niederberger, 580 F.2d 63, 68 (3d Cir. 1978);
United States v. Raborn, 575 F.2d 688, 692 (9th Cir. 1978); United States v. Strand, 574
F.2d 993, 995 (9th Cir. 1978).
324. 18 U.S.C. § 201(c)(l) (1994).
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Nevertheless, in a leading decision, United States v. Brewster,325
the D.C. Circuit insisted that the gratuity statute, too, must be inter
preted in light of political reality. Reversing a senator's conviction on
gratuity charges because of faulty jury instructions, the court pointed
out the problem: the statute would eradicate the distinction between an
unlawful gratuity and a legitimate campaign contribution if it were con
strued to allow liability on the basis of a legislator's mere knowledge
that a contribution was made because of the legislator's record and
would probably be followed by further contributions if the legislator
maintained a similar record:

·

No politician who knows the identity and business interests of his cam
paign contributors is ever completely devoid of knowledge as to the in
spiration behind the donation. There must be more specific knowledge of
a definite official act for which the contributor intends to compensate
before an official's action crosses the line between guilt and innocence.326

The situation might be different, the court noted, in a prosecution
against an unelected official, such as an Internal Revenue Service agent.
In such a case the government might not need to prove any mental
state; any "tip" paid to the agent as an individual could be considered
wrongful, as it would compensate him for actions that he is supposed to
take anyway. But this logic does not work for elected officials, who
under some circumstances

should accept payments of money based on

the giver's appreciation of the official's past or anticipated actions.
Therefore, the gratuity offense as applied to an elected official

must

contain an element of criminal intent.327
For this article's purposes, the significant aspect of McCormick and
Brewster is not whether they drew lines in precisely the right place indeed, both have been criticized.328 More important is the courts' un
derlying point the criminal law must not be applied in a manner that
makes political fundraising unworkable. One need make only a small
extension of this reasoning to arrive at the conclusion that ethics rules,

325. 506 F.2d 62 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
326. 506 F.2d at 81. See also Lowenstein, supra note 30, at 848 & n.237 (agreeing
that a straightforward reading of the gratuity statute is unacceptable, because it would
seriously interfere with legitimate campaign finance activities).
327. See 506 F.2d at 72-73 n.26. See also Note, Campaign Contributions and Fed
eral Bribery Law, 92 HAR.v. L. REv. 451, 455-58 (1978) (supporting Brewster's dis
tinction between elected and unelected officials).
328. See, e.g., James Lindgren, The Theory, History, and Practice of the Bribery
Extortion Distinction, 141 U. PA. L. REv. 1695, 1710-1 1, 1736-38 (1993) (criticizing
McCormick); William M. Welch II, Comment, The Federal Bribery Statute and Special
Interest Campaign Contributions, 19 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1347, 1359-65
(1989) (criticizing Brewster).
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too, must take account of candidates' legitimate interest in raising
money for reelection campaigns.329

3.

The Campaign Finance Reform Connection

The previous section's extrapolation from judicial decisions may
seem unconvincing, because the legislature - unlike the judiciary does not have to take the campaign finance system as a given. Congress
could alter the system itself. Indeed, the Senate Ethics Committee's re
port on the Keating case included an "urgent" call for bipartisan cam
paign finance reform.330 Of course, campaign finance reform is already
the subject of a vast literature, and this article cannot do justice to its
complexities. Still, the logical connection between that subject and the
Keating scandal is too obvious to ignore. The following discussion does
not argue for any particular reform program; it merely attempts to
demonstrate that campaign finance reform would not necessarily elimi
nate, and might not even go far toward ameliorating, the problems of
ethics regulation examined in this Part.
In the first place, the need for congressional candidates, including
incumbents, to raise large sums from private sources is likely to remain
a ''fact of life"331 even if Congress does enact some form of campaign
finance reform legislation. For that situation to change, campaign costs
would have to be either heavily subsidized or drastically reduced, and
neither is probable. The option of large-scale public financing of Senate
and Hpuse races appears to lack support from the electorate and has lit
tle chance of being adopted anytime soon.332 This is not to say that new
campaign finance legislation is unlikely to draw upon public resources

329. See CONGRESS AND THE PUBLIC TRUST, supra note 38, at 180 (noting that,
unlike other gifts, "campaign contributions are tolerated [in governmental ethics] be
cause they are a necessary incident of our present electoral system").
330. See KEATING REPoRT, supra note 4, at 16-17. But see Glenn R. Simpson,
Campaign Reform Now Back on Front Burner, RoLL CALL, Mar. 7, 1991, available in
LEXIS, Legis Library, Rolle! File (quoting Professor Sabato's view that the committee's
remark constituted "passing the buck").
331 . See supra note 307 and accompanying text
332. See, e.g., Schotland, supra note 252, at 457; Frank J. Sorauf, Politics, Experi
ence, and the First Amendment: The Case ofAmerican Campaign Finance, 94 COLUM.
L. REv. 1348, 1357 (1994): Gary C. Jacobson, Campaign Finance and Democratic
Control: Comments on Gottlieb and Lowenstein's Papers, 18 HOFSTRA L. REV. 369,
381-82 (1989); Helen Dewar, Stalemate of Survival, WASH. POST, Aug. 6, 1992, at A l
(quoting former Representative Al Swift's explanation o f the poor prospects fo r public
financing: Congress "will never, never, never do what the public doesn't want and it
doesn't want"); cf. Panel Discussion, Campaign Finance, 8 J.L. & POL. 294 (1992)
(discussion of taxpayers' declining participation in public funding mechanism for presi
dential campaigns).
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at all. For the foreseeable future, however, political realities probably

dictate that both incumbents' and challengers' campaigns will remain
primarily dependent on private money.
At the same time, efforts to overcome the reality that congressional
campaigning is expensive would likely prove futile or self-defeating.
Barring a major reappraisal by the Supreme Court of its First Amend
ment case law, Congress could not impose mandatory limits on spend
ing without inviting a strong constitutional challenge.333 Moreover, the
weight of the political science literature indicates that stringent limits on
campaign spending would be ill-advised as a matter of policy, because
they would handicap challengers and entrench incumbents.334 Challeng
ers generally need generous funding if they are to have a serious chance

of overcoming the advantages of incumbency - one of which, as we

have seen, is the incumbent's record o� constituent service itself.335 Per
haps there is a case for some spending limits, particularly if they are
made voluntary and set at relatively high levels. Much less acceptable,
however, is the notion that a serious reform program would or should
limit expenditures to such an extent that members would lose the incen
tive

to

exploit

constituent

service

for

the

sake

of

campaign

contributions.336
Even if one accepts the thesis developed to this point - that one
should not count on campaign finance legislation to eliminate the need

333. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 54-59 (1976). In view of the Court's recent
reaffina
n tion of First Amendment limits on regulation of election-related spending in
Colorado Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. v. FEC, 1 16 S. Ct 2309 (1996), the pros
pects for such a retrenchment seem remote at best Although Congress could presuma
bly overcome the constitutional difficulty by making spending limits voluntary and of
fering incentives to induce candidates to comply With them (as it has done with public
financing of presidential campaigns, see Buckley, 424 U.S. at 90-108), generous incen
tives would revive the proble of taxpayer resistance to the funding of elections from
the public treasury.
334. Gary Jacobson is the leading exponent of this thesis. See, e.g., Gary C. Jacob
son, Enough Is Too Much: Money and Competition in House Elections, in ELECTIONS
IN .AMERICA 173 (Kay Lehman Schlozman ed., 1987). Scholars in this field widely ac
cept his view. See, e.g., HERBERT E. ALExANDER, FINANCING POLITICS: MONEY,
ELECTIONS, & PoLmCAL REFORM 173-74 (4th ed. 1992); Schotland, supra note 252,
at 452-56; Norman J. Ornstein, Reforming Campaign Reform, N.Y. T!MEs, June 25,
1991, at A25 ("Virtually every academic expert on campaign finance dismisses limits
as unfair impediments to unknown challengers seeking to unseat well-financed incum
bents."). For a dissent, see Jonathan S. Krasno & Donald Philip Green, Stopping the
Buck Here, BROOKINGS REv., Spring 1993, at 17.
335. See supra notes 87-89 and accompanying text
336. The discussion in the text has assumed for the sake of argument that efforts
to curb the money flow would actually be effective, but that premise is open to doubt
Experience testifies to candidates' ingenuity in finding ways to circumvent legislative
ceilings on their campaign spending. See, e.g., ALExANDER, supra note 334, at 170.
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for extensive political fundraising - one might expect that such legisla
tion would at least improve the ethical environment for congressional
constituent service. But even that proposition is open to doubt. As

scholars have repeatedly observed, the history of campaign finance re

form is a "classic illustration of the law of unanticipated conse
quences."337 Future measures could easily meet a similar fate.338

The difficulties can be explored in connection with a few reform

proposals that respond directly to problems that the Keating scandal

highlighted. Charles Keating's ability to generate huge contributions to

the five senators was a direct result of his assiduous 'exploitation of
loopholes that permitted "bundling" (aggregation of contributions from
many donors for a single candidate) and "soft money" donations (con

tributions to party activities, such as voter registration and get-out-the
vote drives).339 Current campaign finance reform bills contain provi
sions that would curb these practices,340 and Congress should give these

proposed measures due attention.341

As intrinsically attractive as these proposals may seem, however,

their significance for the ethical climate of Congress should not be eval
uated in a vacuum. A crucial question is whether the avenues for fun
draising that would exist under the new regime, taken as a whole,

would be less likely to lead to abuse than the avenues available under
the old system. This question cannot be answered with much confi-

337. Sorauf, supra note 332, at 1365; see Lillian R. BeVier, Campaign Finance
Reform: Specious Arguments, Intractable Dilemmas, 94 CoLUM. L. REv. 1258, 1276,
1279 (1994); Schotland, supra note 252, at 437 & n.16.
338. See Cass R. Sunstein, Political Equality and Unintended Consequences, 94
CoLUM. L. REv. 1390, 1400, 141 1 (1994) (warning of this possibility).
339. See Simpson, supra note 330. See generally Peter H. Stone, Labyrinth of
Laopholes, NATL. J., Nov. 25, 1995, at 2912 (documenting continued prevalence of
bundling and soft money practices).
340. The leading bill of the 104th Congress was a "bipartisan" package that,
among other things, would have established "voluntary" spending limits and offered
various incentives to induce candidates to accept them. It also would have imposed se
vere restrictions on bundling, soft money contributions, and PACs. See S. 1219, 104th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1995). In June 1996 the Senate sponsors lost in an attempt to over
come a filibuster, and essentially conceded that the bill would not be enacted during the
104th Congress. See Adam Clymer, Senate Kills Bill To Limit Spending in Congress
Races, N.Y. TIMES, June 26, 1996, at Al.
341. Both of the practices under discussion have their defenders. See Beth
Donovan, Much-Maligned 'Soft Money' Is Precious to Both Parties, 51 CONG. Q.
WKLY. REP. 1 195 (1993) (noting support among political scientists for parties' liberal
access to soft money); Robert Alan Dahl, 'Bundling' Political Expression, LEGAL
TIMES OF WASH.. Sept 20, 1993, at 23 (opposing ban on bundling). The basic question
for Congress is whether it can preserve the beneficial aspects of bundling and soft
money while preventing them from being used to undermine the fundamental purposes
of election regulation.
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dence. Reforms such as curbs on bundling or soft money would pre
sumably have the effect of increasing the pressure on members to solicit
from a larger number of donors. It is at least plausible to suppose that
this pressure could actually intensify incumbents' temptations to exploit
constituent service as one means of winning support from these
donors.342
Other components of a reform package might augment those temp
tations even further. For example, one of the most popular proposals,
which stands a good chance of becoming part of any overhaul of cam
paign finance laws,343 is to eliminate or sharply reduce the amounts that
candidates may accept from political

action committees

(PACs).

Whatever the overall merits of this idea,344 it seems inapt as a cure for
the problems of the Keating case.345 By definition, PACs tend to be
broad-based. They are likely to be much more interested in a member's

legislative record than in, say, the member's willingness to intervene in
an agency enforcement proceeding brought against an individual.346 In
deed, PACs have seldom if ever been accused of attempting to subvert
congressional constituent service functions. Perhaps, as some argue,
tighter constraints on PACs are essential because of their corrupting in
fluence on congressional lawmaking;347 nevertheless, a shift in the rela
tive influence of PACs and individuals in the financing of congressional
campaigns would not seem likely to improve, and might actually aggra-

342. Cf. Sorauf, supra note 332, at 1365 ("[T]he danger of making the supply of
money too small for the candidate demand [is that] the 'value' of contributed money in
creases and thus its political leverage.").
343. See supra note 340.
344. Much of the scholarly literature suggests that the case against PACs is not as
strong as the public usually assumes. See ALExANDER, supra note 334, at 171-72;
Larry J. Sabato, PACs and Parties, in MONEY, ELECTIONS, AND DEMOCRACY: RE
FORMING CONGRESSIONAL CAMPAIGN FINANCE 187, 187-90 (Margaret Latus
Nugent & John R. Johannes eds., 1990); Sorauf, supra note 332, at 1364-65.
345. Cf. Simpson, supra note 330 (debunking Common Cause advertisements that
cited the Keating scandal in support of proposals to ban PACs, even though Keating did
not operate through a PAC).
346. Agency rulemaking proceedings may occupy a middle ground between these
poles: one can easily envision a PAC attempting to induce a member of Congress to be
"helpful" in such a proceeding, but at the same time rulemaking proceedings are con
sidered among the most appropriate for legislative participation. See supra note 179.
347. In one of the more ambitious efforts to document the corrupting power of
PACs, Lowenstein claims that PACs tend to promote their ends by using a "legislative
strategy" - that is, trying to use donations to win the passage of statutes that favor
their interests. See Daniel Hays Lowenstein, On Campaign Finance Reform: The Root
of All Evil ls Deeply Rooted, 18 HOFSTRA L. REv. 301, 308-13, 329-35 (1989). He
does not assert that they similarly corrupt constituent service.
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vate, the political context within which casework occurs.348 This might
become one of the "unanticipated consequences" of campaign finance
reform.
Finally, even if Congress could somehow manage to devise a
workable and politically acceptable method by which its members could
run

for office without any major donors, the ethics issues examined in

this Part would not disappear entirely. Although lavish political support
like Keating's triggers the most intense apprehensions about congres
sional favoritism, much smaller contributions - which would continue
to exist under any plausible campaign finance regime - sometimes
touch a raw nerve in public opinion as well.349 Regardless of the fate of
campaign finance reform, ethics authorities must think through the man
ner in which they will respond to those sentiments.
E.

Reform Proposals and New Approaches

Against this background of competing tensions, Congress should
look with an open mind at suggestions for further ethical limitations on
constituent service. Perhaps the rules can be refined in a way that would
provide greater reassurance of members' integrity without unduly bur
dening their ability to perform the ordinary functions of their offices.
Moreover, even members who oppose further restrictions on their free
dom of action should appreciate the desirability of making

existing ex

pectations more explicit. Clarification of what is now the "unwritten
law" might make it easier to follow, more predictable in its application,

and more reassuring to the public than is now possible under the pre
vailing, open-ended "improper conduct" standard, a criterion that the
chairman of the Senate Ethics Committee, Senator Heflin, aptly de
scribed as a know-it-when-you-see-it test.350

If Congress does reopen serious consideration of the ethics issues
surrounding constituent services for contributors, what new standards
should it adopt? Analysis could begin with some of the ideas for regula
tion that emerged during the Keating proceedings themselves. During

348. See Two Cheers for PACs, ROLL CALL, May 10, 1993, at 4 ("Our own work
at this newspaper has shown, time and again, that truly unsavory donors are not PACs,
'
but individuals [such as Keating].").
349. See, e.g., Contributions and Constituent Service, ST. Lams POST-DISPATCH,
Oct 16, 1993, at 14B (editorial criticizing a state legislator who wrote to a state agency
on behalf of a day care home and soon afterwards accepted a $250 campaign contribu
tion from the home's owners).
350. See Kuntz, supra note 7, at 3432.
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the Ethics Committee's hearings, Special Counsel Bennett proposed
four principles for the Committee's consideration:351

1.

A Senator should not take contributions from an individual he
knows or should know is attempting to procure his services to in
tervene in a specific matter pending before a Federal agency.

2.

A Senator should not take unusual or aggressive action with regard
to a specific matter before a Federal agency on behalf of a contrib
utor when he knows, or has reason to know, the contributor has
sought to procure his services.

3.

A Senator should not conduct his fundraising efforts or engage in
office practices which lead contributors to conclude that they can
buy access to him.

4.

A Senator should not engage in conduct which would appear to be
improper to a reasonable, nonpartisan, fully informed person.

The Committee's ultimate decision did not expressly endorse any of
these principles, but its reasoning contained echoes of all of them. The
Bennett standards deserve attention here because, although each can be
criticized, they do pose the right issues for consideration:

(1) simultane

ity of constituent service with solicitation or acceptance of political con

(3) office prac
(4) discipline based on the appearance of impropriety.

tributions; (2) intervention on behalf of contributors;
tices; and

1.

Simultaneity of Campaign Contributions and Intervention

a. The "Decent Interval" Test. Up to a point, Bennett's principle
that " [a] Senator should not take contributions from an individual he
knows or should know is attempting to procure his or her services to in
tervene in a specific matter pending before a Federal agency" bears
comparison with the first prong of the Ethics Committee's ruling on
Senator Cranston's conduct. Both start from the premise that, even if a
legislator's decision to press an individual's cause before an agency is
not actually influenced by the individual's campaign support, the risk of
influence becomes intolerably high when these two events occur close
together in time, and public appearances can suffer as a result. Thus,
both Bennett's and the Committee's positions recall Senator Douglas's
advice that "a decent interval of time should be allowed to lapse" be
tween a favor and solicitation of a campaign contribution.352 At the
same time, large differences of degree separate Bennett's proposed rule

351 . See 1 Keating Hearings, supra note 129, at 57-58 (Nov. 15, 1990); 6 Keating
Hearings, supra note 129, at 152-53 (Jan. 15, 1991).
352. See supra note 273 and accompanying text
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from the Committee's holding: the Committee went to great lengths to
portray the Keating-Cranston connection as extreme, but Bennett's rule
would govern a broad class of situations.
Bennett claimed that his rule could be deduced from extant Senate
precedents,353 but that proposition was shaky. Collection of campaign
donations and representation of constituent interests before federal
agencies are legitimate and, in many cases, routine events. For the Eth
ics Committee to have treated the confluence of these two common
events as unethical simply because they occurred at about the same
time would have required a considerable extrapolation of precedent an extension that probably would have been too zealous in the context
of a disciplinary proceeding, in which considerations of fair notice loom
large.
That conclusion, however, does not mean that the Senate or House
should not adopt the Bennett rule, or something like it, as a prophylac
tic measure, aimed at preventing the kind of unseemly appearances that
the Keating Five case generated.

If one thinks about Bennett's principle this way, it actually seems

taking a contribution, as opposed
solicitation,- surely, however, any circumstances that would foreclose

underinclusive. First, it refers only to
to

an ethical member from passively accepting a contribution must like
wise prevent that member from actively requesting it. Second, Bennett's
rule would discourage contributions

while a constituent is seeking inter

vention; yet potentially troublesome appearances do not evaporate in
stantly once a legislator accedes to such a request. Perhaps, therefore,
the ethics committees should explicitly endorse Senator Douglas's sug
gestion that the legislator who intervenes with an agency on a constitu
ent's behalf should wait for " a decent interval of time" before soliciting
or accepting a campaign contribution from the beneficiary. To date the
committees have never endorsed that notion, even as an aspirational
matter.354

353. See 1 Keating Hearings, supra note 129, at 58 (Nov. 15, 1990).
354. The suggested rule would address only simultaneity between political contri
butions and intercession with administrative agencies. It would not, for example, speak
to the situation in which a member arranges to hold a fundraising event at just around
the time when he expects to be making decisions on a bill that will vitally affect some
of the persons whom he has invited to the event That situation is not uncommon. See,
e.g., David E. Rosenbaum, Defying Odds, New Yorker Saves Milk Subsidies, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 6, 1995, at Al; Moynihan Holding Well-Timed Party, N.Y. TIMES, June
1 1 , 1993, at A20. Nevertheless, until Congress finds a way to avoid conducting legisla
tive business during campaign season, it probably cannot adopt a categorical ban on
such "well-timed" events.

·
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The purpose of this guideline would be to erect a temporal buffer
between casework and donation, so as to reduce the risk, and minimize
the appearance, of a bargain between legislator and petitioner. To be
sure, the very fact of mutual benefits between the two, even if separated
in time, will strike some external observers as suspicious. That kind of
appearance, however, is not avoidable at reasonable cost. As discussed
above, our campaign system runs on private donations, and it would be
perverse to

try

to make sure that a donor has no reason for his or her

gift. Thus, the rules should not seek to prevent contributions that are
motivated by a�·,preciation for the member's services. Rather, the limited
goal of the suggested rule would be to give the public a degree of as
surance that a donation and an intervention have stemmed from two
separate decisions, rather than from a direct exchange of benefits be
tween legislator and constituent.

·

Although individual members would no doubt feel that such a
measure would be a considerable intrusion on their autonomy, they
probably would be able to live with it. After all, the Committee hear
ings elicited testimony from senators who claimed that they already op
erate under self-imposed restraints of this kind.355 The Keating episode
may have made such self-restraint more common. To the extent that
members are already living by the suggested principle, the case for cod
ifying it becomes all the stronger.356

355. Senator Inouye testified that he returns contributions that he receives within a
few days after assisting the donor. See 3 Keating Hearings, supra note 129, at 46 (Dec.
3, 1990). Two of the Keating Five senators testified more generally that they keep dis
cussions of casework and contributions separate. See 5 id. at 177 (Jan. 4, 1991) (Sen.
Glenn); id. at 20 (Jan. 9, 1991) (Sen. DeConcini). In addition, Senator Riegle testified
that he had returned contributions generated by Keating because he was troubled by
their proximity in time to the fateful April 1987 meetings. See id. at 8 1-82 (Jan. 7,
1991); see also Charles R. Babcock & Helen Dewar, Keating Fallout: Senators Draw
Own Lines on When To Intervene, WASH. PosT, Jan. 16, 1991, at A17 (noting Senator
Rudman's policy against "accepting substantial contributions from any company during
a period in which the company is facing a 'major confrontation' with regulatory
agencies").
356. The committees would need to resolve various implementation issues, includ
ing the length of the waiting period and the advisability of exempting contributions be
low a certain sum. They might also consider exempting solicitations effected on a mass
basis, such as direct mail or phone banks.
In addition, the committees would need to take account of the fact that some ad
ministrative transactions can run for years and go through various stages before a result
is reached. Indeed, Charles Keating's case is illustrative: his feud with the FHLBB
lasted for many months, and he drew upon congressional assistance frequently during
that period. See KEATING REPORT, supra note 4, at 21-27. There may be no entirely
satisfactory way to write a rule to deal with such a situation, but one option would be to
declare that a member must not accept a contribution from a constituent, who has
benefitted from casework unless the member waits for a "decent interval of time" after
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A rule codifying the Douglas "decent interval" principle should
disapprove contributions from persons who the member knows are seek
ing or have recently sought constituent service - but not, as in
Bennett's proposal, from persons who the member "should know" have
sought such service. If the member who receives a contribution does
not actually know that the contributor had recently sought the legisla
tor's help in a dispute with a federal agency, then by hypothesis there
was no illicit barg&in or understanding between the two. Indeed, the
logic behind the "should" in Bennett's principle is difficult to pene
trate. The Keating decision teaches that members who want to play it
safe should, to the extent feasible,

separate the processes of casework

and fundraising; this lesson is not easy to harmonize with Bennett's im
plication that members of a fundraising staff should make it their busi
ness to find out the identities of current requesters of the office's con
stituent services.
Moreover, although this qualification would limit the scope of the
rule, that consequence is attractive, because it would tend to protect leg
islators from becoming embroiled in enforcement proceedings because
of a minor transgression. Many of the transactions addressed by the rule
may involve mundane casework activity and small donations, where the
possibility of an innocent misunderstanding is significant. The rule
should not be so stringently worded as to invite the use of ethics com
plaints as a tool of harassment - an ever-present risk in the high
stakes, sometimes hardball, world of congressional politics.357 On the
other hand, the very existence of the rule would demonstrate that solici
tation of contributions during or immediately after discussions with a
congressional office about constituent service is disfavored.

b. Illustrative Controversies. 1\vo post-Keating controversies illus
trate the scope and limits of the suggested rule. The first example stems
from one of the charges leveled at Representative Newt Gingrich soon
after he became Speaker of the House. He reportedly wrote to the Food
and Drug Administration to urge approval of a home testing kit for the

lilV virus. The kit's manufacturer, Direct Access Diagnostics, had re
quested this letter. A week later the president of Direct Access contribtaldng any steps to help the constituent with her problem. This solution would not nec
essarily foreclose the possibility of the member's soliciting or accepting campaign sup
port from the constituent, because even protracted struggles with the bureaucracy typi
cally have lengthy periods of "down time" in which no member is actively working on
the matter.
357. See Peter W. Morgan, The Appearance of Propriety: Ethics Reform and the
Blifil Paradoxes, 44 STAN. L. RBv. 593, 607-10 (1992) (developing this point in the
specific context of the Keating case); Symposium, Partisan Influences on Ethics Investi
gations, 1 1 J.L. & POL. 41 1 (1995).
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uted $5000 to a foundation that has close ties to Gingrich and funds his
speeches and educational activities. The company itself contributed

$25,000 a few months later.358 The House Ethics Committee dismissed

the charge,359 perhaps because it believed the company's assertion that
these contributions were unsolicited.360

·

•

The Committee may have reached the right disposition under the
House's current rules, but under the rule suggested here the first dona
tion, if not the second, would presumably have been impermissible.361
The suggested rule would be a prophylactic measure and would not turn
on whether or not one believed the company's claim. The premise
would be that donations in the immediate wake of constituent servfoe
should be banned on an across-the-board basis, because they pose unu
sual risks of an impermissible bargain between the two parties, and en
forcement authorities cannot feasibly identify which specific incidents
have actually involved an improper exchange. At the same time, the
rule would not seriously interfere with legitimate fundraising, because
the Speaker could still accept a donation if the company were to remain
appreciative at the end of the " cooling off period."
The second illustrative controversy developed out of.memos writ
ten by an aide to Senator Frank Lautenberg during the senator's 1994
reelection campaign. Addressed to the senator's fundraising staff, the
memos mentioned several individuals for whom the senator had re
cently done favors and lirged the fundraisers to invite these individuals
to make contributions to the senator's reelection campaign.362 The
memos were leaked to the press and led to charges that the senator had
acted improperly by "targeting" beneficiaries of constituent service.363

358. See Patrick J. Sloyan, Corporate Gifts to Gingrich Group: Critics Target
Foundation Run by Associate, NEWSDAY, Jan. 29, .1995, at A5.
359. See Panel To Hire Special Counsel in Gingrich Investigation, 53 CONG Q.
WKLY. REP. 3761 (1995) (text of Committee letter).
360. See Sloyan, supra note 358.
.

361. This discussion assumes that Representative Gingrich could not have exoner
ated himself by merely showing that the foundation to which the donations were made
was not directly involved in his reelection campaign. Cf. Senate Rule XLIII(3) (deci
sions to provide assistance may not be based on contributions given to "organizations
in which the Member has a political, personal, or financial interest"); KEATING RE
PORT, supra note 4, at 1 1-12 (same). In the Keating case itself, the Senate Committee
treated Keating's contributions to voter registration organizations and the California
Democratic Party as being tantamount, for purposes of that proceeding, to political con
tributions to Cranston himself. See id. at 21-23.
362. See Glenn R. Simpson, Second Memo Links Official Act, Support, ROLL
CALL, Apr. 1 1 , 1994, available in LEXIS, Legis Library, Rollcl File [hereinafter Sec
ond Memo]; Glenn R. Simpson, Cash and Aid Linked in Lautenberg Memo, ROLL
CALL, Mar. 31, 1994, available in LEXIS, Legis Library, Rollcl File (misdated 1993).
363. See Simpson, Second Memo, supra note 362.
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The Senate Ethics Committee examined the situation and found no im
propriety, but added that the "appearance created by the memoranda
entries is troubling. "364
This situation would entail no violation of the rule proposed here,
and the Ethics Committee's refusal to find a violation of the Senate's
current rules also seems sound. Even Senator Douglas's classic mono
graph on government ethics says that it is "probably not wrong" to so
licit contributions from past beneficiaries of constituent service - pro
vided fundraisers

wait a "decent interval" before making their
appeal.365 No one seems to have claimed that the solicitations proposed

in the Lautenberg memos would have offended this temporal limitation;
rather, critics suggested that the senator should not have "targeted"
beneficiaries of constituent service

at all. Yet, to repeat, it is natural and

appropriate for an incumbent officeholder to seek contributions from
persons who have identifiable reasons to appreciate his record. Accord
ingly, if a member of Congress has reason to believe that a potential
donor was grateful for advocacy performed on her behalf and regards
the legislator as the kind of conscientious advocate of district or state
interests who deserves to be returned to office, solicitation of a cam
paign contribution from her would be legitimate. This is not materially
different from a member's decision to seek contributions from people
who approve of or believe they have benefited from the member's re
cord as a lawmaker.366

364. Glenn R. Simpson, Ethics Finds No Wrongdoing in Lautenberg Memos but
War.ns of 'Appearance' Created, ROLL CALL, July 21, 1994, available in LEXIS, Legis
Library, Rolle! File.

365. See supra note 273.
366. Professor Thompson appears to argue that campaign contributors given in re
sponse to constituent service activities do deserve less accommodation than contribu
tions based on a member's voting record, because in the former case the contributor and
candidate may not even share ideological positions. A contribution "given to support a
candidate with whom a citizen shares a general political orientation or agrees on issues
that he or she thinks salient . . directly serves a political function: its aim is to help a
candidate get elected, and works through the political process." THOMPSON, supra note
28, at 1 13-14 (footnote omitted). In contrast, a contribution resulting from constituent
service "serves no public political function. A contribution given without regard to the
political positions of the candidate only incidentally provides political support; its pri
mary aim is to influence the candidate when in office." Id. at 1 13. This statement seems
not even to acknowledge the possibility of a contributor who genuinely appreciates the
member's efforts and believes that the member's helpfulness and responsiveness entitle
him to another term. Of course, some contributions that follow in the wake of constitu
ent service are actually payoffs for services rendered, and therefore corrupt - but one
could equally well say that some contributions from a legislator's ideological soulmates
are actually payoffs for his having been "helpful" on a pending bill. The question then
becomes why one should presume corruption, or the subversion of democracy, more
readily in the casework situation than in the lawmaking situation. Perhaps Thompson
•
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Roll Call, which broke the Lautenberg story, ac

knowledged in an editorial that senators routinely "target" contributors
who have interests before their committees. The newspaper thought
Lautenberg's case was different because the memos had been "citing
specific acts the Senator had taken and seeking to capitalize on
them."367 This focus on "specific acts" would be reasonable in a case

to the
targeted individual. Under those circumstances it would be arguable,

in which a legislator or his fundraisers "cited" those acts

though by no means self-evident, that the solicitation embodied a subtle
element of pressure, a low-level type of extortion that could properly
concern ethics authorities.368 But to assume that anyone used or in
tended improper appeals in the Lautenberg situation would have been
pure speculation. The memos - which apparently were the sole basis
for the allegations against the senator - merely referred to the "spe
cific acts" as reasons why the fundraisers should approach the individu
als in the first place. A plan to approach potential donors who have
only one or two known reasons to support the candidate seems indistin
guishable, in ethics terms, from a plan to approach potential donors
who have a wide range of reasons to do so.
The Lautenberg controversy illustrates the confusion that was easy
to predict from the Keating decision, which condemned Cranston for
means to contend that citizens have no valid reasons to contribute to a political cam
paign except to advance their positions on policy issues. Yet many voters consider their
representative's stands on issues less important than his helpfulness as an advocate for

the people of the district. See CAIN ET AL., supra note 45, at 37-43. Intellectuals may
not agree with these voters' priorities, but the prevalence of this attitude in the electo
rate is undeniable. It is by no means clear that incumbents undermine the democratic
process when they seek financial support from voters who hold this view.
To some extent Thompson may be arguing that donations stimulated by casework
are illegitimate beacause congressional intervention in the administrative process is it
self ethically dubious:
[C]itizens should influence their representatives and representatives should influ
ence policy only in ways that can be contested through public deliberation and
political competition in a democratic political process.
. . When legislators
help private interests use public authority- without submitting their claims to the
full test of the democratic process, they are agents of corruption.
•

THOMPSON, supra

note 28, at 1 1 4. This suggestion reopens the policy debate, can
vassed in Part II, about the overall merits of constituent service. One response to

Thompson is that congressional intervention can actually strengthen the democratic pro
cess by bringing the perceptions of popularly elected officeholders to bear on adminis
trative conduct that might otherwise escape effective external review.
367. The Lautenberg Memo, ROLL CALL, Apr. 4, 1994, at 1 .
368. A thin line may separate merely "referring" to past favors from "pressuring"

beneficiaries or depicting the requested contribution as "a payment for services ren
dered," practices that Douglas opposed. See supra note 273. On the_ other hand,
Douglas's general support for solicitation of contributions from recipients of favors in
dicates that he would not have dismissed all such solicitation as "inherently" coercive.
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having "substantially linked" fundraising and official actions, without
fleshing out the contours of that vague term. Close analysis shows,
however, that Lautenberg did not engage in the kind of linkage that the
Committee had denounced or had reason to denounce. The Committee's
refusal to impose sanctions was correct.369

2.

Intervention on Behalf of Contributors

As we saw earlier, efforts to regulate legislators' "pressure" or
"aggressiveness" toward administrative agencies are fraught with com
plexities. This section considers the specific question whether legisla
tors providing constituent service ought to approach agencies with spe
cial restraint if the intended beneficiary is a contributor. Bennett's
second proposed rule gave an affrrmative answer: "A Senator should
not take unusual or aggressive action with regard to a specific matter
before a Federal agency on behalf of a contributor when he knows, or
has reason to know, the contributor has sought to procure his services. "
Although the Senate Ethics Committee did not directly endorse
Bennett's principle in the Keating case, it did acknowledge concerns
similar to his. In particular, the Committee cited Keating's contributions
to Senator DeConcini's campaigns as one reason why the senator
should have investigated the issues in Lincoln's case more thoroughly
before pursuing it so aggressively. 370
Bennett's proposed rule seems awkwardly worded. A legislator
working on behalf of a noncontributor may have legitimate reasons for
displaying "unusual or aggressive action" toward an agency - for ex
ample, if the agency behaves in a particularly uncooperative way. To
the extent that Bennett's rule can be read to imply that a contributor
should be entitled to

less active representation, it seems manifestly un

sound - one should not incur a penalty for supporting a political cam
paign. The last clause of Bennett's proposed rule is also puzzling, be
cause the purity or lack of purity of the constituent's motives would
seem to have little if anything to do with whether the member may
properly be "aggressive" on his or her behalf.371
369. As will be discussed later, however, the Committee deserves less praise for
adding that the incident created a troubling "appearance" of linkage. See infra notes
417-19 and accompanying text.
370. See KEATING REPORT, supra note 4, at 17. The Committee criticized Sena
tor McCain for poor judgment on similar grounds, although it did· not characterize his
conduct as overly aggressive. See id. at 18-19.
371. This analysis assumes that Bennett used the word "procure" in a pejorative
sense (i.e., as equivalent to "purchase"). If, instead, he used the word in a more neutral
sense (i.e., as equivalent to "enlist"), the last clause of his rule would be trivial, be
cause it would always be satisfied.
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Nevertheless, the Bennett proposal points toward a valid criticjsm
of the new Senate Rule XLID. That rule , calls for senators to treat con
tributors and noncontributors equally in deciding
with an agency, but not in regard to the

whether to intervene
manner in which they inter

vene. A logical and probably desirable extension of Rule XLID would
provide that a member should pursue casework as aggressively for peti
tioners who do

not contribute to the member's campaign as for simi

larly situated petitioners who do contribute. In a sense this principle
would represent a partial codification of the teachings of House Advi
sory Opinion No. 1 , which declared years ago that " [aj Member's re
sponsibility in this area is to all his constituents equally and should be
pursued with diligence irrespective of p oliti cal or other
considerations. "372

·

'

Actually, the House advisoiy opinion seems to reach much further
than the suggested rule, because it rejects "favoritism" of all kinds, not
just favoritism as between contributors and noncontributors. Moreover,
as previously noted, the broad notion that congressional ombudsman
services should be available to all constituents on an equal basis is part
of the ethic of professionilism to which congressional offices claim to
aspire.373 One can question, however; whether the ethics committees
should undertake to enforce this norm with the threat of disciplinary
sanctions. After all, society does not expect legislators to observe the
same strict standards of impartiality that it expects from the judiciary.374
Indeed, there is probably no member of Congress who does not some
times make special efforts for personal friends.375 Since the driving

372. Advisory Opinion No. l, supra note 131, at 1 078. The House Ethics Manual
already states: "considerations such as political support, party affiliation, or campaign
contributions should not affect either the decision of a Member to provide assistance or
the quality of help that is given." HOUSE Ennes MANuAL, supra note 133, at 250.
373. See supra notes 301-05 and accompanying text.
374. In the lawmaking sphere, one obviously could not expect legislators to pro
vide "representation" to all constituents on an equal basis. Allying oneself with some
interests, to the detriment of others, is part of the essence of political competition. In
theory the constituent service side of a member's job would be more amenable to a
strict policy of evenhandedness, but as a practical matter the feasibility of keeping the
two spheres completely separate is open to doubt. See also .Lawrence, supra note 138,
at 447 n.157 (questioning the wisdom of a rule confining casework to a legislator's own
constituents, because a citizen of a given district may feel that she would not get ade
quate support from her own representative and should be free to request help from
another).
375. See supra note 301 and accompanying text For example, the Senate Demo
cratic leader, Senator Thomas Daschle, was .criticized for intervening with federal avia
tion inspectors on behalf of a South Dakota friend whose air charter company had failed
safety inspections. The Senate Ethics Committee, however, found that the intervention
was routine and proper constituent service. See Neil A. Lewis, Panel Clears Senate Mi-
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force behind current reform efforts is to address public apprehensions
about the excessive role of money in politics, limitation of the discipli
nary rule to inequities that occur in the specific context of campaign
contributions seems defensible.
Even with regard to a rule that requires only equal treatment be
tween campaign contributors and noncontributors, the ethics committees
should probably limit their enforcement activity to relatively clear-cut
and serious violations. In many cases, disparities that apparently reflect
favoritism could have valid explanations: the facts of individual cases
vary different staff members handle different cases, and office priorities
'
evolve over time. But this does not mean the suggested rule would be
useless. It could still serve a legitimate precautionary function. Moreo
ver, it would at least encourage legislators to instruct staff not to give
contributors special treatment in either the initial decision to intervene
or the methods used in pursuing a case.
The Senate Ethics Committee took a somewhat different approach
to the issue of providing constituent service for a contributor. In such
circumstances, the Committee said, a senator "must be mindful of the
appearance that may be created and take special care to try to prevent
harm to the public's trust in the Senator and the Senate."376 One way in
which senators may do so, the Committee suggested, would be "by es
tablishing office practices indicating that only constituent cases that
they or their staffs reasonably believe have merit will be pursued. "Jn
The Committee's criticism of Senator DeConcini was consistent with
this analysis: casework for a contributor is appropriate if the senator has
made sure that the underlying case is sound. This recommendation
seems attractive as an advisory standard, although it does not seem
amenable to use as a disciplinary rule. Another solution would be for
the congressional office to emphasize that its request is only for fair
consideration of the petitioner's situation, and that the agency should
make its decision on the merits. That advice, which Senator Douglas
recommended to legislators who wish to be "very correct, "378 might be

nority Leader on an Ethics Complaint, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 1, 1995, at A24. His fonner
Republican counterpart, Senator Robert Dole, reportedly used his influence with the
Small Business Administration to help a fonner aide (and constituent) obtain a military
food service contract through the minority set-asides program. Yet a House committee,
controlled at the time by Democrats, examined the incident and found no reason to criti
cize the senator. See Ruth Marcus, Dole Pursued Set-Aside for Ex-Aide, WASH. POST,
Mar. 23, 1995, at A9.
376. KEATING REPORT, supra note 4, at 12.
377. Id. at 30.
378. DOUGLAS REPORT supra note 134, at 29.
,
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especially good practice for legislators who are acting on behalf of
contributors.

3.

Office Practices

Bennett's third principle was that " [a] Senator should not conduct
his fundraising efforts or engage in office practices which lead contribu
tors to conclude that they can buy access to him." Presumably this rule
was intended to address contributors' apparent ability to buy "access"
to a legislator's

services, not "access" in the more limited sense of an

ability to obtain an audience with the legislator.379 So interpreted, it di
rectly foreshadowed the second supporting rationale for the Senate Eth
ics Committee's reprimand of Senator Cranston. As already explained,
the

"substantial linkage"

that the

Committee

discerned between

Cranston's fundraising and constituent service activities consisted in
part of improper office practices.
The Committee focused on the activities of Joy Jacobson, the sena
tor's chief fundraiser.380 Although she was not a Senate employee and
had no legislative responsibilities, her conduct was incompatible with
that nominal limitation. For example, she attended a meeting with econ
omist Alan Greenspan (in order to understand contributors' problems
better, the senator later explained); she arranged substantive meetings;
and she acted as an intermediary between Cranston's legislative aide
and Keating or his staff. In addition, she herself did not keep fundrais
ing and legislative issues separate, raising both in a single conversation
with one Keating aide. She also wrote memos evincing an understand
ing that contributors were entitled to favored treatment. The Committee
found that Senator Cranston was aware of her actions and attitude and
never attempted to correct her understanding.
The basic idea behind Bennett's and the Committee's positions was
sound. In fact, authoritative ethics pronouncements in closely related
contexts have already endorsed the general principle that legislators are

379. To be sure, a lobbyist's opportunity to spend a few minutes with a busy
member of Congress during a frenzied legislative session can be a coveted asset, and
much of the literature on corruption expresses dismay that PACs seem able to purchase
this asset through campaign contributions. See, e.g., THOMPSON, supra note 28, at 1 17;
Lowenstein, supra note 30, at 827-28. But see United States v. Carpenter, 961 F.2d 824,
827 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding that a legislator's meeting with a lobbyist is not an "offi
cial act," and therefore a legislator may use campaign contributions to ration such ac
cess without violating the Hobbs Act; the court relied on a McCormick-like rationale
that such rationing is normal and inevitable). Nevertheless, Bennett probably did not in
tend to address this sort of "access," which was never at issue in the Keating case.
380. See KEATING REPORT, supra note 4, at 27-29.
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responsible for their aides' conduct.381 . Making members accountable for
their offices' routine practices creates desirable incentives for members
to think about the appearances that those practices convey, and also
about their own roles as supervisors of a staff.
However, the wording of Bennett's suggested standard seems
flawed - over and above its ambiguity about the meaning of "access."
It would apparently turn on the

actual perceptions of contributors. To

enforce such a standard, ethics committees apparently would have to
survey campaign supporters to ask them their impressions of the mem
ber's integrity. Loyal supporters might thwart disciplinary actions by
swearing that they had discerned no corrupt tendencies (an act of sup
port that might make the legislator feel all the more indebted to them).
Disgruntled former supporters might exact revenge by testifying to the
contrary.
To minimize these problems, the committees could revise Ben
nett's rule to refer to practices that "would reasonably lead" contribu
tors to conclude that they can buy access. Under this standard, testi
mony from actual contributors would be relevant but not dispositive.
Even that version, however, could be criticized for its vagueness and,
consequently, its failure to give fair warning to the regulated as to what
conduct is proscribed. An even better solution, therefore, would be for
the committees of both chambers to identify particular fundraising or
office practices that they believe will reasonably cause contributors to
believe that they can buy access.382 Existing rules already limit offices'
ability to assign substantive and fundraising tasks to the same staff
member383 - the Joy Jacobson problem - and could be strengthened.
On the other hand, the ethics committees should not feel com
pelled to accept every attack on office practices at face value. For ex
ample, recall the case of Senator Lautenberg's chief of staff, who was
criticized for advising fundraising

staff

to solicit contributions from

381. See Senate Rule XLIII(4); Advisory Opinion No. l, supra note 131, at 1078.
382. Although it was suggested above, see supra note 379 and accompanying text,
that Bennett's proposed rule was not intended to address "access" in the sense of mere
meetings at the Capitol, the committees could, if they wished, take further steps to regu
late "linkage" between contributions and that sort of access. For example, they could
formalize the now-recognized norm that a solicitation letter should never explicitly state
that contributors will receive special access to the member. The classic example is Sen
ator Lloyd Bentsen's invitation to supportel'S to join a weekly "breakfast club" by con
tributing $10,000 apiece. The senator dropped the idea when it was criticized, and he
iater admitted in his vice-presidential campaign debate that it was "a doozy" of a mis
take. See INTERPRETATIVE RULINGS, supra
, note 184, No. 427 (declaring practice
improper).
383. See, e.g., Senate Rule XLl(l) (no Senate staff, other than three aides who
have been specially designated by the senator, may engage in fundraising).
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constituents for whom the senator had recently done favors.384 Critics of
the incident seem to assume that fundraising staff should not only re
frain from doing legislative business themselves (the Joy Jacobson situ
ation), but also should be forbidden to obtain

leads from aides who do

have substantive responsibilities. It seems hypersensitive to recoil
against so small a concession to the reality that members of Congress
are ultimately dependent on outside sources for financial support in
their reelection campaigns. Members and their staff cannot be expected
to solicit contributions purely at random. Despite today's climate of
mistrust of Congress, the committees must struggle to keep the focus on
the impressions that office practices

4.

reasonably convey.

The Appearance of Impropriety

Bennett's fourth proposed principle - that a "Senator should not
engage in conduct which would appear to be improper to a reasonable,
nonpartisan, fully informed person" - stirred up a lively controversy
within the Ethics Committee as to whether senators may be disciplined
for creating an "appearance of impropriety. "385 In the end, Senator
Helms expressly endorsed Bennett's position that they may.386 The ma
jority refrained from adopting an appearance standard;

indeed, it

pointed out that "the Senate has not to date disciplined a member solely
on the basis of the appearance created by his or her conduct. "387

On the other hand, a desire to maintain appearances manifestly

played a major role in the Committee's conclusions. The report con
tained pointed admonitions that senators

should avoid the appearance of

impropriety.388 Indeed, the logic of the Committee's reprimand of Sena
tor Cranston plainly rested to some extent on distress over the appear
ances created by his "linkage" of campaign contributions and official
actions.389 Moreover, in declining to recommend formal proceedings
against Senators DeConcini and Riegle, the Committee upbraided each
senator for conduct that, it said, "gave the appearance of being im-

384. See supra notes 362-69 and accompanying text.
385. See Phil Kuntz, Senators Ponder How To Treat Appearance of Wrongdoing,
49 CONG. Q. WEEK. REP. 228 (1991).
386. See KEATING REPORT, supra note 4, at 14-16 (separate views of Sen.
Helms). As previously noted, Helms's report was a slightly revised versiOn of a draft
prepared by Bennett himself. See supra note 7.
387. Id. at 6.
388. See id. at 12-13 ("B�ause Senators occupy a position of public trust, every
Senator always must endeavor to avoid the appearance that the Senator, the Senate, or
the governmental process may be influenced by campaign contributions or other bene
fits provided by those with significant legislative or governmental interests.").
389. See supra notes 283-86 and accompanying text.
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proper. "390 In short, the Committee evinced a concern for public percep
tions, yet it apparently lacked a precise theory about how to take them
into account.391
Appearance standards have played a prominent role in the public
discourse on government ethics since at least the Watergate era.392 His
torically, however, congressional endorsements of the appearances
theme have been aspirational in character393 or have served as fleeting
supplemental arguments in ethics committee decisions that primarily
rested on findings of actual impropriety.394 The Keating case was the

390. See KEATING REPORT, supra note 4, at 17, 19.
391. The Keating case arose under a Senate resolution that prohibits "improper
conduct which may reflect upon the Senate." S. Res. 338, 88th Cong., § 2(a)(l), 110
CONG. REc. 16,939 (1964). Read literally, this rule seems to foreclose an appearance
standard, because it suggests that the challenged conduct must be both detrimental to
the Senate's reputation and improper in some separately defmed sense. On the other
hand, the corresponding House provision does not support the same limiting argument,
shall conduct himself at all times in a
see House Rule XLID, cl. 1 ("A Member
manner which shall reflect creditably on the House."), yet no one asserts that the Sen
ate and House should take different approaches to "appearances" liability. Accordingly,
the following discussion treats the debate over an appearance standard as a question of
policy and politics, not of finely nuanced readings of the relevant provisions. Neverthe
less, one implication of this article's analysis is that, in any future overhaul of congres
sional ethics rules, the House should adopt a provision like the Senate's, and both
chambers should apply this wording according to its natural meaning.
392. See Morgan, supra note 357, at 598-602.
393. In an effort to demonstrate that an appearance-of-impropriety standard was
already an established norm in congressional ethics regulation, Senator Helms laid par
ticular stress on language from the Code of Ethics for Government Service. See H.R.
Con. Res. 175, 85th Cong. at <JI V (1958) (admonishing against acceptance of "favors or
benefits under circumstances which might be construed by reasonable persons as influ
encing the performance of
governmental duties"); KEATING REPORT, supra note 4,
at 15 & n.94 (separate views of Sen. Helms). Historians agree, however, that the Code
was originally considered purely hortatory. See CONGRESSIONAL ETHICS, supra note
17, at 147; Baker, supra note 17, at 24. Although, as Senator Helms noted, the Senate
Ethics Committee's charter authorizes it to enforce the Code, that authority does not
oblige the Committee to give binding force to any particular Code provision. No one
claims that members of Congress must suffer discipline if they fail to comply with such
Code platitudes as "Give a full day's labor for a full day's pay" or "Seek to fmd and
employ more efficient and economical ways of getting tasks accomplished." H.R. Con.
Res. 175, at 'fflI m, IY.
394. For example, Bennett strained a point when he argued that the Senate had al
ready endorsed the appearance standard in its denunciation of Senator David
Durenberger the year before the Keating decision. See Kuntz, supra note 385, at 229.
The appearances rationale was clearly not the primary basis for that action. In fact, the
Ethics Committee's detailed report, supporting its recommendation that Senator
Durenberger's conduct be deemed "clearly and unequivocally unethical," made no allu
sion to an appearance standard. See S. REP. No. 101-382, at 14 (1990). The basis of
Bennett's claim was that the Committee also adopted in full, see id. at 4, the 106-page
report of its special counsel (Bennett himself), which contained a single paragraph al
luding to a duty to avoid the appearance of impropriety. See id. app. C, at 106.
.

•

.

•

.

•
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first in which congressional ethics enforcement authorities have paid se
rious attention to the possibility of imposing sanctions predicated
squarely on an appearance standard.
Nor has society at large reached a consensus on the role of appear
ances in ethics regulation. The American Bar Association's Model Code
ofJudicial Conduct contains an explicit appearance of impropriety stan
dard,395 and so do the Office of Government Ethics (OGE) regulations
governing the executive branch - although the OGE standard takes
such a diluted form that it might be better described as presenting only
the appearance of an appearance standard.396 On the other hand, the
ABA abandoned its commitment to an appearance standard as a tool of
attorney discipline when it promulgated the Model Rules of Professional
Conduct in 1983.397 One reason for this decision was that scholars had
sharply attacked the "appearance of impropriety" language of the pre
vious code as vague and misleading.398
a. Critique of the Appearance Standard. Admonitions to legislators
that they have an ethical obligation to avoid actions that could result in
public disapproval fit naturally into discussions of congressional ethics.
One of the central goals of the ethics codes, after all, is to promote pub
lic confidence in the legislative branch and thereby to reinforce the le
gitimacy of government.399 The same point can be put in terms of insti
tutional loyalty and responsibility: unseemly behavior by a few
members makes it harder for their colleagues to do their own jobs.400
Professor Andrew Stark, in an illuminating analysis, has explained the
rationale for subjecting officeholders to the constraints of an appearance
of impropriety disciplinary standard: its purpose is "to heighten their
democratic representativeness - in order to ensure that officials per-

395. See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 2(A) (1989).
396. See infra note 407.
397. See Morgan, supra note 357, at 602. The 1983 Model Rules superseded the
Model Code of Professional Responsibility, which provided in Canon 9 (but not in its
Disciplinary Rules) that " a lawyer should avoid even the appearance of impropriety."
MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPONSIBILITY Canon 9 (1980). Even the Model
Code cautioned that a lawyer's duties to clients or the public should never be subordi
nated merely because of possible public misunderstanding or criticism. See id. EC 9-2.
398. See, e.g., CHARLES w. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL Ennes § 7.1.4, at 322
& n.47 (1986). In some states and specialized practice areas, ethics rules or cases still
admonish lawyers to avoid the appearance of impropriety. See, e.g., United Steelwork
ers of America v. Lampl, 67 B.R. 151, 157 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1986) .(bankruptcy
practice).
399. See KEATING REPORT, supra note 4, at 12; id. at 14-15 (separate views of
Sen. Helms); cf. Nolan, supra note 33, at 77-78 (developing same point in executive
branch ethics context).
400. See Ennes OF LEGISLATIVE LIFE, supra note 17, at 41-42.
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ceive reality the way the public does and are sensitive to norms that the
public harbors. "401
The problems inherent in treating an appearance standard as a ba
sis for disciplinary action are formidable, however. A central difficulty
is the stan�d's failure to provide regulated individuals with fair notice
of what is proscribed. "Because it is subjective and amorphous, the ap
pearance standard provides little guidance for assessing individual con
duct. Moreover, an appearance is in the eye of the beholder and thus
not entirely within the control of the one charged with conforming her
conduct to a particular standard. "402
More specifically, the appearance-of-impropriety test is elusive be
cause, as ordinarily understood,403 it predicates liability on

perceptions

of improper conduct, instead of on conduct that is improper as such.
This baseline is unwieldy under any circumstances,404 and is especially
so in a political climate in which deep suspicion of legislators' motives
is pervasive. At a time when many people casually speak of the entire
Congress as corrupt, a guideline that looks to maintaining public confi
dence in Congress can scarcely be applied at face value. Nor would
such a straightforward application be desirable, because popular atti
tudes toward Congress often suffer from misinformation, unrealistic ex
pectations, and failure to appreciate the tradeoffs that legislators must
make among their constituents' many incompatible demands.405
Some proponents of "appearances" liability seem to recognize this
problem, because they define the relevant perceptions as those of so
phisticated citizens. Bennett's reliance on the perceptions of the "rea
sonable nonpartisan, fully informed person" is typical.406 The durability

401. Andrew Stark, The Appearance of Official Impropriety and the Concept of
Political Crime, 105 ETHICS 326, 349 (1995).
402. Nolan, supra note 33, at 78; see Saxon, supra note 21, at 206-10.
403. Professor Dennis Thompson favors a quite different approach to the appear
ance standard, which will be considered below. See infra notes 424-28 and accompany
ing text
404. See WOLFRAM, supra note 398, § 7.1, at 320.
405. See supra section II.D; cf. Gary C. Jacobson, Political Action Committees,
Electoral Politics, and Congressional Ethics, in REPRESENTATION AND REsPONSIBIL
ITY, supra note 17, at 41, 49-50 (arguing that popular demand for changes in campaign
finance laws is not a suitable guide to reform, because the general public lacks suffi
cient information to make reliable judgments on the subject); see also United States v.
Rostenkowski, 59 F.3d 1291, 1312 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (rejecting enforceability of House
conflict-of-interest rules in criminal trials, in part because lay citizens such as jurors
may not understand the unique convergence of official and personal activities in the life
of a member of Congress).
406. Indeed, Bennett explained that "the concept of the informed person means
someone who understands and appreciates that Senators can pressure regulators, that
Senators can act on behalf of people who give them political contributions." 1 Keating
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of this distinction remains open to question, however. After all, literal
adherence to the benchmark of a "fully informed" citizen's viewpoint
would make enforcement of the appearance standard meaningless: to an
observer who knows

all the relevant facts, "appearance" and "reality"

are identical.407 Thus, an ethics committee that wishes to pursue appear
ances liability in a serious way must, at a minimum, adopt the frame of
reference of a person who knows fewer facts than the committee itself
does. Furthermore, one of the main goals cited to justify the appearance
standard is the preservation of public confidence. Yet the objective of
honoring - or appeasing - public sensibilities stands in unavoidable
tension with a commitment to rely on '·'informed" or sophisticated
judgment.408 The more firmly an ethics committee declares that it will
punish members whose conduct impairs public confidence, the more it
creates a dynamic that presses it toward responding to the perceptions
of citizens who are

not "reasonable, non-partisan, and fully informed."

The appearance standard also seems overbroad in another way.
Congress's reputation is threatened by many varieties of ethically dubi
"
ous behavior that the .disciplinary rules cannQt feasibly address and that
ethics committees cannot feasibly police.409 Thus, vices such as duplic
ity, indolence, grandstanding, meanness, pandering, and browbeating

Hearings, supra note 129, at 58 (Nov. 15, 1990); see also id. at 63, 79. The fraction of
the electorate that is "informed" in this sense may be quite small.
407. See Stark, supra note 401, at 336. OGE's version of the appearance standard
provides a tangible illustration of this difficulty. The rule requires executive branch em
ployees to avoid actions creating the appearance that they are violating the law of ethics
regulations "[as] determined from the perspective of a reasonable person with knowl
edge of the relevant facts." 5 C.F.R. § 2635.101(14) (1995). In a famous OGE ruling
stemming from the Whitewater controversy, the issue was whether Treasury Department
officials had improperly disclosed nonpublic· information for the purpose of furthering
the private interests of the President or others - and also whether they had created the
appearance of having done so. Ultimately, OGE found that the officials' conduct had
not appeared improper on essentially the same grounds that it used to decide that their
conduct had not been improper. See OFFICE OF GOVT ETHICS, REPORT TO THE SEC
RETARY OF THE TREASURY 8-10, 19 (July 31, 1994). In effect, the appearance stan
dard became superfluous - not because the report's authors were careless, but because
of the nature of the test they ·were asked to apply.
However, if the "fully informed" observer is not to be the test, what criterion will
be used? "Mostly informed"? "As informed as possible given the inherent limitations
of their position" (as intimated in THOMPSON, supra note 28, at 127)? "As informed as
people who watch C-SPAN"? The difficulty, and perhaps impossibility, of defining the
relevant perspective coherently is one of the reasons why adjudication under the appear
ance standard has proved so impressionistic in practical application. See infra notes
.

410-13 and accompanying text
408. See Stark, supra note 401, at 335-37.
409. See Jennings, supra note 24, at 161-62 (question of what to codify "turns
largely upon issues of enforceability, equity, and clarity of interpretation"); Saxon,
supra note 21, at 213-16; Vogelsang-Coombs & Bakken, supra note 18, at 94-95.
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deserve condemnation but are not considered "improper" as ethics
committees use that term. Still, many people, including "reasonable"
people, might say that these sins

look improper. This is not to suggest

that ethics committees ever would, or should, impose liability for such
conduct, but rather that the perceptions rationale proves too much and
cannot provide legislators with meaningful guidance about what behav
ior the test actually serves to forbid.
By its nature, the appearance standard is an open invitation to find
ings of liability supported by superficial reasoning.410 Adjudicators who
are not sure whether conduct really is improper can shore up a dubious
analysis by asserting that the conduct at least
As

political

c ommentator

Michael

appears to be improper.41 1
Kinsley

has

written ,

" ' [A]ppearances' can . . . be a way of accusing someone of wrongdo
ing without saying what, if anything, is really wrong. It is a shortcut to
moral outrage, for those who are in a hurry to get there. "412 Scoffing at
the Keating decision for its criticism of DeConcini and Riegle for "con
duct that gave the appearance of being improper," Kinsley continues:
"It hardly requires the elaborate and costly proceedings of the Senate
Ethics Committee to determine that there has been an appearance of im
propriety. . . . The

appearance of impropriety is precisely why the Eth
Was there

ics Committee was convened. What we want to know is:

impropriety?"413
In the specific context of congressional ethics, use of an appear
ance standard as a disciplinary standard poses special hazards. The
charges are likely to be highly visible and subject to intense public con
troversy before the ethics committee even begins its inquiry. Moreover,
the adjudicators are not Article ill judges but elected officials who are

410. Experience in the realm of attorney discipline supports this fear. See
WOLFRAM, supra note 398, § 7.1, at 320 n.38 (noting that appearances notion "appears
in opinions . . . in an incantational, intuitive way, and its use is hardly ever defended");
cf. ABA Comm. on Ethics & Professional Responsibility, Fonnal Op. 342, at 5 n.17
(1975) (concluding that inclusion of appearance standard in disqualification rule would
likely cause application of that rule to "degenerateD . . . into a detennination on an in
stinctive, ad hoc or even ad hominem basis").
411. Although not an ethics case, Pillsbury Corp. v. FTC, 354 F.2d 952 (5th Cir.
1966), is sometimes held out as a principal precedent supporting an appearance stan
dard. See Kappel, supra note 130, at 162. If so, it is a tarnished precedent. Even though
the ex parte contacts rule announced in that decision has met with general acceptance,
the court's discernment of an "appearance of partiality" on the specific facts of that
case was exceedingly strained. See supra note 153.
412. Michael Kinsley, Reality Check, NEW REPUBLIC, July 8, 1991, at 4.
413. Id.
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themselves highly accountable to the public.414 Under these circum
stances, an appearance standard, if taken seriously, would virtually
guarantee a finding of liability. How can a member of the ethics com
mittee say to his or her own constituents that the conduct does
pear improper, if

not ap

they think it does? Indeed, such a standard could give

rise to an insidious circularity: hostile editorials might not only trigger
an ethics investigation of a member, but also become conclusive evi
dence that a sanction should be imposed. The distinction between ethics
regulation and public disapproval would then be totally erased.
Special Counsel Bennett apparently tried to avoid this problem by
suggesting that appearances be assessed from the perspective of a "rea
sonable nonpartisan, fully informed person." Aside from the fact that
these qualifications tend to sever the link between the appearance stan
dard and its theoretical justification of respecting public opinion, the ad
ditional criteria are not a realistic solution to the dilemma. They would
put the ethics committee member in the hopeless position of saying to
constituents, "Well, if you disagree with me, you must either be unrea
sonable, uninformed, or have a political ax to grind."
Finally, some might argue that the appearance standard is attractive
precisely because of its stringency: even if it is overbroad, the argument
might run, congressional ethics is in such a deplorable state that mem
bers should be encouraged to err, if at all, on the side of self-restraint.

An in terrorem standard may be appealing where the conduct to be de
terred involves only the member's self-interest, as is arguably true of
limitations on outside income, gift restrictions, and the like. Constituent
service, however, has affirmative value to the political system, and the
realities of campaign finance make fundraising at least a necessary evil.
Overdeterrence of casework or of normal solicitation of political sup
port should not be shrugged off as cost-free.415
This last point reminds us that the mission of the ethics commit
tees is not merely to mete out sanctions and issue denunciations, but
also to advise members about what they may do.416 Because legislative
functions such as constituent service require members to strike a bal-

414. Cf. Bauer, supra note 20, at 481-82 (condemning the Keating proceedings as
a "show trial" in which political demands, rather than Cranston's actual culpability, be
came the Committee's principal concern).
415. Peter Morgan argues that the appearance standard has still another cost. He
contends that the mantle of legitimacy that ethics authorities have conferred on the ap
pearance standard puts an undeserved weapon in the hands of political actors: it enables
them to hurl flimsy but colorable charges at opponents, and also to distract attention
from other problems, including other ethics problems, that deserve greater attention. See
Morgan, supra note 357, at 607-18.
416. See Ennes OF LEGISLATIVE LIFE, supra note 17, at 52-53.
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ance between conflicting responsibilities, the committees have a contin
uing obligation to help members identify the boundaries that separate
permissible from impermissible means of pursuing these functions. The
committees also should strive, on behalf of their chambers, to educate
the public about the locations of these boundaries. One can question se
riously whether a committee can successfully play these exculpatory
and educative roles if it must also enforce a liability standard that con
demns members merely because some fraction of the public would

think that their actions were improper.
As an example of how the appearance standard can undercut de
bate about the limits of propriety, consider the Senate Ethics Commit
tee's equivocal response to the flap involving internal memos written by
Senator Lautenberg's chief of staff.417 The Committee found no evi
dence of an actual linkage between fundraising and official actions, nor
of any other wrongdoing in this incident. Nevertheless, it stated that
"the appearance created by the memoranda entries is troubling to the
Committee," because the language of the memos "tends to create an
appearance that campaign solicitations could have been linked to offi
cial actions taken by the Senator on behalf of prospective contribu
tors. "418 One might have supposed that if the senator and his aide did
nothing wrong, as the Committee found (and as this article has main
tained), the Committee should have exonerated him and declared that
his critics were mistaken, instead of blaming

him for the critics' having

jumped to an erroneous conclusion.419

b. An Alternative Approach. The preceding critique of the appear
ance standard of liability is not intended to deny the desirability of new
rules to bolster public confidence in Congress. Indeed, one of the major
premises of this article, particularly in its treatment of money influence,
is that Congress should give further, serious consideration to adopting

417. For the particulars of this incident, see supra notes 362-69, 384 and accom
panying text.
418. See Simpson, supra note 364.
419. The Committee was not alone in neglecting its educative function. Comment
ing on the same episode, a New York Times editorial acknowledged that "there is no ev
idence that Mr. Lautenberg granted any legislative favors with fund raising in mind,"
and that his aide's memo probably broke no Senate rules. Nevertheless, the editorial
criticized the Ethics Committee for its failure to embrace an appearance standard, sug
gesting that the aide would not have written the memo had that test been in effect. A
Fund-Raising Folly, N.Y. TIMES. Apr. 1 1, 1994, at A18. Should not a major newspaper
strive to educate citizens about what it regards as the real boundaries of legislative pro
priety, instead of blaming legislators for public misconceptions that the newspaper itself
has not sought to counteract? See Kinsley, supra note 412, at 4 ("[I]t is the function of
The New York Times to bring perceptions into line with reality, not the other way
around.").
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measures that may help to dispel the public's doubts about the integrity
of the legislative branch. What is needed is an approach that serves this
end without the substantial drawbacks of the appearance-of-impropriety
standard of liability.
One reason that the appearance standard is so attractive to its sup
porters is its recognition that the legislative branch needs ethics rules
that prohibit some conduct that is not intrinsically unethical. In other

prophylactic rules should be part of the congressional ethics en
forcement scheme. Indeed, probably most conflict of interest rules are
words,

written with this strategy in mind.
Prophylactic rules aimed at incipient or potential improprieties are
attractive on several grounds. The opportunity to intercept some other
wise unprovable misbehavior is one such ground. Moreover, the rules
can be written in objective terms. Objective rules can strengthen ac
countability by setting up visible standards by which citizens can evalu
ate officials' performance.420 In this respect, they compare favorably
with rules that allude to legislators' motives; the latter sort of rules may
have a closer link to ethical norms, but constituents cannot readily
judge whether their representatives have obeyed them. Prophylactic
rules can also counteract rationalizations. As the ABA Committee on
Government Standards has noted, "ethics regulation can make its most
meaningful contribution by helping government employees to recog

nize, and take steps to defuse, situations that invite compromised behav
ior. "421 Finally, although these rules should not make public perceptions
germane to the resolution of individual cases, the very existence and en
forcement of these rules could be expected to bolster public confidence
indirectly.
A focus on corrupting tendencies can make a useful contribution to
the continuing evolution of ethics regulation, even if the appearance
standard itself is renounced. This is essentially the position advocated
by the ABA committee just mentioned. In its 1993 report on govern
ment ethics, the committee said that "appearance" concerns were perti
nent to conflict-of-interest rules in the sense that such rules should ad
dress "the

potential for (i.e., the 'appearance'), as well as the fact of,

impropriety." Beyond this role in the delineation of basic rules in the
area, however, " 'appearance of impropriety' is too vague and contesta-

420. See THOMPSON, supra note 28, at 126-27.
421 . Keeping Faith, supra note 33, at 297; cf. DENNIS F. THOMPSON, POLITICAL
ETlilcs AND PUBuc OFFICE 1 1 1-13 (1987) (arguing that, because legislators tend to
rationalize their conduct, efforts to detennine whether they acted for legitimate reasons
should focus not on motives, but on the objective circumstances, such as campaign con
tributions, that may have corrupted their judgment).
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ble a concept to function effectively as an independent benchmark in a
system of ethics regulation," in the committee's view.422
Extrapolating the same logic, the House and Senate should con
tinue to develop rules to regulate practices that, although not inherently
improper, tend to be

associated with improper behavior. At the same

time, however, such a rule-writing process can and should take account
of countervailing values, such as the need to leave room for beneficial
constituent service and reasonable political fundraising opportunities.

An example of this sort of balancing is this article's proposal for a re
quired "decent interval" between acceptance of a campaign contribu
tion and performance of constituent service. That proposal is predicated
on the assumption that, although simultaneity of contributions and ser
vices is not intrinsically corrupt, a prohibition on such temporal over
laps will tend to discourage improper bargains

and will not cause sub

stantial interference with normal campaign fundraising.423
The ABA Committee's approach provides a useful lens through
which to examine a variant on the appearance-of-impropriety test, pro
posed by Professor Dennis Thompson. Acknowledging some of the lim
itations of a test rooted in perceptions, he contends that "the more judi
cious versions of the appearance standard do not refer to appearances at
all. "424 "Properly interpreted," he says, the test "would be better called
a tendency standard because it presumes that under certain institutional
conditions the connection between contributions and services

tends to

be improper."425 In particular, " a connection between contributions and
services should be regarded as corrupt if it takes place under conditions
that would lead citizens reasonably to believe that the contributions are
causing services to be provided without regard to substantive merit or
appropriate fairness. "426
One has to wonder why Thompson characterizes his proposed rule
as an "appearance of impropriety" test at all, as he acknowledges that

422. See Keeping Faith, supra note 33, at 296-97; see also Nolan, supra note 33,
at 77-78 (arguing in executive branch ethics context for use of appearance considera
tions as a basis for writing rules, but not as a test for judging individual conduct).
423. An extant measure that has similarly been established for prophylactic pur
poses is Senate Rule XLI, which provides that only three employees of a Senate staff
may engage in campaign fundraising. Although perhaps not classifiable as an ethics
rule, this requirement does serve to reinforce the line of separation between election
eering efforts and official business. See also 18 U.S.C. § 207(e)(l) (1994) (members
may not lobby Congress for one year after leaving office).
424. THOl'vfPSON, supra note 28, at 124.
425. Id.
426. Id. at 125.
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his proposal does not really depend on appearances.427 Retention of the
familiar language can only serve . to maintain continuity with conven
tional interpretations of the standard - and with those interpretations'
many pitfalls. His proposal is perhaps best understood as a suggestion
that the ethics committees should continue to develop rules to forbid ac
tions that have unhealthy "tendencies." This idea, which is substan
tially equivalent to the ABA Committee's recommendation, deserves to
be pursued.428 Much less attractive, however, is his implication that the
committees should issue a generalized warning to members that they
will face sanctions if they engage in actions that

tend to be associated
in terrorem threat

with impropriety. Using this statement as a vague

would pose the risks of overdeterrence mentioned above. Thompson
does not address those risks at all, and his analysis remains somewhat
·

one-sided as a result.

In the end, it is worth recalling that the ethics enforcement system
does not exist in a vacuum. According to the harsh rules of political
life, members of Congress who fail to heed - or to anticipate changes
in - political morality risk repudiation at the ballot box. Their political
accountability gives them strong incentives to avoid unseemly appear
ances. Yet the imprudent and the unethical are not necessarily the same.
Apprehensions about the legitimacy of legislators' behavior should be
addressed through new categorical rules, such as those discussed in pre
vious sections of this· article, rather than through a standard that is as
open-ended and difficult to contain as "the appearance of impropriety."

427. Although he does phrase the critical inquiry in tenns of objective facts that
would "lead citizens reasonably to believe" the legislator has acted corruptly, this is in
effect no different than an inquiry in which adjudicators ask whether they themselves
believe that the facts would reasonably support that conclusion. In other words, when
one turns from asking what citizens do believe to asking what they should believe, the
citizens become superfluous to the analysis, and allusions to their beliefs become only a
rhetorical device. Thompson could escape this logical dilemma if he were to posit that
the citizens whose conclusions matter under his test possess fewer facts than the ethics
committees do. But he insists that his proposed test revolves around well-informed and
reasonable perceptions. See id. at 127, 129. He also argues that the ethics committees
could elaborate on the meaning of his standard through case law over time, thus imply
ing that the standard would not depend in any substantial way on "perceptions" at all.
See id. at 128-29.
·

428. Even in this context, however, the slogan "appearance of impropriety" seems
unhelpful and could even hamper the full development of the kind of strictures that
Thompson envisions. The phrase connotes conduct that, in the view of infonned observ
ers, is probably associated with impropriety - the member is "apparently" acting im
properly. Yet the rationales for prophylactic rules, as described above, do not suggest
that they must be so confined. In some circumstances such measures could legitimately
be used to reach conduct that is occasionally or possibly associated with impropriety, if
ethics authorities see little or no reason to protect the conduct from overregulation.
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CONCLUSION
This article began with an assertion that the ethical dimensions of
congressional constituent service give rise to an exceptionally complex
set of issues. The breadth of these issues should now be evident in light
of this article's lengthy tour through such disparate topics as representa
tion theory, ethics theory, empirically oriented political science, and the
case law on administrative law and criminal corruption. Yet the scope
of the article's discussion has largely been driven by its premise that
proposed refonns in this area would touch upon some of the central re
sponsibilities of congressional life. At least some of the time, legisla
tors' advocacy of constituents' interests before administrative agencies
serves as a beneficial check on executive branch indifference or over
reaching. Similarly, the acquisition of campaign contributions is an in
escapable incident of the political competition in which elected office
holders must regularly participate. Although both casework and political
fundraising involve elements of self-interest that invite continuing scru
tiny by the ethics committees, their respective roles in the political pro
cess give the committees good reasons to remain circumspect about reg
ulating them.
The tension between ideals of legislative ethics and the legitimate
needs of the political system leads naturally in the direction of compro
mise solutions and narrow distinctions. The foregoing pages have sug
gested a few ways in which a balance might be struck in specific con
texts. One suggested principle would normally preclude a member of
Congress from exerting strong pressure on an agency when fonnal ad
ministrative proceedings have commenced or are about to commence,
or when the member tries to induce the agency to act on grounds that
controlling law renders impermissible. In other situations, however,
pressure generally should be tolerated. Another suggestion was that the
ethics rules should forbid a member from soliciting a campaign contri
bution from a constituent at about the same time, or immediately after,
she intercedes with an agency on the constituent's behalf; but if she
waits for a "decent interval of time" before seeking the contribution,
no violation should be found.
This article's specific appraisals of current and potential ethics
rules are certainly debatable, depending as they do on contestable fac
tual assumptions and a pragmatic process of reconciling competing in
terests. The principal aim here, however, is not to supply definitive an
swers to particular controversies but, instead, to explain and exemplify
a general approach to thinking about issues of legislative ethics. This
approach maintains that it is not enough to leap directly from the reali
zation that a given legislative practice can be abused to the conclusion

October 1996]

Congressional Ethics

109

that it should be suppressed. One must also go on to explore, to the ex
tent possible, the workability of rules that would regulate the practice,
the prevalence of the abuses, and the consequences of suppressing the
practice for the political system as a whole.
General acceptance of this analytical approach might at least facili
tate resolution of some of the unsettled questions in this area. Hair
trigger suspicion of the normal processes of constituent advocacy and
campaign fundraising is a common enough feature of popular debate on
congressional ethics, but it is hardly a constructive response to the com
plex issues that the Keating case raises.429 Perhaps, if thoughtful mem
bers of Congress and thoughtful segments of the general public could
mutually agree to consider the issues from the more comprehensive per
spective offered here, they could improve the chances that their solu
tions to these problems would be both wise and broadly acceptable.
APPENDIX

As a result of the project for which this study was prepared, the

House of Delegates of the American Bar Association endorsed the fol
lowing recommended guidelines regarding congressional constituent
service on February 5, 1996:430
BE IT RESOLVED, that the American Bar Association recom
mends that * * *

2. In order to obtain the benefits to American citizens of constitu
ent service contacts with administrative agencies by individual Mem
bers of Congress, while minimizing the risk that agencies will be in
duced to violate the substantive arid procedural statutes that govern their
decisions, Members of Congress and their staffs should:
A. comply with legal restrictions on ex parte contacts in formal
proceedings by avoiding communications with the responsible agency
decisionmakers that bear on the merits of pending cases;
B. observe special restrictions on ex parte contacts in informal pro
ceedings set forth in statutes or agency regulations;
429.

A genuine commitment to improving ethics in government .
requires resisting
the simple, and popular, assumption that more regulation is better regulation.
Those who shape public policy must summon the diligence and fortitude to take
on the difficult, and seldom applauded, task of thoughtfully identifying not only
the areas that need more rules, but also the areas that need fewer rules and the
areas that need different rules.
Keeping Faith, supra note 33, at 340; see Abner J. Mikva. From Politics to Paranoia,
WASH. POST, Nov. 26, 1995, at C2 (decrying excesses in policing of ethics).
430. Part I of the resolution, which concerned the procedures by which the House
and Senate enforce their ethics rules, is not reprinted here.
.

•
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C. cooperate with efforts of agencies, as required by statute or reg
ulation, to maintain logs that detail contacts between their personnel
and persons outside the agency, including the Members and staff of
Congress;
D. refrain from asking agencies to consider factors that are not per
missible under the statutes that govern their programs;
E. work with staff of the agencies to ensure that oversight proceed
ings consider general issues of law and policy and avoid reference to
any particular pending formal proceeding before an agency;

F. avoid advocating a constituent's position before an agency with

out knowledge of its merits;
G. for investigations in which an agency is actively considering in
itiation of civil or administrative enforcement proceedings or referral
for criminal prosecution:
i. avoid any contacts that are relevant to the merits with agency of
ficials who may later serve in an adjudicative role, and

ii. for contacts with agency personnel who have investigative or
enforcement responsibilities, ensure that any advocacy of a constituent's

claims is well-founded.
H. minimize the risks of undue linkage between contributions and
constituent service by:
i. neither soliciting nor accepting a substantial campaign contribu
tion from an individual who the Member knows is currently attempting
or has recently attempted to induce the Member to intervene before a
federal agency, and

ii. varying neither the initiation nor the vigor of a constituent ser
vice contact with an agency according to the status of the requester as a
contributor.
I. These guidelines do not require Members of Congress and their
staffs to refrain from:
i. making a referral of a constituent's inquiry, with a request that
the agency give it due consideration, and

ii. urging prompt conclusion of a matter in whatever manner the
merits justify.

